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Abstract
This thesis uses a sample of 807 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over
the period 1987-2013 to investigate the differences in financing decisions, leverage
adjustments and trade credit policies between innovative firms that report R&D and
non-innovative firms that do not report R&D. This focus is motivated by the marked
increase in intangible investments amongst firms in the UK, and the need to re-
examine the overlooked interdependence of financing and investment decisions. The
empirical analyses in this thesis use a combination of ordinary least squares with
fixed effects (OLS FE thereon) and system Generalised Method of Moments (system
GMM thereon) as the main estimation techniques. The results show that leverage
is persistent, with innovative firms adopting similar financing structures as non-
innovative firms despite being supposedly constrained. Further, innovative firms
consistently adjust their leverage towards a target faster than non-innovative firms.
This result suggests that innovative firms are more active in managing their capital
structure, perhaps because they face higher costs of deviating from target relative to
non-innovative firms. The results also show that innovative and non-innovative firms
have different credit policies, where the former give (use) more (less) trade credit than
the latter. Finally, analyses of time variation in leverage and credit adjustments,
which are largely overlooked in the literature, suggest that such variations are im-
portant in understanding corporate decisions. This is especially pertinent given the
economic shift from predominantly manufacturing based sectors towards technology
and service based sectors. Overall, the results show that investment type has a sig-
nificant effect on corporate decisions beyond the factors reported in the literature.
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Despite advancements in the literature, several questions on corporate financing de-
cisions remain unresolved.1 What are the determinants of capital structure? Do firms
have a target financing structure? If they do, what is the speed of adjustment towards
the target capital structure? What explains the observed divergence and the form of
the divergence in financing patterns? Further, the transition of economies from pre-
dominantly manufacturing sectors towards service and technology sectors has raised
new questions on how these changes in corporate investments affect financing de-
cisions.2 This economic transition entails a change in corporate balance sheets and
composition of firms, which has implications on corporate decisions. Specifically, the
marked increase in R&D, which has coincided with significant changes in corporate
assets (e.g., decreases in tangible assets (collateral) and increases in intangible as-
sets), should result in the adoption of conservative financing structures as managers
use capital structure to manage operating risk. These predictions are in line with
Krainer (2014) who formulates a model in which asset adjustments result in changes
in expected income and operating risk of firms, and managers respond by adjusting
capital structure to reduce or increase operating risk to levels that conform with the
risk aversion of shareholders. However, firms appear not to reduce corporate debt in
a way that offsets the increase in operating risks arising from the increase in R&D
and the decrease in collateral (tangible assets). Rather, corporate debt has remained
largely persistent with a general upward drift characterised by several spikes for both
innovative and non-innovative firms.3 The seemingly contradictory trends in corpo-
1Recent reviews highlight several limitations in the extant literature which include mixed results
even within the US where studies are more concentrated, mis-specified models, mis-measurement of
variables, low explanatory power of existing models and omission of important factors such as the role
of non-financial stakeholders, financial contracts, and value effects of leverage (see, Frank and Goyal,
2009; Graham and Leary, 2011; Oztekin, 2015; Parsons and Titman, 2007).
2Several report marked increases in the proportion of firms is undertaking innovative investments
as economies shift towards service and technological sectors (e.g., Aghion et al., 2004; Damodaran,
1999, 2009; Lim et al., 2014; Moshirian et al., 2013; Sporleder et al., 2002).
3The rise in intangible investments (with low collateral values), which are more prone to asset
substitution and information asymmetry problems, should be accompanied by a decrease in corporate
leverage. However, contrary to these expectations, the appetite for corporate debt (leverage) in the
UK has not subsided, but has been increasing from an average of 13% in the 1980s to over 17% just
before the onset of the recent global financial crisis (as shown in Figure 3.1 of Chapter 3). Similarly,
several studies in the US also report marked increases in corporate gearing (debt-to-equity ratios)
over time (e.g., Almeida et al., 2012; Campello et al., 2010, 2011a,b; Carmassi et al., 2009; Chava and
Purnanandam, 2011; Dang et al., 2014a; Kahle and Stulz, 2013; Miglo, 2013). In particular, Graham
2
rate investments and financing structure highlight the need for a detailed study of
the linkages between financing and real decisions.4
The marked changes in corporate investments and their implications on corporate
decisions have been largely overlooked in the literature, with most studies focusing
on fixed capital investments.5 Yet, this decrease in collateral and increase in in-
tangible investments appear to be a long-term phenomena that has not resulted in
marked changes in corporate financing decisions. Moreover, studies on the relation-
ship between fixed capital investments (real decisions) and financing decisions often
adopt a ceteris-paribus framework over short horizons (see, Dammon and Senbet,
1988; Dang, 2011), which, according to Buera and Kaboski (2012), does not capture
changes in firm compositions in the long-run.6,7 Using the predictions of the model
by Krainer (2014), innovative firms should respond to the increasing risk in their
investment portfolio by adopting conservative financing policies as firms use capital
structure to manage risk. According to Aghion et al. (2004), firms with a low propor-
et al. (2015) report a threefold increase in corporate debt for non-financial firms in the US over the past
century, while DeAngelo and Roll (2015) report a wholesale abandonment of conservative financing
policies in the US after the Second World War. Further, Custódio et al. (2013) report a significant shift
by firms in the US from long-term debt to short-term debt, which is inconsistent with the increase in
operating risks due to changes in corporate investments.
4Chava and Roberts (2008) and Stein (2003) highlight that despite the existence of a general
consensus that financing activities and real decisions are interdependent in the presence of market
imperfections, the exact nature of the relationship is subject to debate.
5The change in corporate investments is marked by a surge in R&D to levels that match or exceed
capital expenditure, and a decrease in tangible assets coupled with a significant increase in intangible
assets. Borisova and Brown (2013) report a fourfold increase in R&D among young firms and a twofold
increase for mature firms in the US over the period from 1980 to 2001. Similarly, Brown and Petersen
(2011) report a significant increases in R&D from 2% over the period 1970-1981 to 6.3% between 1982
and 1993, with R&D increasing further to 10.3% from 1994 to 2006 in the US. Several other studies in
the US report similar marked increases in R&D (e.g., Brown and Petersen, 2011; Falato et al., 2013;
Sporleder et al., 2002). Although studies on the changes in corporate investments outside of the US
are limited, Brown et al. (2012) report that over the period 1995-2007 firms in Europe spend one and
half times more on R&D relative to physical capital.
6The relationship between capital structure and corporate investment is contentious (see, Chava
and Roberts, 2008; Stein, 2003) as studies report mixed and inconclusive results, with one group of
studies reporting a positive relation (e.g., Caglayan and Rashid, 2014; Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005),
while another reports a negative relation (e.g., Aivazian et al., 2005; Dang, 2011; DeAngelo and Ma-
sulis, 1980; Lang et al., 1996). This leaves the question of how do investment (financing) decisions
affect financing (investment) decisions largely open to debate.
7Recent studies over relatively long periods by Frank and Goyal (2009) and Graham et al. (2015)
report interesting changes on corporate financing decisions as the significance of some determinants of
capital structure decreases considerably over time. For example, Frank and Goyal (2009) report that
firm size, growth and inflation are becoming unreliable determinants of capital structure. Recently,
Buera and Kaboski (2012) highlight that studies in corporate finance that only focus on changes within
firms tend to overlook the important effects of changes in the composition of firms on the dynamics in
cash holdings over time.
3
tion of tangible assets and risky investments are less reliant on debt financing as they
are more likely to have high bankruptcy costs. The trade-off theory posits that firms
have an optimal capital structure that is a result of balancing the marginal benefits
of debt (tax shields) with the marginal costs of financial distress (bankruptcy costs).8
Following on this prediction, innovative firms are, thus, more likely to actively ad-
just capital structure towards the target as they face high costs of deviating from
the target. This prediction will be examined in this thesis by comparing the speed of
adjustment of innovative and non-innovative firms, both cross-sectionally and over
time. The market timing theory also posits that market timing increases with in-
formation asymmetry, which suggests that innovative firms that have more opaque
investments should show high levels of market timing behaviour (see, Alti, 2006;
Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Elliott et al., 2008; Jung et al.,
1996; Heaton, 2002; Myers, 2003). Further, the theoretical literature suggests two
main channels through which financing decisions of firms with unique investments
(innovative firms) may differ from traditional firms (non-innovative firms). These
channels are: information asymmetry problems (see, Myers, 1984; Myers and Ma-
jluf, 1984) and control rights (see, Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart and Moore, 1995).9
Empirical studies are yet to systematically test these theoretical predictions.
This thesis fills the gap in the literature by investigating the differences in financing
structure, leverage adjustments and trade credit policies between innovative firms
that report R&D and non-innovative firms that do not report R&D. Further, the ma-
jority of extant studies focus on the US, which limits the generalisability of the results
to other economies that have different legal, institutional and macroeconomic envi-
ronments. Oztekin and Flannery (2012) report that legal, institutional and macroe-
conomic factors have a significant effect on capital structure. Similarly, a survey by
8See, Bradley et al. (1984), Brennan and Schwartz (1984), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Goldstein
et al. (2001), Hennessy and Whited (2005), Ju et al. (2005), Kane et al. (1984), Kraus and Litzenberger
(1973), and Strebulaev (2007).
9The control rights proposition posits that when a firm has less tangible assets (more intangible
assets), outside investors will insist on having control rights over the firm’s decisions so as to satisfy
their ex-ante participation with incomplete information (Hart and Moore, 1995). This may result in
innovative firms relying more on retained earnings and debt financing, which all do not result in
dilution (via heavily discounted equity issues) or the need to cede control to outside investors in a bid
to satisfy their ex-ante participation constraint.
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Graham and Harvey (2001) emphasises the need for concerted research efforts in
smaller sub-samples in view of the failure of large cross-sectional studies in explain-
ing the observed variations in corporate capital structure. The de-compositional ap-
proach used in the analyses in this thesis allows for an examination of the degree to
which the different forms of corporate investment explain the observed variations in
corporate decisions (financing structure, leverage adjustments and trade credit poli-
cies). The empirical studies in this thesis on the effect of changing firm composition
and corporate investments on corporate decisions, adds new insights on the evolu-
tion of the relationship between financing and investment decisions.10 The analysis
of Chapter 4 will examine whether innovative firms use less debt financing than non-
innovative firms as predicted by the information asymmetry proposition (see, Myers,
1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), or more debt financing as advocated by the control
rights proposition (see, Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart and Moore, 1995). Further, the
analysis of Chapter 5 examines the prediction of the trade-off theory that the speed of
adjustment increases with costs of deviating from a target capital structure. Follow-
ing on the predictions of the trade-off theory, innovative firms that are likely to face
higher costs of deviating from target and bankruptcy costs should more actively ad-
just leverage towards the target than non-innovative firm (that face relatively lower
bankruptcy costs). Similarly, Faulkender et al. (2012), Leary and Roberts (2005) and
Strebulaev (2007) report that firms adjust leverage faster if the benefits outweigh
the associated costs of adjusting towards the target. We examine this prediction by
comparing the speed of adjustment for innovative and non-innovative firm and over
time. The focus on time variations adds new insights on the evolution of corporate
financing decisions that have not been examined in the literature.
The following sections present a summary of the main contributions of the thesis and
an overview of its structure.
10The rising corporate debt levels is an empirical irregularity that raises interesting questions on
how changes in corporate investments affect financing structure. In addition, questions on how man-
agers decide on capital structure (Myers, 2003) and whether capital structure affects real decisions
such as investment (Lang et al., 1996) or firm value (Korteweg, 2010; Van Binsbergen et al., 2010)
still remain open to debate despite decades of extensive research.
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1.2 Main contributions
This thesis contributes to the literature on financing decisions through three interre-
lated empirical studies on financing structure, leverage adjustments, and trade credit
policies. The focus on how different types of corporate investment affect corporate de-
cisions, in particular, financing structure, target financing and trade credit policies,
provides new insights on the relatively unexplored interdependence between financ-
ing and investment activities and time variations in corporate decisions. The need
to understand this interdependence in corporate decisions and how it changes over
time is increasingly becoming important in light of the marked changes in corporate
investments and corporate balance sheets as economies shift towards technological
and service sectors.11
The first contribution of the analyses is the documentation of evidence of an evolving
relationship between financing and investment decisions. There is limited prior work
on the interdependence of corporate decisions, and where considered, has mostly
been under a ceteris-paribus condition that does not account for the dynamic na-
ture of corporate decisions. This study fills this gap in the literature by adopting
a de-compositional analysis to examine financing decisions and the determinants of
financing structure. Further, the study compares the financing decisions of innova-
tive and non-innovative firms in the UK over a relatively long period from 1987 to
2013.12 The focus on the differences between innovative and non-innovative firms
provides new evidence on the evolving nature of the relationship between financing
and investment decisions. The results show that leverage has remained persistent
with an upward drift despite the marked increase in R&D and decrease in collat-
eral values (tangible assets). This result is inconsistent with theoretical predictions
11Recent models by Buera and Kaboski (2012) and Krainer (2014) show that changes in the econ-
omy and corporate investments have significant effects on cash holdings and risk management poli-
cies.
12The application of a de-compositional approach on leverage (leverage is divided into total debt,
net-debt, long-term debt or total liabilities) is in line with Welch (2004) who highlight that while lever-
age on aggregate may exhibit relative stability or persistence over time, as Lemmon et al. (2008) and
Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) report, its components show greater variability over time. Similarly,
DeAngelo and Roll (2015) report that the observed stability in leverage is a temporary phenomenon
which only occurs at lower levels of debt financing as firms actively change their capital structure in
the long-run.
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that firms reduce leverage to manage increases in operating risk (see, Krainer, 2014)
arising from changes in a firm's investment portfolio. However, leverage increases
with intangible assets in a similar way as with tangible assets. Further, the the-
sis reports significant time variation in the relationship between financing structure
and corporate investments. This, previously overlooked feature, helps explain the
mixed results in the literature that is split between studies that report a positive
relationship and others that report a negative relationship between financing struc-
ture and investment decisions.13 This investigated aspect on time variations adds
new insights on the relatively overlooked effects of changes in firm characteristics on
corporate decisions, more specifically, financing policies.
The second contribution is the quantification of the speed of adjustment, and the de-
gree to which different types of corporate investment (R&D and capital expenditure)
affect target financing behaviour and time variations in the speed of adjustment. Em-
pirical evidence reported in the literature on target financing behaviour is decidedly
mixed, and is often reported through analyses of short-time horizons (mostly 5-year
periods), which does not allow for an adequate examination of the effect of changes in
firm compositions on leverage adjustments. By examining one source of heterogene-
ity (differences in corporate investments) in leverage adjustments that has not been
considered in the literature, this thesis provides the first attempt at understanding
how investment types affect target financing behaviour, thereby, adding insights on
the often contentious relationship between financing and real decisions.14 Time vari-
ations in leverage adjustments have been overlooked in the literature, which has
focused mostly on cross-sectional variations. A study of the time variations in the
13The results in the extant literature on the relationship between investment and financing deci-
sions are rather mixed (see, Dammon and Senbet, 1988) as Caglayan and Rashid (2014) and Lyandres
and Zhdanov (2005) report a significant positive relationship while Aivazian et al. (2005), DeAngelo
and Masulis (1980), Dang (2011) and Lang et al. (1996) report a significant negative relationship.
14Ever since the irrelevancy theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and the 'separation principle'
which are premised on the proposition that financing and investment decisions are made indepen-
dently (see, Jackson et al., 2013), the linkages between financing activities and real decisions in the
presence of market imperfection are still ambiguous (see, Chava and Roberts, 2008; Stein, 2003).
Although several studies have converged on the idea that the financing and real decisions are not in-
dependent, especially in the presence of market imperfections (e.g., Kim, 1978; Krasker, 1986; Kraus
and Litzenberger, 1973; Miller, 1977; Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf,
1984; Scott, 1976), the exact channels through which they relate is a subject of considerable debate
(Stein, 2003).
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speed of adjustment provides information on the ease with which firms can access
financing, and how access to capital markets affects target financing behaviour.15
The final contribution of this thesis emerges from empirical analyses of the deter-
minants of trade credit and time variations in the relationship between trade credit
and short-term debt, and between trade credit and cash holdings. These analyses
also compare trade credit decisions and trade credit adjustments between innova-
tive and non-innovative firms. The focus on the time variation in the sensitivity
of trade credit to cash and short-term debt is motivated by the considerable debate
on whether trade credit is a substitute or a complement to other forms of financ-
ing (see, Ferrando and Mulier, 2013; Giannetti et al., 2011; Love et al., 2007; Yang,
2011b).16 The analyses extend the literature by showing that there are significant
time variation in the relationship between trade credit and other forms of financing.
Further analyses that use partial adjustment models are conducted to examine the
trade credit adjustments. A reported slow to moderate speed of adjustment supports
the existence of adjustment costs, which impede firms from fully adjusting towards
the optimal credit level. Dynamic adjustments in trade credit have largely been over-
looked in the literature despite the importance of trade credit in alleviating product
market and capital imperfections, and that customers who are accustomed to getting
goods on credit expect this practice to continue.
Overall, the asymmetries arising from corporate investments that are the focus of
this thesis have been overlooked in the literature, yet, our results show that they are
a significant factor in understanding heterogeneity in corporate financing decisions.
This result is new to the literature and remains significant even after controlling for
other factors affecting corporate financing decisions.
15Recently, Faulkender et al. (2012) highlight the need to distinguish active leverage adjustments
(arising from accessing capital markets to issue or retire securities) from passive changes (due to
changes in operations or profitability) in capital structure so as to provide more focused tests of theo-
retical predictions on target financing behaviour. Similarly, Hovakimian et al. (2004) and Hovakimian
and Li (2010) highlight that it is better to focus on refinancing points when studying financing deci-
sions.
16Meltzer (1960) and Yang (2011b) report that the relationship between trade credit and short-term
debt changes with the monetary policy.
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1.3 Policy implications
The results in this thesis show significant differences in capital structure, target fi-
nancing behaviour, and trade credit policies between innovative and non-innovative
firms. These differences in financing policies have important policy implications con-
sidering the increasing dominance of the technology and service sectors.
The slow-to-moderate speed of adjustment reported from the analyses in this the-
sis should be a major concern to both managers and policymakers as the speed of
adjustment is an indirect indicator of the level of financial constraints. This slow-
to-moderate speed of adjustment that we report suggests that firms in the UK still
face considerable levels of financial constraints that deter them from fully adjusting
towards the target. Further, investors need to take into consideration the capital
structure of the firm when evaluating investments as deviating from optimal capi-
tal structure has significant negative effects on firm value. The costs of deviation
from the target increase with bankruptcy or financial distress costs that are rela-
tively higher for innovative firms. The slow-to-moderate speed of adjustment sug-
gests "inertia" on the part of managers and that firms still face significant adjust-
ments costs. Further, the results also show that the "inertia" is relatively higher for
non-innovative firms that can potentially engage in non-value maximising activities
such as abuse of free-cash flows given that they face lower financial constraints and
bankruptcy costs. Focusing on the "inertia" in adjusting capital structure towards the
target, investors should put pressure on firms to ensure that the managers actively
adjust towards the optimal capital structure. Investors can engage in shareholder
activism that will force managers to actively adjust towards the target and maximise
shareholder value. At policy level, policymakers should actively implement reforms
that help ease the significant financial constraints faced by firms, especially, firms
that invest in innovation. The reforms could take the forms of regulations that allow
for new instruments to finance innovation as most innovative firms lack the collat-
eral required to access financing under collateral-based lending approaches.
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The significant decrease in trade credit should be worrisome to both small firms and
policymakers alike as it has traditionally been a major form of financing for small or
constrained firms that cannot access bank loans or capital markets. This decrease
in trade credit highlights the need for firms that ordinarily relied on trade credit to
look elsewhere for short-term financing. The decrease negatively affects the growth of
small firms, which will reduce economic growth since small firms employ a significant
proportion of the labour force and are a major driver of economic growth. Further, the
decrease in trade credit will also harm innovation as most of the innovation is made
by small firms that have limited access to traditional sources of financing. Banks can
help by providing readily accessible short-term debt on favourable terms to small or
constrained firms if there is government support or guarantees. Policymakers can
help reduce financial constraints faced by small firms either through implementing
regulations that promote the financing of innovating or by setting up new funds or
financial structures that are earmarked towards small or constrained firms.
The results also show a significant increase in intangible assets as the economy is
increasingly shifting towards technology and service sectors. This shift implies that
firms will face binding financial constraints as they have less tangible assets that can
be pledged when accessing bank loans. Policymakers can further promote the lend-
ing against intangibles by putting in place enabling legislation for banks to extend
loans collateralised by intangible assets. The need to channel capital towards tech-
nology and service sectors is increasingly becoming more apparent as economies are
shifting towards technology and service sectors. Further, the financing of innovation
should be prioritised as it has several positive spill-over effects on other sectors and
economic growth.
Overall, the results in this thesis show a marked shift in corporate investments to-
wards intangibles, which may expose firms to binding financing constraints given
that traditional forms of financing such as trade credit have decreased as well. This
calls for an implementation of reforms that are aimed at increasing access to capital
markets of firms that would not ordinarily get financing under the collateral-based-
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lending approaches currently being used by banks.
1.4 Data and research methodology
The sample used in the analyses of this thesis consists of 817 firms (8,396 firm-year
observations) in the manufacturing, extraction and construction sectors listed on the
main official list of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) over the period 1987-2013.17
The data on all firm specific variables is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream,
while that of macroeconomic variables is drawn from the Bank of England. The sam-
ple period is restricted by data unavailability as the reporting of R&D only became
compulsory in 1989 in the UK (see, Aghion et al., 2004). The focus on the UK is
motivated by the concentration of studies on the US, which limits the generalisation
of results to other economies.18 The sample spans a comparatively long period of 27
years which allows for an examination of the effects of changes in firm composition
on corporate decisions.19
In this thesis, panel data models are used to investigate the factors that affect financ-
ing and trade credit policies. Using panel data allows for modelling of cross-sectional
dynamics over time, while simultaneously controlling for the potential endogeneity
of the variables used. Prior studies on corporate decisions rely on panel data mod-
els that include fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant features of
the firms (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2006; Brav, 2009; Cook and Tang, 2010; Dang et al.,
2012; Denis, 2011; Faulkender et al., 2012; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Lemmon
et al., 2008; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Oztekin, 2015). In this thesis, the models
are estimated using a combination of ordinary least squares with fixed effects (OLS
FE thereon) and system Generalised Method of Moments (system GMM thereon),
17Several studies exclude the financial and utility sectors that are heavily regulated (e.g., Fama
and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Oztekin, 2015). According to
Brav (2009), the exclusion of the financial and utility sectors allows for a more focused analyses of
companies with organisational structures that are most relevant to capital structure theories.
18Antoniou et al. (2008), Oztekin (2015) and Oztekin and Flannery (2012) report macroeconomic
and institutional have a significant effect on corporate decisions.
19Recently, Buera and Kaboski (2012) highlight that studies over short periods tend to overlook
important dynamics on the effect of changes in firm compositions on liquidity management decisions.
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with the system GMM being used as the main estimation technique.20 However, re-
sults using other estimation techniques such as ordinary least squares (OLS thereon)
(Dang, 2013a; Dang et al., 2014a; Ghaly et al., 2015; Love et al., 2007), Anderson
Hsiao Instrumental Variables (AH IV thereon) (Dang et al., 2014a), Instrumental
Variable Generalised Method of Moments (IV GMM thereon) (Baum et al., 2006),
Difference Generalised Method of Moments (DIFF GMM thereon) (Dang et al., 2012,
2014a) and Fractional Dependent Variable (DPF thereon) (Elsas and Florysiak, 2013)
are also presented in appendices, where applicable, for robustness and to facilitate
comparisons with prior studies that use similar estimation techniques. Further, fol-
lowing Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Hovakimian and Vulanovic (2010), estimation
results are reported on the probability of issuing or retiring debt and equity through
probit regressions with a binary dependent variable that is equal one if a firm issues
or repurchases debt or equity, and zero otherwise.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature.
It motivates the analyses in this thesis by discussing the main strands in the litera-
ture and identifying relevant gaps therein.
Chapter 3 presents a description of the data, the data screening process used, and
variable definitions. The chapter also presents information on the sample composi-
tion and trends on the variables used in the analyses, and concludes by presenting
a summary of the characteristics of the data used in the three empirical chapters
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
Chapter 4 contains the first empirical analysis, which investigates the determinants
of financing structure and the differences in financing structure between innovative
and non-innovative firms. The analysis also investigates time variations in the re-
lationship between leverage (including its components) and corporate investments,
20Several studies in corporate finance use similar estimation techniques (e.g., Dang, 2013b; Faulk-
ender et al., 2008; Flannery and Hankins, 2013; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Oztekin and Flannery, 2012).
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and the determinants of the probability of accessing capital markets.
Chapter 5 contains the second empirical analysis which examines the speed of adjust-
ment of leverage to a target level with a focus on the differences in target financing
behaviour between innovative and non-innovative firms. The chapter then presents
an examination of the effects of asymmetries (over-levered and under-levered firms)
and financing deficits on leverage adjustments. Finally, the chapter presents an in-
vestigation of the time variation in the speed of adjustment.
Chapter 6 is the third empirical chapter. It presents an analysis of the determinants
of trade credit, trade credit adjustments and the differences in trade credit policies
between innovative and non-innovative firms. The analysis also examines the re-
lationships between short-term debt and trade credit, and cash holdings and trade
credit, and how these relationships change over time. Finally, the chapter presents
an investigation of trade credit adjustments.







This chapter presents a review of the literature on corporate financing and trade
credit decisions. The attention devoted to the study of corporate finance decision
making highlights that financing decisions are amongst the most important corporate
decisions. Although the literature investigates the determinants of the financing
structure (which includes firm characteristics and macroeconomic conditions), the
question on how firms decide on capital structure remains open to debate.1 This
chapter presents a review of literature which motivate the research in this thesis.
The rest of this chapter is structured into two sections. Section 2.2 presents a review
of the main research themes and results on capital structure. Section 2.3 presents a
review of the literature on trade credit that highlights the main themes and results
of prior studies.
2.2 Capital structure: Literature review
2.2.1 Capital structure theories
The Modigliani and Miller theory
The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) on capital structure irrelevancy
(MM theory henceforth) marked the beginning of formal studies on corporate financ-
ing decisions. The MM theory posits that real decisions, such as those on corporate
investment, are independent of financing decisions (the mix of debt and equity) in
perfect market.2 According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) any differences in firm
values arising from differences in capital structure are eliminated through arbitrage
as investors engage in "home-made gearing" by borrowing and lending on their per-
sonal accounts. This arbitrage-based irrelevancy proposition in which investors undo
any increase in firm value arising from an increase in gearing through "home-made
1Recent surveys highlight the mixed results in the literature and low explanatory power of existing
models of capital structure (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009; Graham and Leary, 2011; Oztekin, 2015;
Welch, 2011). Similarly, several studies (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2007b, 2009; Myers, 2003) highlight
that the major limiting factor in the understanding of how firms make financing decisions is the lack
of a unified theory of capital structure in the presence of several competing propositions.
2In perfect markets there are many market participants, no transaction costs, no taxes and bor-
rowing or lending at the risk free rate.
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gearing" or "in multiple equilibria" supports the hypothesis that financing decisions
have no effect on firm value (see, Auerbach and King, 1983; Miller, 1977).
The prediction of the MM theory that financing decisions have no effect on firm
value generated a huge debate which divided scholars into two broad groups. Miller
(1991) argues that managers should not worry over "second-order" and largely "self-
correcting problems" such as capital structure.3 Similarly, Korteweg (2010) and
Van Binsbergen et al. (2010) report low marginal net contributions of capital struc-
ture to firm value, with estimates of 4% and 3.5% on average, respectively. Graham
and Leary (2011) also highlight that changes in leverage have a small effect on firm
value. However, several scholars subsequently criticised the narrow view of financing
decisions in the MM theory (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Myers,
1977; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).4 According to Miller (1988) the MM theory shows,
by implication, the factors that are important through highlighting the conditions
under which financing decisions do not affect firm value (in perfect capital markets).
The dis-satisfaction with the central predictions of the MM theory has resulted in
the emergence of several other theories (which include the trade off theory, pecking
order theory and market timing theory) that predict a significant effect of financing
decisions on firm value. Literature on these theories is reviewed next.
Trade-off theory
The trade-off theory posits that firms decide on the optimal capital structure by
balancing the marginal benefits of debt (mainly the tax-deductability of interest on
debt) with the marginal costs of financial distress (see, Bradley et al., 1984; Brennan
and Schwartz, 1984; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Goldstein et al., 2001; Hennessy
3Several studies on the relationship between financing and investment decisions report mixed
results. For example, Mauer and Triantis (1994) report an insignificant relationship while Lyan-
dres and Zhdanov (2005) and Rashid and Caglayan (2012) report a significant positive relationship
and Aivazian et al. (2005), Dang (2011), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Lang et al. (1996) report
a significant negative relationship. Chava and Roberts (2008) and Stein (2003) highlight that the
ambiguity on the relationship arises from difficulties encountered in establishing the exact channels
through which financing activities affect real decisions (such as investment or hiring) in the presence
of market imperfections.
4Harris and Raviv (1991) offer a rich review of studies that show the failure of the irrelevancy
theorem in imperfect capital markets.
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and Whited, 2005; Ju et al., 2005; Kane et al., 1984; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973;
Strebulaev, 2007). This further incorporation of taxes in the original MM theory by
Modigliani and Miller (1963) shows that firm value increases with debt. The impli-
cation of trade-off theory is that firms should finance their operations entirely with
debt if there are no offsetting costs to debt. However, an increase in debt exposes
firms to higher levels of financial distress or bankruptcy costs which may offset the
benefits of using debt. In the presence of such costs, the optimal capital structure
is a result of a trade-off between the benefits and costs of using debt (Kraus and
Litzenberger, 1973). Further extensions of the trade-off theory to incorporate other
benefits of debt, such as the disciplinary role of debt on the potential abuse of free
cash-flows by managers (see, Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the mit-
igation of shareholder-manager conflicts (see, Stulz, 1990), show that firms seek to
balance the financial distress costs and the benefits of using debt. Given these predic-
tions of the trade-off theory, we posit that innovative firms are more likely to adjust
their capital structure faster than non-innovative firms as they face high bankruptcy
costs and high costs of deviating from the optimal capital structure. This prediction
is in line with Borisova and Brown (2013), Brown et al. (2012) and Moshirian et al.
(2013) who report that innovative investments are more susceptible to high informa-
tion asymmetry, asset substitution, longer investment horizons, and low pledgeable
value issues. These characteristics increase bankruptcy costs and costs of deviating
from the optimal capital structure, which would motivate innovative firms to actively
rebalance capital structure.
Pecking order theory
Unlike the trade-off theory which assumes that firms have a target capital structure,
the pecking order theory posits that capital structure is a result of distinctive prefer-
ences for different financing sources (internal and external sources). The prevalence
of information asymmetry and adverse selection costs in financial markets results
in firms preferring internal to external financing sources as firms seek to minimise
the adverse costs of security issuance (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984).5 The
5The pecking order is attributed to an article by Donaldson (1961).
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theory postulates that financing costs increase with asymmetric information. This re-
sults in hierarchical ranking of financing sources, with retained earnings being most
preferred, followed by debt and lastly, equity. Adverse selection models by Myers
and Majluf (1984) motivate the hierarchical preferences through the argument that,
due to information asymmetry, investors always view the firm as being overvalued
and managers as opportunists who want to take advantage of them by issuing over-
valued securities. The low value attached by investors to new equity issues, which
results in under pricing, highlights that information asymmetry is the main driver of
the hierarchical preferences in the pecking order theory.6
The predictions of the pecking order theory point towards managers accumulating
financial slack (retaining earnings) so as to avoid having to issue securities (in un-
favourable periods) and incur issuance costs (Leary and Roberts, 2010). The presence
of transaction costs and differences in required rates of return results in hierarchical
preferences as predicted by the pecking order theory.7 Given the direct variation of
financing costs (issuing costs, required rates of return and dilution costs) with infor-
mation asymmetry, firms seeking to maximise profits will show higher preferences
for internal financing sources than external alternatives.8 The pecking order hier-
archical ranking of financing sources should be more significant for innovative firms
that have higher levels of information asymmetry than for non-innovative firms. This
should result in innovative firms being more reliant on retained earnings, followed
by debt, and lastly equity. Equity is likely to be more costly to issue for innovative
firms (leads to dilution as new investors would only buy shares if they are heavily
discounted) as the new investors will insist on having more control rights to compen-
6Several studies report underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs thereon) due to informa-
tion asymmetry (see, Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Bessler et al., 2014; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003;
Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Ritter and Welch, 2002; Ritter, 2003).
7The significance of transaction costs is diminishing due to technological advancements and mar-
ket integration. However, Philippon (2015) reports that the cost of intermediation in the US has in-
creased (remained relatively unchanged in some periods) in a way which suggest that improvements
in information technologies have not filtered through to capital markets.
8The control rights proposition posits that when a firm has less tangible assets (more intangible
assets), outside investors will insist on having control rights over the firm’s decisions so as to satisfy
their ex-ante participation with incomplete information (Hart and Moore, 1995). Further, the required
rate of return increases with information asymmetry (see, Borisova and Brown, 2013; Brown and
Petersen, 2009, 2011; Brown et al., 2012; Moshirian et al., 2013).
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sate for the inherent high levels of information asymmetry associated with innova-
tive investments (see, Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart and Moore, 1995). Information
asymmetry results in the persistent underpricing of new issues, with this underpric-
ing being more pronounced for firms with high levels of intangible investments.9
Agency theory
Central to agency theory is the proposition that in the presence of information asym-
metry, managers may exploit their informational advantage by making decisions that
further their self-interests rather than those of shareholders. Early studies on agency
theory include Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), Narayanan (1988)
and Ross (1977). Following on the propositions of the agency theory, information
asymmetry arises as managers (insiders) are better informed about the prospects of
the firm than investors (outsiders). In this environment, which is characterised by an
uneven distribution of information, firms use capital structure to signal their quality
(signalling model) by adopting either a conservative or aggressive financing struc-
ture.
The agency theory posits that high quality and profitable firms commit to paying a
high dividend or interest on debt as they are in a better position to avoid or manage
the costs of bankruptcy. However, the ability of firms with bad prospects to mimic
the information transmission mechanism of good firms, even if it might expose them
to bankruptcy risks, results in the 'lemons problem in a market for used cars ' (see,
Akerlof, 1970). This mimicking behaviour reduces the credibility of the signals as in-
vestors find it more difficult to distinguish between firms with good or bad prospects
(see, Akerlof, 1970; Leland and Pyle, 1977). According to Myers (2003) agency theory
also leads to hierarchical preferences of financing sources (as predicted by the peck-
ing order theory).
It is reasonable to argue that since innovative firms are likely to be subject to rel-
9Several studies attribute IPOs underpricing to information asymmetry (e.g., Loughran and Rit-
ter, 2002; Ritter, 1991; Ritter and Welch, 2002; Ritter, 2003).
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atively higher levels of information asymmetry than for non-innovative firms, they
are more likely to signal their quality by adopting conservative capital structures
and commit to paying less dividends to retain a higher proportion of their earnings.
These retained earnings are needed to finance R&D and further growth. According to
O’Brien (2003), innovative firms are less reliant on debt as the covenants associated
with debt financing may inadvertently restrict strategic flexibility that may harm in-
novation. The covenants can take the form of restrictions on further borrowings, ex-
pansion/investment and disclosure of information that may be proprietary. The need
to maintain strategic flexibility by avoiding these restrictions should result in inno-
vative firms adopting financing structures that differ from those of non-innovative
firms.
Market timing theory
The market timing theory is premised on the proposition that managers time the
issues or repurchases of debt and equity in order to take advantage of opportunities
presented by changing capital market conditions (see, Alti, 2006; Baker and Wurgler,
2002; Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Elliott et al., 2008; Jung et al., 1996; Heaton, 2002;
Myers, 2003). Managers issue new equity when they perceive that it is overvalued
and repurchase equity when it is perceived to be undervalued. Similarly, managers
prefer debt financing in periods of undervaluation, and reduce debt in periods of
overvaluation. According to Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) managers defer issuing
or repurchasing equity or debt if conditions are unfavourable.
The implication of market timing theory is that managers can affect firm value by
strategically altering the financing mix to capture perceived mis-pricing. Baker and
Wurgler (2002) argue that the current capital structure is a cumulative function of
the past strategic attempts by managers to time equity markets. In line with the pre-
dictions of the market timing theory, Welch (2004) reports that the effects of changes
in market prices remain persistent in a way that managers show no attempt at un-
doing the effects of changes in stock prices on capital structure. Similarly, Heaton
(2002) also proposes the "windows of opportunity" and managerial optimism model
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to explain capital structure choices. The clustering of equity issues as firms seek to
exploit higher prices and optimism in good times offers support to the market timing
proposition (see, Campello and Graham, 2013; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). A sur-
vey by Graham and Harvey (2001) report results consistent with the market timing
proposition as the extent to which managers perceive the stock to be overvalued or
undervalued influences financing decisions.
These results of the market timing theory suggest that the market timing behaviour
is likely to be higher for innovative firms than for non-innovative firms because the
former face higher levels of information asymmetry arising from their risky invest-
ments. Firms prone to high information asymmetry problems tend to "time the
markets" by issuing (repurchase/redeem) overvalued (undervalued) securities in good
(bad) times (Campello and Graham, 2013). This may result in innovative and non-
innovative firms adopting divergent financing policies as financing and investment
decisions are interdependent.10 This thesis will extend the literature by examining
how investment type (both fixed capital investments and R&D) may cause divergence
in corporate financing decisions and how this overlooked interdependence changes
over time.
Unified theory of capital structure
Relatively recently researchers started to consider the complementarity of the cap-
ital structure theories which had earlier divided scholars (see, Barclay and Smith,
1999; Beattie et al., 2006). Efforts to formulate a unified theory of corporate capital
structure arise from the realisation that no extant theory on its own can fully explain
the variations in capital structure (see, Frank and Goyal, 2009; Graham and Har-
vey, 2001; Myers, 1993; Oztekin, 2015). Carmen and Farhat (2009) report that the
trade-off theory and the pecking order theory are not mutually exclusive. Similarly,
10Chava and Roberts (2008) and Stein (2003) highlight that despite the existence of a general
consensus that financing activities and real decisions are interdependent in the presence of market
imperfections, the exact nature of the relationship is subject to debate. Further, the results in the
extant literature on the relationship between fixed capital investment and financing decisions are
rather mixed (see, Dammon and Senbet, 1988) as Caglayan and Rashid (2014) and Lyandres and
Zhdanov (2005) report a significant positive relationship while Aivazian et al. (2005), DeAngelo and
Masulis (1980), Dang (2011) and Lang et al. (1996) report a significant negative relationship.
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several studies conduct joint tests on the predictions of the theories. For example,
Warr et al. (2012) in a joint test of the market timing theory and the trade-off theory
report that equity mis-pricing has a significant effect on target financing behaviour,
with over-levered firms adjusting faster when they have overvalued equity than un-
dervalued equity. This result points to firms more susceptible to high information
asymmetry problems, as the case with innovative firms, exploiting the mis-pricing of
securities to more actively adjust capital structure towards the target. Further, as
financial distress costs increase with both leverage and information asymmetry, in-
novative firms that may have high leverage will tend to adjust faster than those with
low leverage and non-innovative firms.11 The results in Chapter 5 confirm this pre-
diction and suggests that investment type has a significant effect on target financing
behaviour. This form of asymmetry that arises from investment type, that this thesis
examines, is new to the literature and remains significant even after controlling for
several other important determinants of capital structure.
Using a unified framework, Bonaimé et al. (2014) report that the value of adjusting
leverage towards a target depends on equity mis-pricing, with firms that are under-
valued and under-levered enjoy more economic benefits from using repurchases to
adjust leverage. Similarly, Brav (2009), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Lem-
mon and Zender (2010) report that firms with a financing deficit have a higher speed
of adjustment than firms with a financing surplus. Joint tests of theories on capital
structure can add new insights on financing decisions. However, Myers (2003) high-
lights that a unified theory is not feasible as the major theories are premised on often
conflicting or opposing propositions. In contrast, Frank and Goyal (2007b) express
optimism that attempts to unify the conflicting propositions of the trade-off theory,
pecking order theory and market timing theory appear fruitful.
Overall, the predictions of the pecking order theory suggests that innovative firms
11According to a theory of Krainer (2014), firms use capital structure to manage the risks in their
investment portfolio. This prediction suggests that firms with high risks should adopt conservative
financing structures so as to reduce the overall risk of the firm to levels that are acceptable to their
investors.
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should be more reliant on internal financing sources than non-innovative firms. How-
ever, the internal financing sources may not be enough as innovative firms usually
have high growth rates (as shown in Fig 3.3 of Chapter 3), which may result in them
accessing external financing sources more often than non-innovative firms. Further,
innovative firms may have more attractive investment opportunities that will enable
them easily access external financing sources more easily (Fig 3.3 of Chapter 3 shows
that, on average, innovative firms are more profitable than non-innovative firms).
Although the market timing theory is premised on propositions that are different
from those of the pecking order theory, it also suggests that innovative firms (high
growth firms) should be more active in capital markets. Following on the predictions
of the market timing theory, innovative firms are more likely to time the markets by
issuing (repurchase) securities when they are over-valued (under-valued) as market
timing behaviour increases with information asymmetry. In contrast to the predic-
tions of the pecking order and market timing theories, the predictions of the trade-off
theory suggests that innovative firms are likely to differ in terms of the target capi-
tal structure and how they adjust towards the target. The difference in the speed of
adjustment arises may arise due to the fact that innovative firms are likely to face
higher costs of deviating from the target than non-innovative firms would. This the-
sis will examine these theoretical predictions on the capital structure of innovative
and non-innovative firms.
2.2.2 Empirical literature on capital structure
Most empirical studies focus on testing the propositions of the theories of capital
structure (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009; Faulkender et al., 2008, 2012; Rajan and
Zingales, 1995; Oztekin, 2015; Welch, 2004). This section presents a review of the
determinants of financing structure and is used as a guide to our choice of variables
that we use in the empirical analyses of Chapters 4 and 5. All the following variables
will be used as core variables given that Chapter 4 focuses on the differences in the
determinants of capital structure between innovative and non-innovative firms. In
Chapter 5, the same variables will be used as control variables, except for, investment
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types, because the analysis is focused on differences in the target financing behaviour
of innovative versus non-innovative firms.
Investment
Recent studies report that firms which access capital markets to fund large profitable
investments also use that opportunity to adjust capital structure. For example, Dud-
ley (2012) reports that lumpy investments provides an opportunity for firms in the
US to adjust towards their optimal capital structure at lower marginal costs.12 Simi-
larly, Elsas and Florysiak (2013) find that firms in the US mostly use external sources
to finance large investments and the issued securities move firms toward their target
capital structure. However, several theories show that the impact of investment on
leverage also depends on the nature of investments undertaken.13
The stakeholder co-investment theory, for example, posits that firms with unique
products use less debt because they are more likely to face binding constraints (Tit-
man, 1984). Following this prediction, firms investing in fixed capital use more debt
financing (see, Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005; Caglayan and Rashid, 2014), while firms
investing in R&D use less debt (see, Dang et al., 2012; Flannery and Rangan, 2006;
Faulkender et al., 2012). According to Frank and Goyal (2009), the negative relation-
ship between debt and fixed capital investments is consistent with predictions of the
pecking order theory that low issuance costs drive firms to use more equity financ-
ing. Similarly, Aivazian et al. (2005), Lang et al. (1996) and McConnell and Servaes
(1995) report that firms use less debt so as to avoid or reduce underinvestment prob-
lems associated with debt overhang. However, the relationship between investment
and leverage is not clear, with one strand of the literature (e.g., Aivazian et al., 2005;
Dang, 2011; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Lang et al., 1996) reports a negative rela-
12Further, Dudley (2012) finds that firms sequence equity before debt when raising external financ-
ing for large investments, as the tax benefits of debt will not be immediately realised given that most
large projects take time to generate cash-flow. The preference to use equity over debt in financing
lumpy projects is inconsistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory.
13Dudley (2012) uses an aggregate measure of lumpy investments that combines capital expendi-
ture, R&D and changes in working capital. This approach tends to overlook the proposition that firms
match financing sources to the asset structure (see, Campello and Giambona, 2013; Diamond and He,
2014; Myers, 1977; Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, 2014; Stein, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).
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tionship while another reports a positive relationship (e.g., Lyandres and Zhdanov,
2005; Rashid and Caglayan, 2012). Similarly, Mauer and Triantis (1994) report a in-
significant relationship. These mixed results on the relationship between financing
and investment decisions highlight the need for further research.14
Tangible assets
Firms with more tangible assets have greater collateral values with which to sup-
port further borrowing (see, Antoniou et al., 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2003, 2009;
Oztekin, 2015; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Several studies report that collateral
reduces moral hazard behaviour as the borrower stands to lose pledged assets if the
borrower engages in opportunistic behaviour that is detrimental to the creditor (e.g.,
Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011; Berger et al., 2011; Norden and van Kampen, 2013;
Rampini and Viswanathan, 2013). Recently, Campello et al. (2010), Campello et al.
(2011b) and Kahle and Stulz (2013) report that firms used assets to alleviate the ad-
verse effects of the recent global financial crisis. Campello et al. (2010) report that,
in an attempt to avoid possible bankruptcy, financially constrained firms conducted
fire sales of assets to generate liquidity. Similarly, Campello and Giambona (2013)
find that firms with more redeployable assets (such as land, buildings, plant and
equipment) are less likely to be credit constrained, especially during periods char-
acterised by contractions in bank lending and decreases in economic growth. Also,
Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2014) find that firms with illiquid assets face binding
financial constraints. Consistent with these theoretical predictions that collateral
reduces information asymmetry problems, tangible assets is likely to exhibit a signif-
icant positive effect on leverage, with this effect being significantly higher for inno-
vative firms that have less pledgeable assets.15 This may result in innovative firms
that also have high tangible assets being more able to access debt financing, since
collateral reduces financial constraints. This thesis investigates whether the role of
collateral in facilitating access to debt financing differs between innovative and non-
14Further, Stein (2003) highlights that although financing and investment decisions are interde-
pendent (in contrast to the propositions of the MM Theory), the channels through which they relate
remain unclear.
15See, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Leland and Pyle (1977), and Leland (1998).
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innovative firms. This is carried out by comparing the coefficients on tangible assets
between the two-firm groups.
Intangible assets
Intangible assets are increasingly becoming one of the most important assets on
corporate balance sheets. Studies have overlooked the role of intangible assets in
corporate financing decisions despite theoretical studies showing that contract in-
completeness and limited enforceability subject firms to binding financial constraints
(e.g., Hart and Moore, 1994; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). According to Aghion et al.
(2004) and Brown et al. (2012) intangible investments are a poor form of collateral
as they are more prone to information asymmetry, asset substitution and high speci-
ficity issues. However, it is rather important to note that firms with more intangible
assets are surprisingly among the most geared (see Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3). The
persistence of leverage against an increase in intangible assets is inconsistent with
the literature (see, Aghion et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2012; Hall, 2002; Borisova and
Brown, 2013), as this suggests that some firms with more intangible assets are still
able to access debt financing. This evidence suggests that intangible assets support
debt financing, which is inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of Hart and
Moore (1994) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). This thesis will examine the effects
of intangible assets of capital structure and whether this effect differs between in-
novative and non-innovative firms. As innovative firms have more intangible assets,
their effect on leverage is likely to be higher, and perhaps increasingly so, with the
increasing rate of transition of economies towards service and technological sectors.
Growth
There is an ongoing debate on the effect of growth on capital structure. According to
the predictions of the trade-off theory, firms with more growth opportunities use less
debt financing to preserve flexibility (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Oztekin, 2015). This
results in a negative effect of growth on debt (see, Graham and Leary, 2011; Rajan
and Zingales, 1995; Ozkan, 2001; Wu and Au Yeung, 2012). High growth firms use
less debt to signal to the market that they do not under-invest or engage in asset
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substitution (Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006). However, the need for high-growth
firms to regularly access capital markets implies that growth has a positive effect
on debt financing (see, Dang et al., 2012; Dang, 2013a; Dang et al., 2014a; Drobetz
and Wanzenried, 2006). According to Frank and Goyal (2009), the observed high
market-to-book ratios may be due to mis-pricing, which tends increase the possibil-
ity of market timing. If innovative firms are more likely to engage in market timing
relative to non-innovative firms, then, their high market-to-book ratios (high growth)
would result in a decrease in leverage (implying a negative relationship) as they is-
sue more overvalued equity. This prediction suggests that the role of market-to-book
ratios in financing decisions, which is examined in this thesis, may differ significantly
between innovative and non-innovative firms.
Size
Size is positively related to leverage as the risk of bankruptcy decreases with firm
size (see, Elsas et al., 2013; Faulkender et al., 2008, 2012; Frank and Goyal, 2009;
Leary and Roberts, 2005; Oztekin, 2015; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Similarly, Stre-
bulaev and Kurshev (2006) report that large firms have well established relationships
with lenders, which implies that they face low financial constraints than small firms.
According to Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) and Vincent and Michaely (2012) in-
formation asymmetry and agency problems decrease with firm size since large firms
are closely followed by investors and analysts. The high reputation, low information
asymmetry, and agency issues of large firms allow them to access capital markets
more easily, which results in a positive relation between size and debt financing. Ac-
cording to Titman and Wessels (1988) larger firms are able to borrow at relatively
lower costs since they are more diversified than smaller firms.
The importance of size as a determinant of capital structure is decreasing overtime
and mostly in countries with weak institutional frameworks (Oztekin, 2015). Sim-
ilarly, Graham et al. (2015) report that the relationship between size and leverage
is affected by the increase in small firms in the US over the past century. In a
cross-country study, Frank and Goyal (2009)'s literature review on the most reliable
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determinants of capital structure shows that the effect of size on leverage is more
important for firms with low market-to-book ratios than those with high market-to-
book ratios. This should result in a lower effect of size on debt for innovative than
non-innovative firms. However, this is in contrast to the pecking order theory which
predicts a negative relationship between leverage and firm size as large firms are
better positioned to issue equity and reduce debt financing (Frank and Goyal, 2009).
This also shows the mixed results on the effect of size of debt even though most stud-
ies report a positive relationship. This thesis examines the differential effect of size
on capital structure of innovative and non-innovative firms. Size is likely to have
a higher positive effect on the capital structure of innovative firms with high infor-
mation asymmetry, asset substitution problems, long investment horizons and low
collateral values due to high specificity. All these characteristics may subject innova-
tive firms to binding financing constraints relative to non-innovative firms.
Profitability
Reported evidence on the effect of profitability on leverage is rather mixed.16 Goyal
and Wang (2011), Liu (2009), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Oztekin (2015) and Warr
et al. (2012) report a negative effect of profitability on debt financing as is consistent
with the pecking order theory which posits that internal financing is preferred to ex-
ternal financing. Profitable firms have more retained earnings with which to finance
further investments and pay-off outstanding debt (see, Antoniou et al., 2008; Oztekin
and Flannery, 2012). Firms may prefer equity because the use of debt reduces strate-
gic flexibility and requires greater transparency, which may inadvertently reveal pro-
prietary information to rivals (see, O’Brien, 2003). This may result in firms with in-
novative investments adopting conservative financing structures even though their
profitability encourages the use of high levels of debt financing. In an attempt to
avoid the restrictions associated with debt financing, firms use internal sources and
access external capital markets only when retained earnings are exhausted (Myers,
1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, other empirical studies report a positive
16Chen and Zhao (2005) and Strebulaev (2007) show that the channels through which profits and
leverage relates are unclear and complex.
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effect of profitability on debt, as is consistent with the trade-off theory (Jensen et al.,
1992).
Agency theory predicts a positive relationship as the disciplinary role of debt in curb-
ing the abuse of free cash flow is more valuable for profitable firms which generate
free cash flows (see, Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986).
Similarly, the signalling hypothesis of Ross (1977) implies a positive relation as firms
use debt to signal their quality in the form of a commitment to pay a large pro-
portion of earnings (interest on debt) to creditors. Frank and Goyal (2009)'s review
shows that the importance of profitability as a determinant of capital structure is
decreasing over time, which is consistent with the increasing willingness to finance
unprofitable investments with good long-term prospects.17 Following on these stud-
ies, profitable firms are likely to use less external financing (in particular, debt) as
they can satisfy most of their financing needs using internally generated funds. In
line with this prediction, Fig 3.3 of Chapter 3 shows that over time innovative firms
are more profitable than non-innovative firms. This should result in a relatively high
negative effect of profitability on debt for innovative firms relative to non-innovative
firms. However, as innovative firms are mostly high-growth firms, they may use their
high profitability (in case they generate high profits) to access further debt financing.
These opposing predictions highlight that the effects of profitability on debt financing
is rather unclear for both innovative and non-innovative firms. This is investigated
further in this thesis.
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS)
The results on the effects of the non-debt tax shield on leverage is similarly mixed.
The non-debt tax shield is negatively related to leverage as it is a substitute for tax
shields of debt financing (see, Dang et al., 2012, 2014a; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980).
Similarly, Leary and Roberts (2005) and de Miguel and Pindado (2001) report a neg-
ative effect of the non-debt tax shield on leverage. However, other studies report a
17Similarly, Fama and French (2004), Fama and French (2005) and Frank and Goyal (2003) report
marked increase in issuing activities of small and financially weaker firms.
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positive effect (Antoniou et al., 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Titman and Wessels,
1988), which is inconsistent with the substitution proposition of DeAngelo and Ma-
sulis (1980). Titman and Wessels (1988) attribute the change in the coefficient of the
non-debt tax shield to differences in the way in which this shield is measured, with
a negative coefficient observed if the measure of the shield is scaled by total assets
while a positive coefficient is observed if the measure is scaled by operating income or
sales. This thesis examines whether the lower proportion of fixed assets on corporate
balance sheets of innovative firms (as shown in Fig 3.3 of Chapter 3) should result
in a lower effect of non-debt tax shield on their capital structure decisions relative to
non-innovative firms.
Volatility
Firms with volatile earnings are more risky and have higher bankruptcy costs, which
leads them to use less debt (Fama and French, 2002). Similarly, volatile earnings sub-
jects firms to binding financial constraints (Antoniou et al., 2008; Dang et al., 2012,
2014a). According to studies in the US by Campello et al. (2010) and Cook and Tang
(2010) risk increase in bad macroeconomic environments further exacerbate credit
constraints for firms with volatile earnings. Brown et al. (2012), Hall (1992) and Hall
(2009) report that firms with intangible investments use equity financing to offset
the high risk in their investment portfolios. Similarly, Dierker et al. (2013) report
that firms adjust capital structure to manage risk. The low leverage of firms with
risky investments is consistent with the trade-off theory which posits that firms bal-
ance the benefits and costs of debt when deciding on the optimal capital structure.
Recently, Krainer (2014) develops a model in which managers use capital structure to
manage operating risk to levels commensurate with the risk appetite of the investors.
The high volatility of earnings of firms that invest in innovation (see, Brown et al.,
2012; Dang, 2011; Hall, 2009) should result in innovative firms adopting conserva-
tive financing structures relative to non-innovative firms. In this thesis, comparisons
based on cross-sections and time variations are drawn on the effect of volatility on
capital structure for innovative and non-innovative firms.
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Overall, the mixed results on the determinants of capital structure highlight the need
for further research. In particular, the unclear relationship between leverage and in-
vestment (see, Chava and Roberts, 2008; Stein, 2003) suggests the need for a study of
how investment type (innovative and non-innovative investments) affects financing
decisions. Further, the extant literature investigates mostly capital expenditure and
overlooks the marked increase in intangible investments.18 It also largely ignores
the fact that different types of corporate investment often compete for the same fi-
nancing sources (interdependence).
The following section presents a review of the theories and determinants of trade
credit.
2.3 Trade credit: Literature review
This section presents a review of the literature on trade credit. There are four major
propositions on trade credit: (i) comparative advantages in borrowing, (ii) informa-
tional advantages and control over the buyer, (iii) price discrimination, and (iv) trans-
action costs and warranty on quality. Literature relevant to each of these propositions
is review in turn next.
2.3.1 Trade credit theories
Comparative advantages in borrowing
Suppliers of goods have a comparative advantage in evaluating the creditworthiness
and enforcing credit contracts over traditional lenders in the presence of information
asymmetry (see, Cuñat, 2007; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Suppliers may borrow from
lending institutions at comparatively better terms than their customers and, in turn,
advance credit to financially constrained customers. Frank and Maksimovic (2005)
and Mian and Smith (1992) report that suppliers have a comparative advantage in
liquidating the repossessed inventory if a buyer fails to settle since they already have
18Several studies in the US report marked increases in R&D over the past decades (e.g., Borisova
and Brown, 2013; Brown and Petersen, 2011; Falato et al., 2013; Sporleder et al., 2002).
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an established network to sell the repossessed goods. Similarly, Frank and Maksi-
movic (2005) report that suppliers have advantages in salvaging value from repos-
sessed goods. The comparative advantages in borrowing are likely to be greater for
non-innovative firms with more pleadgeble assets relative to innovative firms that
invest mostly in intangible assets. This prediction, which is examined in this thesis,
should result in non-innovative firms giving (using) more (less) trade credit than in-
novative firms.
Informational advantages and control over the buyer
According to Emery (1984) and Jain (2001) informational advantages arise as the
supplier has regular access to the buyer. The timing and size of the orders placed by
customers reveal important information about the credit quality of the buyer (Biais
and Gollier, 1997; Brennan et al., 1988; Smith, 1987). According to Petersen and
Rajan (1997) the supplier has greater control over the buyer if the supplier is large
and the products supplied are specialised. This reduces the incentive for the buyer
to default as the buyer has limited alternatives. Petersen and Rajan (1997) report
that this influence is not available to other creditors such banks. Biais and Gollier
(1997) present a model in which firms are unable to secure lending from banks unless
the bank observes that the firm is able to get credit from its suppliers. The ability
to secure credit from suppliers who are better informed than lending institutions
about the buyer acts as a credible signal on the prospects of the borrower. The in-
formational advantages and control over the buyer hypothesis posits that firms with
unique products, like innovative firms, may be more willing to give credit to their
customers (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Brennan et al., 1988; Smith, 1987).19 Consistent
with this hypothesis, Stroebel (2015) presents a model showing that non-integrated
lenders charge comparatively higher interest rates than integrated lenders to com-
pensate for the high information asymmetry in collateral values. Cuñat (2007) and
Petersen and Rajan (1997) highlight that firms with unique products (such as in-
novative firms) may have a comparative advantage in the quantity and quality of
19This should result in innovative firms giving relatively more trade credit to their customers as
they have comparative advantages in evaluating the credit quality of their customers for innovative
products.
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information collected on the credit worthiness of their customers. This would suggest
that innovative firms may be able to provide relatively more trade credit than non-
innovative firms. In fact, this is confirmed in our sample of UK firms as shown in
Figure 3.4 of Chapter 3. This prediction is formally tested in Chapter 6 by examining
the difference in the determinants of trade credit for innovative and non-innovative
firms.
Price discrimination
Since by law firms are precluded from engaging in price discrimination, the ability
to combine credit with the goods helps in overcoming this restriction. Meltzer (1960)
and Petersen and Rajan (1997) report that a supplier may be able to charge higher
prices to risky customers by offering them trade credit, while at the same time offer-
ing low prices through discounts to credit worthy customers and for early payments.
Petersen and Rajan (1997) highlight that financially constrained customers may find
it worthwhile to borrow using trade credit as it may still be relatively cheaper and
easier to access than other types of loans. These predictions are in contrast to Lin
and Chou (2015) who report that trade credit is relatively more expensive than bank
loans. In line with the price discrimination hypothesis, Fig 3.4 of Chapter 3 shows
that innovative firms in our sample give more trade credit than non-innovative firms,
which suggests that they are more likely to discriminate using trade credit as they
sell risky products that may have low re-saleable values (in case of repossessions).
Transaction costs and warranty on quality
Specialised goods require a warranty from the supplier. The provision of trade credit
is a form of warranty on the quality of the goods as it allows the buyer to try the
goods before paying for them. Long et al. (1993) report that if trade credit is used
as a form of guarantee for product quality, then large and more established firms
with reputable products, need not offer trade credit. Elliehausen and Wolken (1993),
Ferris (1981) and Wilson and Summers (2002) highlight that trade credit can reduce
the need to hold precautionary cash balances (by reducing transaction costs) in the
presence of uncertainty about production needs and delivery times. Petersen and
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Rajan (1997) report that trade credit may also help to reduce transaction costs as
buyers can accumulate obligations and discharge them later instead of paying for
every transaction. According to Emery (1987) trade credit can be used to reduce
storage or warehousing costs as it facilitates early sales of seasonal products. Since
innovative products require more warranties than non-innovative ones, this should
result in innovative firms giving their customers more credit than non-innovative
firms.20
2.3.2 Determinants of trade credit
This section presents a review of the empirical results on the determinants of trade
credit. Although the literature identifies a core set of factors that determine trade
credit, the results are mixed and do not address whether trade credit policies of in-
novative firms differ from those of non-innovative firms.21 This guides our choice of
control and other variables that we use in the empirical analyses of Chapter 6 fo-
cusing on the differences in trade credit and its determinants. All of the following
are used as control variables , except for short-term debt and cash that are the core
variables for the analyses in Chapter 3.
Short-term debt
There is an ongoing debate on the relationship between short-term debt and trade
credit. Guariglia and Mateut (2013) and Kling et al. (2014) report that short-term
debt and trade credit are compliments rather than substitutes. However, the substi-
tution hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between short-term debt and trade
credit. According to Meltzer (1960) and Wilner (2000) firms with access to other forms
of financing use these to substitute the relatively expensive trade credit. Mateut et al.
(2006) and Yang (2011b) report that the relationship between short-term debt and
trade credit changes with monetary policy. Yang (2011b) find that short-term debt
and trade credit are compliments under a loose monetary policy regime and substi-
20(Fig 3.4 of Chapter 3 consistently show that innovative firms give (use) more (less) trade credit
than non-innovative firms.
21For a review of the determinants of trade credit, see Bastos and Pindado (2013), Bougheas et al.
(2009), Klapper et al. (2012), Kling et al. (2014), Long et al. (1993), Love (2003), Mateut et al. (2006),
Murfin and Njoroge (2015), Nilsen (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Wu et al. (2012).
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tutes under a tight regime. These changes show that it is not a priori clear whether
the complementary or substitution effect predominate the relationship between trade
credit and short-term debt, more so, between innovative and non-innovative firms.
Further, firms that face binding financial constraints are more likely to rely on trade
credit as a form of financing, which suggests that short-term debt and trade credit
are compliments rather than substitutes for innovative firms. Theories of Diamond
(1991) and Hart and Moore (1994) posits that firms match the maturity of assets to
financing sources, which suggests that innovative firms with longer investment hori-
zons are less likely to rely on short-term debt and trade credit financing. Following
on these mixed predictions, this thesis will examine in Chapter 6 the differences be-
tween innovative and non-innovative firms in the relationship between short-term
debt and trade credit, and how this relationship changes over time. Although the
literature examines the relationship between short-term debt and trade credit, the
time variations and differences between innovative and non-innovative firms that we
examine in this thesis have been overlooked in prior studies (see, Guariglia and Ma-
teut, 2013; Kling et al., 2014; Meltzer, 1960; Wilner, 2000).
Cash
There is an ongoing debate on the effect of cash on trade credit. Petersen and Rajan
(1997) report that cash has no empirical effect on trade credit. However, Dass et al.
(2014) and Wu et al. (2012) report that cash has a negative effect trade credit. Sim-
ilarly, Bougheas et al. (2009) find a negative effect of cash on trade credit amongst
private firms in the UK. Innovative firms are less likely to use excess cash to reduce
accounts payable as they would rather hoard cash to finance future investments and
to cushion against adverse supply shocks in capital markets. Similarly, Acharya et al.
(2007), Acharya et al. (2012), Ang and Smedema (2011) and Bates et al. (2009) report
secular increases in cash holdings in the US and attribute this to the growing need
to increase corporate flexibility. As corporate flexibility is more important for inno-
vation, this suggests that innovative firms are less likely to use cash to reduce trade
credit they may have taken. This prediction is also consistent with O’Brien (2003)
who report that maintaining flexibility is critical for survival in highly competitive
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innovative product markets. However, the reverse applies for account receivables,
as innovative firms are more likely to use cash to increase the credit they extend to
their customers relative to non-innovative firms. The informational advantages and
control over the buyer propositions suggest that innovative firms are likely to extend
more trade credit than non-innovative firms (Emery, 1984; Jain, 2001). This suggests
that cash will have a relatively more significant positive effect on accounts receivable
of innovative than non-innovative firms. However, the stability of cash in UK firms
over time shows no clear relationship with trade credit (Chapter 3). Further, the
relationship between trade credit and cash is a subject of an ongoing debate. This
thesis examines the relation, and how it may differ and change over time between in-
novative and non-innovative firms. The time variations, though important (as shown
by results in Chapter 6), have been not been examined in the literature, which focus
mostly on cross-sectional differences.
Tangible assets
Firms with more tangibles assets have more access to other sources of financing
and can in-turn give more trade credit to their customers. According to Campello
and Giambona (2013) firms with deployable real assets are likely to face low credit
constraints, hence, will use less trade credit. Consistent with the comparative ad-
vantage in borrowing proposition, Bastos and Pindado (2013), Garcia-Appendini and
Montoriol-Garriga (2013), Giannetti et al. (2011) and Guariglia and Mateut (2013)
report a negative effect of tangible assets on trade credit. If firms have access to al-
ternative sources of financing, they use less trade credit as it is relatively expensive
(see, Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995). This prediction suggests that innovative firms,
with less tangible assets, are more likely to use trade credit than non-innovative
firms. However, the unreliability of trade credit may discourage firms from using
it as it tends to decrease when is needed most during contractions in bank lending
(such as during the recent global financial crisis). Further, firms match the matu-
rity of assets with that of financing, which suggests that innovative firms with longer
investment horizons use less trade credit. This thesis examines how the effect of tan-
gible assets on trade credit may differ for innovative and non-innovative firms.
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Intangible assets
The growing importance of intangible assets on corporate balance sheets has been
overlooked by researchers.22 As intangible assets are poor candidates for collateral,
firms with more intangible assets are prone to problems of information asymmetry,
asset substitution and high specificity which limit their ability to access borrowing
(Brown et al., 2012). However, Lim et al. (2014) report that intangible assets, re-
ported in the purchase price allocation data of the bidding firms’ 10-Ks or 10-Qs,
support debt financing. Also, firms with innovative investments are able to borrow
at better terms than traditional firms (Hall, 2009). Therefore, the effect of intangible
assets on trade credit is a priori clear.
Size
Firm size is associated with greater ability to extend trade credit to customers as
larger firms can borrow at competitive rates.23 Also, larger firms may offer more
trade credit as they have low credit risk and higher bargaining power (Petersen
and Rajan, 1997). However, with easier access to more favourable forms of financ-
ing, larger firms may rely less on trade credit. Bastos and Pindado (2013), Garcia-
Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013), Giannetti et al. (2011) and Guariglia and
Mateut (2013) report that size is positively associated with trade credit. Lin and
Chou (2015) report mixed effects of size on trade credit. This thesis examines these
mixed results, and how the effect of size on trade credit may differ between inno-
vative and non-innovative firms, with the former being generally smaller and likely
more credit constrained than the latter.
22Studies have overlooked the role of intangible assets in corporate financing decisions despite the-
oretical predictions from models by Hart and Moore (1994) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) showing
that contract incompleteness and limited enforceability of intangible assets subject firms to binding
financial constraints.
23Studies on capital structure report that size is positively related to leverage as the risk of
bankruptcy tends to decrease with the growth in a firm's assets (e.g., Elsas et al., 2013; Faulkender




Profitable firms have more internal sources and easier access to capital markets,
which enables them to extend more trade credit to their customers.24 Consistent
with this proposition, Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) and Giannetti
et al. (2011) report that profit is negatively related to trade credit. However, more
profitable firms are good candidates for credit from suppliers, which implies a positive
relationship between profit and trade credit. Similarly, a study of Chinese firms over
the period 2000-2007 by Guariglia and Mateut (2013) reports mixed effects of profit
on trade credit. Furthermore, profitable firms are better positioned to advance credit
to their customers. This prediction, which is examined in this thesis, suggests that in-
novative firms may give (use) more (less) trade credit than than non-innovative firms.
Asset turnover
Firms can increase turnover through credit sales. This results in a positive relation-
ship between asset turnover and trade credit. However, a study of firms in Argentina,
Brazil, and Turkey by Bastos and Pindado (2013) reports that asset turnover has a
insignificant effect on trade credit. They attribute this to an increase in total as-
sets arising from an increase in debtors which then reduce asset turnover ratios.
The overall effect of asset turnover on trade credit is ambiguous as it depends on
which effect predominates. Asset turnover is likely to be higher for innovative than
non-innovative firms as they have relatively more intangible assets. This high as-
set turnover for innovative firms may result in a relatively more significant posi-
tive effect of asset turnover on trade credit policies of innovative firms relative to
non-innovative firms. As the results in Chapter 3 show that trade credit and asset
turnover are all decreasing over time, with this decrease being relatively higher for
innovative than non-innovative firms, the relationship is becoming rather unclear,
particularly over time and between innovative and non-innovative firms.
Volatility
24A model of Schwartz (1974) show that suppliers with easy access to capital markets find giving
trade credit more attractive.
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Firms with volatile earnings use less debt as they are considered more risky and have
high bankruptcy costs (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008; Dang et al., 2012, 2014a; Fama and
French, 2002). Giannetti et al. (2011) report a negative effect of credit risk on trade
credit. This evidence implies that firms with more volatile earnings should use less
trade credit. However, financially constrained firms may use more trade credit as
this presents them with an opportunity to extract large concessions from suppliers in
case of bankruptcy (see, Evans, 1998; Wilner, 2000). Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995,
1997) and Wilner (1997) report that financially constrained firms are amongst the
most frequent users of trade credit. A positive effect of volatility on trade credit may
also result if high risk in operating earnings limits access to other alternative forms
of financing. Consistent with this proposition, Bastos and Pindado (2013) report a
positive relationship between probability of insolvency and trade credit. This predic-
tion suggests that innovative firms may use more trade credit than non-innovative
firms. However, as firms match the maturity of assets to financing sources (see, Di-
amond, 1991; Hart and Moore, 1995) and want to maintain strategic flexibility (see,
O’Brien, 2003), innovative firms with longer investment horizons and irreversible in-
vestments should use less trade credit financing. This thesis investigates these two
opposing predictions on the relationship between volatility and trade credit by com-
paring the effect of volatility on trade credit policies of innovative and non-innovative
firms.
Overall, the mixed results on the determinants of trade credit also highlight the need
for further research, particularly, in relation to the overlooked differences between
innovative and non-innovative firms. There is a need to examine why trade credit
is decreasing over time. Examining the changes in corporate policies, such as trade
credit, arising from different types of corporate investment is increasingly becoming




The review of the literature in this chapter highlight a lack of consensus on the
determinants of financing and trade credit policies. Several hypotheses have been
put forward in an attempt to explain the observed variations in financing structure
(trade-off theory, pecking order theory, agency theory and market timing theory). The
existence of these propositions that try to explain the same phenomena makes it dif-
ficult to achieve consensus with scholars divided along the lines of the major theories
on corporate financing decisions. This thesis represent an attempt to fill some of the
gaps in the literature, in particular, on how investment types influence financing and
trade credit decisions, using sample of firms in the UK (in country analysis) given
the concentration of studies to the US (which limits generalisation of results to other
economies) and mixed results from previous large cross-country studies. The litera-
ture motivating the research in each of the empirical chapters (Chapter 4, 5 and 6)







This chapter presents the data and methodology used in the following three empir-
ical chapters. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents
the sample screening process, Section 3.2.1 presents the sample composition, Sec-
tion 3.3 presents the variable definitions, and Section 3.5 presents an overview of the
methodology used.
3.2 Sample screening
The data on all variables is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream. The initial
sample consists of 296,044 firm-year observations (10,573 firms) of all firms listed
on the main official list of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) over the period 1987-
2013. Prior periods have limited observations on key variables to facilitate meaning-
ful analysis.1
As is standard in the literature, a number of filters (screens) are applied to the data.
First, the sample is restricted to 1,754 firms (49,112 firm-year observations) exclud-
ing firms in the financial and utility sectors, as their operating and regulatory envi-
ronments have significant effects on corporate decisions.2 Fama and French (2002),
Frank and Goyal (2009), Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Oztekin (2015) apply a simi-
lar approach. Brav (2009) argues that this restriction allows for a more focused anal-
ysis of companies with business structures that are most relevant to capital structure
theories. Second, firms with missing data on total debt, sales and total assets are ex-
cluded (37,107 firm-year observations).3 Third, consistent with Dudley (2012), miss-
ing values for the research and development (R&D) variable are set to zero (40,702
firm-year observations).
Fourth, in order to control for mergers and acquisitions, 475 firm-year observations
1Further, the reporting of R&D only became compulsory in 1989.
2The exclusion of the financial and utility sectors allows for direct comparisons with prior studies
on capital structure (e.g., Aghion et al., 2004; Brav, 2009; Dudley, 2012).
3Akbar et al. (2013), Lemmon and Roberts (2010) and Sufi (2009) use a similar criterion to deal
with problems of missing data.
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with changes in total assets, employees or sales in excess of 100% are excluded (Bloom
et al., 2007; Dudley, 2012).4 Fifth, firms with less than five years of observations are
excluded (3,134 observations) as the system Generalised Method of Moments (system
GMM thereon) used in the analyses in this thesis requires the use of lagged variables
as instruments (Baum et al., 2013; Banos-Caballero et al., 2013). Sixth, all variables
used are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentile of the distribution in each
year to address the compounding effects of outliers and conserve sample size.5 Fi-
nally, de-listed or suspended firms (254 observations) are retained in the final sample
in order to ameliorate survivorship bias. Due to missing data, entry and exit as well
as the application of the above filters, the final sample consists of 8,396 firm-year
observations (817 firms), over the period 1987 to 2013. Data unavailability and the
need to use lagged variables as instruments for endogenous variables represent the
main restrictions on the sample size and period.
3.2.1 Sample composition
Table 3.1 presents the sample composition. Panel A presents the distribution of the
sample across industries. Panel B presents the distribution of the sample by age
which is defined as the difference between the current year being examined and the
year the company first appeared in Datastream. Panel A shows that innovative firms
constitute the majority of the 8, 396 firms (61%), while non-innovative firms account
for 39% (3,304) of the total firms in the sample. This shows that an high proportion of
firms in the UK are undertaking innovative investments, which is similar to results
in the US (see, Damodaran, 1999, 2009; Lim et al., 2014). The main drawback of fo-
cusing on listed firms is that most innovative investments are undertaken by private
firms, many of which do not go public either due to them opting to remain private
or going out of business. The limitations to the studies in this thesis are discussed
further in Chapter 7.
4Using 125% cut-off to eliminate mergers and acquisitions or unusual changes in firm size as
applied by Dudley (2012) does not change the results significantly.
5Dang et al. (2014a) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) use a similar approach to address the ef-
fects of outliers. The alternative to dealing with outliers involves excluding or deleting observations
identified as outliers from the final sample. This would greatly reduce the sample size.
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Table 3.1 Sample composition
The table presents the distribution of the sample by industry and age. The table reports the proportion
of firms in each industry and age group. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for
non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D.
The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK from the main official list of the London Stock
Exchange over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Table 3.2. The data is
drawn from Worldscope through Datastream.
Panel A: Industrial distribution
Industry ALL NIN INN Frequency (%)
Total 8396 3304 5092 100.0%
Frequency (%) 100.0% 39.4% 60.6%
Panel B: Sample structure
Age Firms Firm-year Frequency Cumulative
(years) observations (%) frequency (%)
5 131 655 8% 8%
6 97 582 7% 15%
7 79 553 7% 21%
8 75 600 7% 28%
9 80 720 9% 37%
10 65 650 8% 45%
11 50 550 7% 51%
12 34 408 5% 56%
13 45 585 7% 63%
14 22 308 4% 67%
15 19 285 3% 70%
16 21 336 4% 74%
17 12 204 2% 77%
18 13 234 3% 79%
19 12 228 3% 82%
20 8 160 2% 84%
21 6 126 2% 86%
22 10 220 3% 88%
23 3 69 1% 89%
24 3 72 1% 90%
25 4 100 1% 91%
26 5 130 2% 93%
27 23 621 7% 100%
Consistent with studies on the US, the 51% of the firms in Panel B of Table 3.1 have
a life below 11 years.6 This short life span of firms suggests that studies focusing
on shorter periods tend to overlook the impact of changes in firm composition on
corporate decisions. This thesis accounts for the effects of changes in firm composition
on corporate decisions by examining capital structure decisions of firms in the UK
over a relatively longer period and also, using sub-period analyses. Studies on the
UK are restricted to annual data, whereas data on US company accounts is available
at quarterly intervals. Also, data limitations on UK company accounts reduces the
sample period since some account items are unavailable prior to 1989.7 However,
6Dang et al. (2012, 2014a), and Flannery and Hankins (2013) report that the average life of firms
in the US is less than 10 years.
7Appendix 3.A presents a sample decomposition by year. It shows that there are more firm-year
observations during the period from 1989 to 1999. The high concentration of the firm-year observa-
tions in the 1990s is partly attributed to the entry of young growth firms prior to the tech-bubble.
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the focus on a relatively long period as adopted in this study may also be subject to
survivorship bias.8
3.3 Variable definitions
This section presents definitions of the variables used. Table 3.2 presents the vari-
ables and the account items. The Datastream code of which is reported in parenthe-
sis. The account items were obtained from Datastream. All variables, except size
and earning volatility, are divided by total assets to reduce scaling effects. Size is
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets, and earnings volatility is defined
as the three-year-moving standard deviation of profits. The adopted definitions are
standard in the literature on capital structure.9
3.3.1 Dependent variables
This section presents the construction of the dependent variables and discusses the
literature motivating the choice of the dependent variables used in this thesis.
Leverage
There is considerable debate on the most appropriate measure of leverage, with Bar-
clay et al. (2006), Fama and French (2002) and Graham and Harvey (2001) preferring
book-based measures, while Dang et al. (2012), Frank and Goyal (2007a) and Welch
(2004) preferring market-based measures. Barclay et al. (2006) highlight that there
is no particular economic reason to expect the same results from studies that adopt
market-based and book-based measures of leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) high-
light that the appropriate measure of leverage depends largely on the objectives of
the study. Similarly, Bessler et al. (2011), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Stone-
hill et al. (1975) report that managers base their decisions on book-based measures
Consistent with this, Fama and French (2004) report an influx of young firms conducting initial public
offerings (IPOs) in the US from 1980 to 2001.
8This problem is addressed in this thesis by using a combination of sub-period and time variation
analyses. According to Welch (2011), survivorship bias is difficult to correct and most studies assume
that the population of firms is fairly constant.
9Several studies on capital structure use similar variable definitions (e.g., Flannery and Rangan,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rather than market-based measures of capital structure. Since the focus of the anal-
yses in this thesis is on the changes in capital structure arising from decisions taken
by managers, book-based measures are deemed more appropriate as they are less
influenced by changes or events unrelated to the firm.
Beside the debate on book versus market-based measures, there is also a debate on
which components of leverage (total liabilities, total debt, net-debt or long-term debt)
should studies focus on. In light of the debate on the components of leverage and the
mixed results in the literature, this thesis adopts a decompositional approach that
focuses on four main components of leverage, namely, total debt, net-debt, long-term
debt and total liabilities.10 The main advantage of this approach is that it allows for a
more comprehensive analysis of compositional changes in leverage over time. Welch
(2004) highlights that although leverage may be relatively stable in aggregate, as
Lemmon et al. (2008) and Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) report, the components of
leverage exhibit greater variability. DeAngelo and Roll (2015) report similar varia-
tions in leverage in the US and conclude that the observed relative stability of capital
structure is an exception rather than the rule because firms actively re-balance cap-
ital structure. Further, the decompositional approach provides insights on whether
or not the mixed results in the literature are largely due to the adoption of different
measures of leverage.
This thesis uses five book-based measures of leverage in light of the considerable
debate on the appropriate measure, and the observed compositional differences in
corporate capital structure.11 The five measures of leverage used for firm i in year t
10Fama and French (2002), Leary and Roberts (2005) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) use total
debt, Byoun (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) use long-term
debt, while Baum et al. (2013), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) use total
liabilities as a measure of leverage. However, Rajan and Zingales (1995) highlight that including non-
financial components (such trade credit, pension and employee liabilities) in the definition of leverage
maybe misleading as it does not show if the firm is at risk of defaulting on its obligations.
11Rauh and Sufi (2010) highlight that the failure to recognise heterogeneity in corporate debt is
one of the major limitations in the extant literature.
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are constructed as follows:
TDAit = Total DebtitTotal Assetsit
= Long-term debtit+Short-term debtit
Total Assetsit




STDAit = Short-term DebtitTotal Assetsit
TLTAit = Total LiabilitiesitTotal Assetsit
Total debt
Total debt (TDA) is the main measure of leverage used in this thesis, and this is
consistent with Fama and French (2002), Leary and Roberts (2005) and Rajan and
Zingales (1995). Total debt includes long-term and short term debt divided by total
assets. Rajan and Zingales (1995) highlight that when investigating agency problems
associated with the use of debt, the most relevant measure is total debt. The main ad-
vantage of focusing on total debt is that it is not affected by non-financing components
such as trade credit (which are used mainly for transactional purposes and cover
temporary shortfalls in short-term financing) and employee and pension liabilities.
These non-financing components are included in leverage, if leverage is measured
based on total liabilities.12 However, studies by Aktas et al. (2012), Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic (2001), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Wu et al. (2012) report that
trade credit is a major source of short-term financing, hence, its inclusion in the anal-
yses of corporate financing decisions in this thesis.
Net-debt There is a debate on whether or not cash should be treated as negative
debt, since it can be used to redeem outstanding debt. Acharya et al. (2007) report
that the propensity to save out of cash flows increases with financial constraints and
the need to hedge future financing gaps, which implies that firms hoard cash instead
12The role of trade credit in corporate financing decisions, and how it differs between innovative
and non-innovative firms is examined in detail and separately in Chapter 6.
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of reducing outstanding debt. This suggests that cash is negative debt for uncon-
strained firms or when the hedging motive is low, as these conditions present an op-
portunity to reduce outstanding debt using the excess cash. In order to examine the
effects of cash on capital structure decisions, models that include net-debt (NDA) as
a measure of leverage are estimated. This allows for comparisons to be drawn with
studies on the US that report secular increases in cash holdings (e.g., Bates et al.,
2009; Brown and Petersen, 2011; Faulkender, 2002; Faulkender and Wang, 2006;
Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Seungjin and Jiaping, 2006). Also, the recent increases in
cash holding in the US indicate that models of capital structure that exclude cash
ignore important changes in financing policies.
Long-term debt
Long-term debt (LTDA) is consistently used as one of the most appropriate mea-
sure of leverage (see, Byoun, 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Shyam-Sunder and
Myers, 1999). In a study that includes France, Germany and the UK over the period
1969-2000, Antoniou et al. (2006) highlight inconsistencies in a few prior studies that
examine debt maturity structure. Long-term debt is included in models estimated in
this thesis to investigate whether the type of investment undertaken by firms influ-
ences debt maturity decisions. Although theories of capital structure suggest that
the nature of investments or corporate assets influence the debt-equity choice, there
is limited empirical evidence of these linkages.13 The major drawback of focusing
only on long-term debt is that it ignores changes in short-term debt. Custódio et al.
(2013) report a marked decrease in debt with maturity greater than three years of
firms in the US. According to Custódio et al. (2013), the decrease in debt with ma-
turity greater than three years from a peak of 53% in 1976 to 6% in 2008 is due
to the increase in firms with information asymmetry problems. As these firms are
mostly young, equity financing is most preferred, and if the firms use debt, they pre-
fer debt with short maturity. Short-term debt presents opportunities to refinance at
comparatively lower costs should the economic conditions or credit rating of the firm
13For the theoretical literature that examines the linkages between the nature of investments and
capital structure see Diamond and He (2014), Myers (1977) and Stein (2003).
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improve. Fama and French (2004) report similar changes as evidenced by a jump in
new listings of firms that are young and financially weak in the US over the period
1980–2001.
Short-term debt
Abdulla et al. (2014a), Rashid and Caglayan (2012) and Titman and Wessels (1988)
use short-term debt (STDA) as a proxy for leverage. Recently, Diamond and He (2014)
present a model showing that the maturity risk arising from short-term debt has a
stronger debt overhang effect on corporate investment than that from long-term debt.
This model implies that firms with high information asymmetry (which increases
with innovative investments) should use equity, and if they resort to using debt, it
should be in the form of long-term debt as the debt overhang effects of short-term
debt are much higher in the presence of information asymmetry. However, Custódio
et al. (2013) highlight that it may be optimal for financially weak firms to finance us-
ing short-term debt as it presents opportunities to refinance at better credit terms in
the future. Short-term debt is included in the analyses in this thesis as there are few
studies on short-term debt, particularly in the UK, and on how it relates to different
forms of corporate investments (R&D or capital expenditure).14
Total liabilities
Total liabilities (TLTA) is the broadest measure of leverage used in the analyses in
this thesis. Baum et al. (2013), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Flannery and Rangan
(2006) use a similar measure of leverage. The inclusion of trade credit in leverage
allows for a broader view on how it relates to corporate investments. Further, several
studies report that trade credit is a major source of short-term financing (e.g., Aktas
et al., 2012; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wu
et al., 2012). This implies that trade credit plays a more significant role in capital
structure beyond the transactional role as reported by Rajan and Zingales (1995).
Similarly, Biais and Gollier (1997) report that trade credit is important as it allevi-
14The only study on short-term debt in the UK by Rashid and Caglayan (2012) does not investigate
the effects of R&D on short-term debt as it focuses risk.
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ates information asymmetry in both the product (as customers can try the product
before making a payment) and capital (suppliers have a comparative advantage in
evaluating their customers and will lend more than banks) markets. Further, the
focus on total liabilities as a measure of leverage allows for comparisons with prior
studies and is a form of test for robustness.
Issues or repurchases of debt or equity
Issues or repurchases of equity or debt are defined as any net change in equity or debt
that is in excess of 5%. This threshold is standard in the literature (e.g., Hovakimian
et al., 2001; Hovakimian and Vulanovic, 2010; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Korajczyk
and Levy, 2003). Results using alternative measures of debt and equity issuance are
reported where available for robustness (Datastream account items WC04251 for is-
suance of equity and preference shares and WC04401 for issuance of debt are used).
The analysis of issues or repurchases of debt or equity is largely confined to the US
(see, Hovakimian et al., 2001; Hovakimian and Vulanovic, 2010; Leary and Roberts,
2005; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). Extension of US studies to the UK offers an oppor-
tunity to draw fruitful comparisons on factors influencing decisions to access capital
markets as Antoniou et al. (2008) and Oztekin and Flannery (2012) report that dif-
ferences in the legal and institutional environments between two economies explain
some of the observed variations in capital structure. Survey results by Beattie et al.
(2006) also show that managers of firms in the UK prefer relatively lower levels of
debt financing and use more short-term debt than their counterparts in the US.
Trade credit
Table 3.2 presents the account items from Datastream used in the construction of
trade credit variables. The three book-based measures of trade credit used in Chapter
6 are constructed as follows:
APit = Trade CreditorsitTotal Assetsit
ARit = Trade DebtorsitTotal Assetsit
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NTCit = Trade Debtors - Trade CreditorsitTotal Assetsit
Accounts payable to total assets (AP) and accounts receivable to total asset (AR) are
the most commonly used measures of trade credit (e.g., Aktas et al., 2012; Uchida
et al., 2013; Pindado and De La Torre, 2011). Aktas et al. (2012), Garcia-Appendini
and Montoriol-Garriga (2013), Giannetti et al. (2011) and Love et al. (2007) use ac-
counts payable to sales and accounts receivable to sales as measures of trade credit.
Guariglia and Mateut (2006) highlight that scaling by total assets or sales does not
materially change the results. The analyses in this thesis also use net trade credit
as another measure of trade credit as it is more informative because it includes both
accounts receivable and payable. Net credit is a more comprehensive measure of
trade credit as most firms buy goods on credit while at the same time giving credit
to their customers. According to Guariglia and Mateut (2006) using net trade credit
allows for the study of the link between taking and giving trade credit, and how this
relationship varies over time.
3.3.2 Independent variables
This section describes the construction of the variables proposed as the determinants
of capital structure and trade credit. Recent reviews by Frank and Goyal (2009) and
Oztekin (2015) highlight that there is considerable debate on the importance of the
determinants of capital structure.15
Research and development
Research and development (R&D) is defined as the ratio of research and development
expenditure to total assets. Other studies use the ratio of research and development
expenditure to sales as a measure of R&D (e.g., Aghion et al., 2004; Begenau and
Palazzo, 2015; Brown and Petersen, 2009; Hall, 2002; Hall and Lerner, 2010). How-
ever, the analyses in this thesis use research and development expenditure to total
assets so as to address scaling effects that may arise if some variables used are scaled
15For earlier reviews on corporate capital structure, see Harris and Raviv (1991) and Titman and
Wessels (1988).
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by total sales. The analysis in this thesis is largely motivated by the limited studies
on R&D and how it affects corporate decisions. Borisova and Brown (2013) report a
fourfold increase in corporate spending on R&D to the extent of exceeding fixed capi-
tal expenditure (Capex) for most firms in the US over the period 1980-2008. Further,
there are no comprehensive studies comparing how innovative and non-innovative
firms differ with regards to corporate financing and trade credit decisions. Despite
the increase in R&D, corporate debt levels, particularly in the UK, have remained
largely persistent with an upward drift (Figure 3.1).
R&Dit =
Research & Development Expenditureit
Total Assetsit
Capex
Capex is defined as the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. This measure
is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Dang, 2011; Dudley, 2012; Morgado and Pin-
dado, 2003). The relationship between investment and leverage is rather unclear as
Aivazian et al. (2005), Dang (2011), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Lang et al.
(1996) report a negative relation, Lyandres and Zhdanov (2005) report a positive re-
lation, and Mauer and Triantis (1994) report an insignificant relation. Further, the
channels through which financing activities relate to investment decisions are the
subject of considerable debate (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Stein, 2003), with Miller
(1991) famously arguing that managers should not worry about "second order self-





Investment is defined as the ratio of capital expenditure plus research and develop-
ment expenditure plus changes in working capital divided by total assets. Dudley
(2012) uses a similar definition to study the effects of lumpy corporate investments
on capital structure decisions. However, combining different forms of corporate in-
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vestments tend to overlook heterogeneity and how this heterogeneity affects financ-
ing decisions. For example, R&D is mostly financed with equity as it is suscepti-
ble to high information asymmetry, asset substitution, longer investment horizons,
and low pledgeable value issues (see, Borisova and Brown, 2013; Brown et al., 2012;
Moshirian et al., 2013). The results from the analyses in this thesis presented be-
low show that accounting for the differences in corporate investments is important to
understand variations in capital structure.
Investit =
Capital Expenditureit+R&D Expenditureit+∆Working Capitalit
Total Assetsit
Other short-term liabilities
'Other short-term liabilities' is defined as the ratio of current liabilities less trade
creditors divided by total assets. Guariglia and Mateut (2013) and Kling et al. (2014)
report a positive effect of short-term debt on trade credit while Meltzer (1960) re-
ports negative effect of short-term debt on trade credit. Mateut et al. (2006) and
Yang (2011b) report that the relationship between short-term debt and trade credit
changes with monetary policy, with the two being compliments under an expansion-
ary regime and substitutes under a contractionary regime. This suggests that it is not
clear whether the complementary or substitution effect of short-term debt on trade
credit predominates.
Ostliabit = Current Assetsit−TradeCreditorsitTotal Assetsit
Cash
Cash is defined as the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets. Although
there is a generally negative relationship between cash and leverage, Acharya et al.
(2007) present a model showing that this relationship depends on the financial con-
dition and hedging motives of firms. According to Acharya et al. (2007), financially
constrained firms save cash without attempting to reduce outstanding debt and only
reduce debt using excess cash if their hedging motive is low. Although the effect of
cash on debt is largely negative, its effect on trade credit is a subject of debate. Pe-
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tersen and Rajan (1997) report that cash has no significant effect on trade credit,
while Bougheas et al. (2009), Dass et al. (2014) and Wu et al. (2012) report a signifi-
cant negative effect. Lately, there has been a marked increase in cash holdings among
firms in the US. Acharya et al. (2007), Acharya et al. (2012), Ang and Smedema (2011)
and Bates et al. (2009) report secular increases in cash holdings in the US and at-
tribute this to the growing need to increase corporate flexibility. In contrast to the
results in the US, Figure 3.4e shows that cash holdings in the UK are relatively sta-
ble over time.
Cashit =
Cash and Cash Equivalentit
Total Assetsit
Tangible assets
Tangible assets are defined as the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total
assets. This is consistent with Byoun (2008), Faulkender et al. (2012) and Oztekin
(2015). Tangible assets are used as a measure of collateral, which is expected to
have a positive effect on debt financing. High collateral values, just like size, reduce
information asymmetry problems (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Leland and Pyle,
1977; Leland, 1998). However, the shrinking collateral values (tangible assets) in the
US and UK (see, Figure 3.2c) have largely been overlooked in the literature, yet, it
implies that there are changes in lending approaches as firms (with low collateral
values) are able to access credit.16 Similar decreases in tangible assets are also ob-
servable for UK firms in Figure 3.2c. Stroebel (2015) presents a model showing that
integrated lenders with more information about collateral values are more willing
to advance credit (to firms with specialised investments) at relatively lower interest
rates than non-integrated lenders. This implies that firms may be able to access debt
financing despite the significant decrease in tangible assets.
Tangibleit =
Property Plant & Equipmentit
Total Assetsit
Intangible assets
Intangible assets are defined the ratio of intangible non-current assets to total assets.
16Falato et al. (2013) report significant decreases in the US over the period 1996 - 2005, which
implies that the debt capacity of firms has decreased over time as they have less pledgeable assets
(collateral).
55
Although, intangible assets have been largely ignored in the literature, Figure 3.2d
shows marked increases to levels similar to those of tangible assets. During the same
period in which tangible assets decrease significantly, leverage remains persistent,






Growth (Tobin-q) is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the book
value of total assets (Byoun, 2008; Goyal et al., 2011; Graham and Leary, 2011; Liu,
2009). Although Alti (2003) and Erickson and Whited (2006, 2010, 2012) highlight
the mis-measurement errors in the Tobin-q ratio, Adam and Goyal (2008) argue
that this ratio has the highest information content about future investment oppor-
tunities compared to other proxies of growth opportunities (such as sales growth or
analysts' forecasts).
Growthit =
Market Value of Equityit+Total Assetsit−Book Value of Equityit
Total Assetsit
Size
Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets, and this definition is consis-
tent with Faulkender et al. (2012), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Graham et al. (2015).
However, other studies use the natural logarithm of sales as a measure of firm size
(e.g., Hovakimian and Vulanovic, 2010; Ozkan, 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Gra-
ham et al. (2015) highlight that there are no significant differences between using the
natural logarithm of sales or total assets as a measure of firm size. Similarly, Titman
and Wessels (1988) and Frank and Goyal (2009) report a high correlation between
the two measures of firm size. Further, the high correlation between the logarithm
of sales and total assets for firms used in this thesis suggests that using either the
logarithm of size or sales lead to similar results.17 Therefore, for the purposes of the
17The unreported correlation between the logarithm of sales and total assets for firms used in this
thesis is 0.956.
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analyses in this thesis, size is defined as the logarithm of total assets.
Sizeit = ln(Total Assetsit)
Profit
Profit is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets.
Faulkender et al. (2012), Graham et al. (2015) and Oztekin (2015) use a similar mea-
sure of profitability. Profitability is widely used to test the predictions of the pecking
order theory (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2007b; Leary and Roberts, 2010; Vasiliou et al.,
2009). A negative relation with leverage implies that a manager exhibits hierarchical
preferences of financing sources as is consistent with the predictions of the pecking
order theory. However, Jensen et al. (1992) report a positive relationship between
profitability and leverage which is inconsistent with the predictions of the pecking
order theory but consistent with the trade-off theory. The mixed results highlight
that the effect of profitability on leverage is still not clear.
Profitit =
Earnings Before Interest & Taxit
Total Assetsit
Non-debt tax shield
Non-debt tax shield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. Leary and Roberts
(2005), de Miguel and Pindado (2001) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) use a sim-
ilar measure, and report a negative relationship between non-debt tax shield and
leverage. The negative relationship is consistent with the predictions of the model
of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) which posits that non-debt tax shield (such as de-
preciation, investment tax credit and net-loss carryforwards) are substitutes for the
benefits arising from the interest deductibility of debt. However, Antoniou et al.
(2008), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Titman and Wessels (1988) report a positive ef-
fect. Similarly, MacKie-Mason (1990) argues that the effect of the non-debt tax shield
on leverage is likely to be insignificant as most of the shield elements are in the form
of investment tax credit, which is only generated by a few highly profitable firms.
Similarly, a review of the determinants of capital structure by Parsons and Titman
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(2007) highlights the mixed results on the relationship between leverage and the
non-debt tax shield. This suggests that there is still a debate on the exact effects of





In line with Serghiescu and Văidean (2014), asset turnover is defined as the ratio of
sales to total assets. It is used to measure how efficiently firms manage their assets to
generate revenue. Serghiescu and Văidean (2014) report a significant positive effect
of asset turnover on leverage. However, Bastos and Pindado (2013) report that asset




Volatility is defined as the average 3-year rolling standard deviation of earnings.
Earnings volatility is used to measure operating risk. This is in line with Krainer
(2014) who shows that firms use capital structure to counteract changes in operating
risk. Similarly, Dierker et al. (2013) report that firms adjust capital structure to
manage risk. Antoniou et al. (2008) and Dang et al. (2012) highlight that firms with
volatile earnings should use less debt as they may not be in a position to meet their
debt obligations in bad macroeconomic environments (recessions). Further, Dang




where σit is the standard deviation of earnings for firm i at time t.
The following section presents descriptive statistics on all the variables used and
discusses the emerging trends.
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics on the variables used. It reports firm-year
observations (N), mean, standard deviation (Stdev), 25th percentile, median, and 75th
percentile of leverage (total debt, TDA; net-debt, NDA; long-term debt, LTDA; short-
term debt, STDA; and total liabilities, TLTA), trade credit (accounts payable, AP; ac-
counts receivable, AR; and net trade credit, NTC), research and development dummy
(RDD), research and development (R&D), capital expenditure (Capex), investment
(Invest), other short-term liabilities (Ostliab), cash, tangible assets, intangible assets,
growth, size, asset turnover (AssetTurn), non-debt tax shield (NDTS) and volatility.18
Across all firm-year observations, the mean (median) leverage ratio for total debt
(TDA), net-debt (NDA), long-term debt (LTDA) and total liabilities (TLTA) is 20.6%
(20.0%), 11.2% (12.9%), 12.7% (10.8%) and 55.3% (55.1%), respectively. The lower
net-debt (NDA) relative to other leverage measures suggests that firms hold on aver-
age 9.4% of total assets in cash. About 61% of the firm-year observations (458 firms)
have positive R&D, which suggests that a high proportion of firms in the UK are
investing in R&D. The mean (median) R&D and capital expenditure for all firms in
the sample are 1.60% (0%) and 5.70% (4.70%), respectively. The standard deviation
of capital expenditure (10.9%) is relatively higher than that of R&D (4.3%) which is
consistent with decreases in capital expenditure and increases in R&D. On average,
capital expenditure is higher than R&D although it is decreasing over time. The
low volatility of R&D is consistent with Borisova and Brown (2013) who report that
during the recent global financial crisis, firms in the US continued to support in-
vestments in R&D by either selling-off assets or cutting back on capital expenditure.
The mean (median) tangible assets and intangible assets is 33.2% (31.5%) and 9.20%
(0.00%), respectively.
18The histograms in Appendix 3.B present the distribution of the variables used in the analyses.
Appendix 3.B shows that these variables are not normally distributed. Further, considering some of
the variables as endogenous requires the use of instrumental variables in estimation (discussed later
in each of the empirical chapters). Appendix 3.D presents the time series averages of the variables
used.
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics
The table reports the number of observations (N), mean, median, standard deviation (Stdev), 25th
and 75th percentiles for the variables used. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for
non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D.
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for all firms. Panel B presents the differences between
non-innovative and innovative firms in the mean of the variables used. Panel C presents estimates
of the coefficients on the time trend from the regression of leverage or trade credit on a time trend.
The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK from the main official list of the London Stock
Exchange over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter
3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through
Datastream. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Panel A
Variables N Mean Stdev 25th Median 75th
TDA 8396 0.206 0.120 0.118 0.200 0.279
NDA 8396 0.112 0.172 0.020 0.129 0.221
LTDA 8396 0.127 0.106 0.038 0.108 0.187
STDA 8396 0.093 0.132 0.023 0.058 0.118
TLTA 8396 0.553 0.158 0.453 0.551 0.654
AP 8396 0.134 0.090 0.069 0.121 0.181
AR 8396 0.228 0.118 0.145 0.225 0.300
NTC 8396 0.094 0.096 0.042 0.090 0.144
RDD 8396 0.496 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
R&D 8396 0.016 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.016
Capex 8396 0.057 0.048 0.026 0.047 0.074
Investment 8396 0.082 0.087 0.010 0.065 0.121
Ostliab 8396 0.293 0.126 0.211 0.275 0.355
Cash 8396 0.094 0.101 0.025 0.064 0.133
Tangible 8396 0.332 0.186 0.201 0.315 0.441
Intangible 8396 0.092 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.112
Growth 8396 1.544 1.014 1.030 1.312 1.748
Size 8396 12.104 2.134 10.564 11.699 13.503
Profit 8396 0.123 0.122 0.087 0.134 0.182
AssetTurn 8396 1.204 0.558 0.844 1.169 1.514
NDTS 8396 0.043 0.025 0.028 0.040 0.053
Volatility 8396 0.039 0.055 0.013 0.023 0.044
Panel B: Non-innovative and Innovative firms
NIN INN Diff
Variables N Mean Stdev N Mean Stdev (p-value)
TDA 3304 0.211 0.129 5092 0.203 0.114 (0.002)
NDA 3304 0.137 0.165 5092 0.095 0.175 (0.000)
LTDA 3304 0.130 0.116 5092 0.125 0.098 (0.020)
STDA 3304 0.101 0.152 5092 0.088 0.118 (0.000)
TLTA 3304 0.554 0.158 5092 0.552 0.158 (0.569)
AP 3304 0.147 0.107 5092 0.125 0.076 (0.000)
AR 3304 0.220 0.134 5092 0.233 0.107 (0.000)
NTC 3304 0.074 0.108 5092 0.108 0.085 (0.000)
RDD 3304 0.000 0.000 5092 0.818 0.386 (0.000)
R&D 3304 0.000 0.000 5092 0.260 0.050 (0.000)
Capex 3304 0.059 0.059 5092 0.570 0.039 (0.067)
Investment 3304 0.070 0.080 5092 0.090 0.090 (0.000)
Ostliab 3304 0.278 0.123 5092 0.303 0.127 (0.000)
Cash 3304 0.074 0.082 5092 0.107 0.109 (0.000)
Tangible 3304 0.342 0.219 5092 0.325 0.160 (0.000)
Intangible 3304 0.085 0.181 5092 0.097 0.162 (0.001)
Growth 3304 1.342 0.837 5092 1.676 1.093 (0.000)
Size 3304 11.586 1.752 5092 12.440 2.287 (0.000)
Profit 3304 0.112 0.116 5092 0.130 0.124 (0.000)
AssetTurn 3304 1.232 0.655 5092 1.186 0.484 (0.000)
NDTS 3304 0.040 0.028 5092 0.045 0.023 (0.000)
Volatility 3304 0.040 0.056 5092 0.038 0.054 (0.197)
Panel C: Trend*100
TDA NDA LTDA STDA TLTA AP AR NTC
ALL 0.114*** 0.089*** 0.280*** -0.120*** -0.110*** -0.180*** -0.400*** -0.220***
NIN 0.163*** 0.120*** 0.316*** -0.098** 0.027 -0.210*** -0.400*** -0.190***
INN 0.090*** 0.099*** 0.263*** -0.130*** -0.200*** -0.140*** -0.410*** -0.260***
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Comparison of the differences between innovative firms and non-innovative firms in
Panel B is based on non-parametric equality tests of the mean. Non-innovative firms
use relatively higher leverage than innovative firms, with the differences in mean,
being significant on total debt, net-debt and long-term debt. The relatively low lever-
age for innovative firms as implied by the non-parametric equality tests of the mean
is consistent with prior studies. For example, Borisova and Brown (2013) and Brown
and Petersen (2009) report that R&D subjects firms to binding credit constraints. The
results in Panel B further show that innovative firms have relatively lower capital
expenditure than non-innovative firms, although the differences are only marginally
significant. Non-innovative firms have relatively higher tangible assets while inno-
vative firms have higher intangible assets. This is generally expected as innovative
firms invest more in intangible assets while non-innovative firms concentrate on tan-
gible assets. The differences in the mean of the control variables between innovative
and non-innovative firms are largely significant, except for volatility.19 In general,
innovative firms have relatively higher growth, size, profit and non-debt tax shield,
whereas non-innovative firms have higher earnings volatility.
The results in Panel C provide prima facie evidence on the trend of leverage and trade
credit over time. The coefficients on the time trend are highly significant, except for
total liabilities of non-innovative firms. Panel C shows a statistically significant up-
ward trend on total debt and net-debt, and a downward trend on short-term debt,
total liabilities and accounts payable. The trends are indicative of a significant shift
towards debt with longer maturity. Further, there are marked differences between in-
novative and non-innovative firms in the trend coefficient of leverage and trade credit
but not for accounts receivable. This preliminary result is consistent with Panel B
and indicates that there are differences in trends of debt and trade credit between
innovative and non-innovative firms.
The trends in leverage and trade credit over time, and how leverage and trade credit
19Growth, size, profit, asset turnover, non-debt tax shield and volatility are used as control vari-
ables in the analysis in this thesis.
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relate to changes in firm characteristics, is examined further in the following subsec-
tions.
3.4.1 Evolution of corporate leverage and collateral
Figure 3.1 shows time-series plots of mean leverage ratios (total debt, net-debt, long-
term debt, short-term debt and total liabilities) and debt-to-collateral ratios (total-
debt-to-collateral, net-debt-to-collateral, long-term debt-to-collateral, short-term-debt-
to-collateral and total-liabilities-to-collateral). ALL represents all firms in the sam-
ple, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for
innovative firms that report R&D. Appendix 3.D presents the time series averages
used to construct Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 indicates that the financing structure of firms varies significantly over
time. There are three observable peaks (1991, 2003, and 2008) in leverage ratios.
From 1987 to 1991 there is an increase in debt, followed by a decrease to 1997. Total
debt initially increases from 1987 to 1991, falls temporarily between 1992 and 1994,
and rises to 2003. Although total debt fluctuates over time, it exhibits an upward
drift throughout the period 1987-2013. Also observable are trends of increasing re-
liance on long-term debt and marked decreases in short-term debt from 1990 to 2013.
Prior to 1990, most corporate debt in the UK is predominantly short-term (on average
80%), with long-term and short-term debt converging from 1990 to 1993. Thereafter,
there is a marked reversal in financing trends as the proportion of long-term debt
increases progressively, reaching a peak of 71% (on average 63%) of total corporate
debt in 2012. The decrease in short-term debt is more pronounced for innovative
firms, which would be consistent with the existence of binding financial constraints
and the need to avoid roll-over risk. Similarly, Kahl et al. (2015) report that firms
with a high roll-over risk are more likely to use more long-term debt and less short-
term debt. A large proportion of the decrease in total liabilities from 1990 onwards,
is attributable to the decrease in short-term debt (Figure 3.1i) and other short-term
liabilities (Figure 3.4e). This shows less reliance on short-term financing sources,
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Figure 3.1 The evolution of leverage and collateral
(a) TDA (b) TDCO
(c) NDA (d) NDCO
(e) LTDA (f) LTDCO
(g) TLTA (h) TLCO
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Figure 3.1 The evolution of leverage and collateral (continued)
(i) STDA (j) STDCO
which is in contrast to Custódio et al. (2013) who report an increase in short-term
debt among firms in the US (they attribute the decrease in long-term debt between
1976 to 2008 to de-leveraging activities of small firms).
Comparisons of trends on leverage between non-innovative and innovative firms
show they use similar proportions of debt financing, except that the former use rel-
atively more total debt than the latter during the period from 2000 to 2013. The
relatively similar levels of total debt from 1987 to 1999 is inconsistent with existing
empirical evidence in the US that R&D should be financed mostly with equity (e.g.,
Borisova and Brown, 2013; Brown et al., 2009; Hall, 2002, 2009). However, Chava
et al. (2013) report that banks that have experience in lending to innovative firms
(specialised lenders) recognise the value of innovation (intangible investments) and
provide credit at comparatively lower rates than non-specialised lenders. Further,
the net-debt of innovative firms as shown in Figure 3.1c has a comparatively higher
standard deviation of 17.5% relative to the 16.5% for non-innovative firms (see, Table
3.3). This is opposite to the results of the volatility of total debt, as non-innovative
firms (12.9%) have higher volatility than innovative firms (11.4%) in Figure 3.1a. The
relatively high standard deviation of net-debt (Table 3.3) is due to the high variability
in cash, with innovative firms holding comparatively more cash than non-innovative
firms. The total debt and long-term debt of non-innovative firms are more volatile
than those of innovative firms, while there are no significant differences in the volatil-
ity of total liabilities. This is inconsistent with Brown et al. (2009) who report lower
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leverage levels for firms with R&D in the US over the period 1990-2004.
Similar differences as those on total debt (Figures 3.1a and 3.1b) between innova-
tive and non-innovative firms are observable on trends in long-term debt and total
liabilities. However, the result on net-debt is the opposite of that on other measures
of leverage, as non-innovative firms have relatively higher levels of net-debt than
innovative firms. Consistent with the this result, Figure 3.4f shows that innovative
firms hold relatively more cash holdings than non-innovative firms, which result in
low net-debt. The comparatively high cash holdings of innovative firms as shown in
Figure 3.4f is consistent with the proposition that these firms hoard cash to smoothen
the funding for R&D (e.g., Brown et al., 2009; Brown and Petersen, 2011; Buera and
Kaboski, 2012). However, in contrast to results in the US, a study of a sample of
Taiwanese firms by Sheu and Lee (2012) reports that excess cash is significantly
correlated with capital expenditure, while it is insensitive to R&D for financially
constrained firms (with severe managerial entrenchment). The recent literature on
investment-cash-flow sensitivity (ICFs) reports similar contradictory results on the
linkages between cash and R&D. 20 This leaves the question of how the relationship
between investment and financing activities has changed over time largely unan-
swered. The analysis in this thesis investigates the changes in this relationship in
the UK by drawing comparisons between innovative and non-innovative firms.
Overall, the persistence in leverage and the increasing collateral-to-debt ratios (Fig-
ures 3.1b, 3.1d, 3.1f and 3.1h) is inconsistent with collateral based lending. This
implies that an increasing proportion of intangible assets are financed using debt.
The following subsection presents a discussion of the time variations in corporate
investments and corporate assets.
20For example, in a study of 45 countries Moshirian et al. (2013) attribute the decrease in
investment-cash flow sensitivity to the increase in R&D. This decrease in investment-cash flow sensi-
tivity is inconsistent with what is expected, as the increase in R&D and the decrease in fixed capital
expenditure should result in marked increases in investment-cash-flow sensitivity. Brown et al. (2009)
report that R&D subject firms to binding financial constraints. If investment-cash-flow sensitivity are
a good measure of financial constraints, then the R&D-cash-flow sensitivity should be relatively higher
than that of fixed capital expenditure. Chen and Chen (2012) report similar decreases in investment-
cash flow sensitivity in the US.
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Figure 3.2 The evolution of corporate investments and assets
(a) Corporate investment (b) Capex and R&D
(c) Tangible assets (d) Intangible assets
3.4.2 Evolution of corporate investments and corporate assets
Figure 3.2 plots annual averages of total investments (includes capital expenditure,
R&D and changes in working capital), capital expenditure (Capex), and research and
development (R&D) over time. The figure also shows the time series evolution of
corporate assets (tangible assets and intangible assets). ALL represents all firms in
the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN
stands for innovative firms that report R&D. Appendix 3.D presents the time series
averages used to construct Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 shows that capital expenditure (Capex) is generally decreasing over the
sample period, with temporary increases during the periods 1987-1990, 1994-1998,
2005-2007, 2008-2009, and 2010-2013. There are marked increases in R&D dur-
ing the periods 1989-1998 and 2000-2003, and a decrease from 2006 to 2011. The
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marked changes in corporate investments has implications for corporate financing
policies as intangible investments (R&D), which are characterised by high specificity,
asset substitution, and low collateral value (see, Buera and Kaboski, 2012), are likely
to increase susceptibility to financial constraints (see, Brown et al., 2012). However,
the increase in R&D and the decrease in tangible assets shown in Figure 3.2 has not
been matched by a corresponding decrease in debt financing, which has remained
largely persistent with an irregular sinusoidal wave that has a slight upward drift as
shown in Figures 3.1a, 3.1c and 3.1e.21 This preliminary result indicates that firms
are still able to access debt financing despite significant changes over time in corpo-
rate investments and corporate assets.
Tangible assets are relatively stable from 1987 to 2000, then they decrease rapidly
from 2001 to 2013, except for a temporary recovery by non-innovative firms between
2006 and 2011. The decrease in tangible assets from 2001 to 2013 is consistent with
Figures 3.1b, 3.1d, 3.1f and 3.1h, which show a large increase in debt-to-collateral ra-
tio. This suggests a marked decrease in corporate debt capacity (assuming collateral
based lending). Figure 3.2d shows an opposite trend, with intangible assets remain-
ing relatively low from 1987 to 1998, and increasing rapidly thereafter. The increase
in intangible assets after 1998 suggests that firms should increase equity and de-
crease debt, as intangible assets are a poor form of collateral. According to Brown
et al. (2012), innovative investments are prone to information asymmetry, asset sub-
stitution and high specificity issues. The decrease in collateral values is difficult to
reconcile with the persistent and upward drift in corporate debt levels, and the propo-
sition that a fall in tangible assets should result in de-leveraging (e.g., Campello and
Giambona, 2013; Goyal et al., 2011; Oztekin, 2015). The persistent leverage suggests
that an increasing proportion of debt is supported by intangible assets which are tra-
ditionally considered to be poor a form of collateral.22
21Lemmon et al. (2008), Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) and Xu and Baranchuk (2008) report that
leverage is highly persistent. However, DeAngelo and Roll (2015) report that the stability of leverage
is only a temporary phenomenon, with greater variations occurring in the long-run.
22Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) present models which show that intangible assets are a poor
form of collateral. Despite this theoretical predictions, there are no empirical studies investigating
how changes in corporate assets affects corporate debt financing.
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The next sub-section presents a discussion of the other firm characteristics (used as
control variables in the analyses in this thesis) usually associated with corporate debt
and trade credit.
3.4.3 Evolution of other firm characteristics
Figure 3.3 presents time series plots of the annual cross-sectional mean of size,
growth, profit, non-debt tax shield, volatility and asset turnover from 1987 to 2013.
As before, ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative
firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D.
Appendix 3.D presents the time series averages used to construct Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3a indicates that size exhibits an increasing trend from 1988 onwards. The
increase from 2009 is rapid and is largely driven by the exit from the database of
firms that faced financial distress during the recent financial crisis (mostly small
firms). The recent global financial crisis is marked by an increase in the number of
firms that went into receivership and liquidation. According to Ivashina and Scharf-
stein (2010), corporate bankruptcy in the US peaked in 2008 and 2009. Similarly,
Appendix 3.A shows that the proportion of firms in the sample decreased progres-
sively from 2000 to 2013.23 The increase in size (Figure 3.3a) is driven by the growth
in intangible assets (as shown in Figure 3.2c and 3.2d), which should usually be fi-
nanced with equity. Yet, leverage exhibits persistence with a general upward drift.24
Figure 3.3b shows large fluctuations in firm growth, but the general trend is rel-
atively flat. Comparisons of growth rates between innovative and non-innovative
firms suggests that they experience similar growth patterns, although innovative
23This shows that the majority of the observations in the sample are concentrated over the period
1987-2000. This period reflects an influx of small innovative and high growth firms prior to the tech-
bubble. Fama and French (2004) report similar trends in new listings in the US, with these listings
being conducted mostly by young and high growth firms with weak balance sheets. They attribute this
influx of new listings by financially weaker firms (which would not ordinarily access public markets)
to a decline in the cost of equity.
24Graham et al. (2015) highlight that examining the relationship between the trend in firm size and
corporate debt financing in the US is problematic as firm size increases progressively with economic
growth.
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Figure 3.3 Changes in firm characteristics
(a) Size (b) Growth
(c) NDTS (d) Asset Turnover
(e) Profit (f) Volatility
firms consistently have higher growth rates, with a marked divergence between the
two type of firms from 1990 to 1996. There is considerable debate on how growth
affects leverage, with some studies (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008; de Jong et al., 2008;
Frank and Goyal, 2009; Oztekin, 2015) reporting a negative effect while others (e.g.,
Dang et al., 2012; Dang, 2013a; Dang et al., 2014a; de Jong et al., 2008; Drobetz and
Wanzenried, 2006; Oztekin and Flannery, 2012) reporting a positive effect. Trends
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of growth in Figure 3.3b do not allow for conclusive visual interpretations of how the
variables relate to the largely persistent and rising debt levels shown in Figure 3.1.
Non-debt tax shield is negatively related to leverage, which is a substitute for tax
shield (Goyal et al., 2011; Oztekin, 2015). Figure 3.3c shows that non-debt tax shield
increases from 1987-2003, and decreases from 2004 to 2007, before increasing again.
The general decrease in non-debt tax shield from 2004 to 2007 is consistent with
trends in tangible assets (Figure 3.2c) which show marked changes in corporate as-
sets. However, the trend in non-debt tax shield is difficult to relate to changes in
leverage as there appear to be a weak positive relationship, which is inconsistent
with the literature (e.g., de Miguel and Pindado, 2001; Leary and Roberts, 2005;
Goyal et al., 2011; Oztekin, 2015). Figure 3.3d shows that asset turnover decreased
rapidly from 1998 to 2008 and stabilised thereafter. The decrease in asset turnover is
rather difficult to reconcile with macroeconomic conditions in the UK, as the economy
did not experience a recession from the late 1990s up to the recent global financial cri-
sis. The decrease in asset turnover also occurs concurrently with a marked change in
corporate assets. Given that asset turnover is positively related to leverage (Serghi-
escu and Văidean, 2014), the decrease in asset turnover (Figure 3.3c) should lead to
a decrease in leverage. However, Figure 3.1 shows that leverage is persistent and
suggests that asset turnover is negatively related to corporate debt.
Figure 3.3e shows that on average, firms in the UK have become less profitable over
time. However, contrary to prior literature in the US, innovative firms are rela-
tively more profitable than non-innovative firms, except from 2001 to 2004.25 The
relatively low profitability of innovative firms during the period 2001-2004 coincides
with the tech-bubble during which several technologically oriented firms were liqui-
dated. Consistent with the pecking order theory, Goyal et al. (2011), Liu (2009) and
Warr et al. (2012) report a negative relationship between leverage and profitability.
Antoniou et al. (2008) and Oztekin and Flannery (2012) report similar results for
25Fama and French (2004) report that on average, high growth firms in the US are financially weak
and less profitable.
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firms in the UK and around the world, respectively. Thus, the general decrease in
profitability shown in Figure 3.3e should result in an increase in corporate debt, if
an inverse relationship exists between these two variables. However, the decrease
in profitability also implies that firms'ability to meet debt obligations has decreased
and, hence, the need to reduce debt financing.
Figure 3.3f shows that earnings volatility has increased, on average, peaking around
2001, decreasing temporary until 2005, increasing from 2006 to 2009, and falling
thereafter. Trends in earnings volatility mirror general economic conditions as they
peak around 2000 and trough around 2009 coinciding with the tech-bubble and the
global financial crisis, respectively. This is consistent with Brandt et al. (2010),
Campbell et al. (2001) and Kang et al. (2011) who report a similar increase in id-
iosyncratic risk in the US. In contrast to Brandt et al. (2010) who report a partial
reversal in idiosyncratic risk by 2003 in the US, Figure 3.3f shows that the reversal
is temporary in the UK, as earnings volatility increase again from 2005 to 2009. The
concurrence of the persistence in leverage and the general upward trend in earn-
ings volatility is rather contradictory to the theory and existing empirical evidence.
Theory predicts that in the presence of increasing operating risk, firms respond by
adopting conservative financing structures (Krainer, 2014). Consistent with the de-
leveraging hypothesis, Dang (2011) reports a negative relation between leverage and
earnings volatility in the UK for the period 1996-2003. However, interpreting the
visual trends in earnings volatility (Figure 3.3f) and leverage (Figure 3.1) suggests a
positive relation, which is rather surprising.
Overall, the change in other firm characteristics is difficult to reconcile with the
largely persistent and increasing trends in leverage, while the trends in leverage
determinants suggest that it should decrease over time. This raises new questions
on how, and in what way, have the relationships between capital structure and its de-
terminants changed over the past decades.26 Chapter 4, 5 and 6 investigate changes
26Survey evidence from Chief Finance Officers (CFOs) in the US by Graham and Harvey (2001)
show large differences between theory and practice. Similarly, Graham et al. (2015) report that the
factors commonly associated with capital structure (size, profit, tangible assets and market-to-book
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in the relationship between leverage (including trade credit) and firm characteristics
using sub-period analyses and rolling regressions over the sample period.
3.4.4 Evolution of trade credit, short-term debt and cash
Figure 3.4 presents time plots of the average trade credit, short-term liabilities and
cash holdings over the sample period. Trade credit is defined as either accounts
payable (AP) or accounts receivable (AR). Net trade credit (NTC) is the difference
between accounts receivable and accounts payable. Appendix 3.D presents the time
series averages used to construct Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4a shows a gradually decreasing trend in trade credit from 1989 to 2013,
accounts payable decreased from a peak of 25% in 1988 to below 15% in 2013. A sim-
ilar downward trend is also observable in accounts receivable. Figure 3.4c shows that
net trade credit also decreased over time. This decrease is rather inconsistent with
the changes in firm characteristics (size, growth, cash and other short-term debt) dis-
cussed above, except for the decrease in profitability and asset turnover. Trade credit
should increase with growth, as firms have to offer more goods on credit to increase
sales, and should decrease with cash, as firms have to increase cash sales to increase
liquidity. Similarly, trade credit should increase with decreases in short-term debt if
short-term debt and trade credit are substitutes (Dass et al., 2014). The decrease in
profitability and asset turnover (Figure 3.3) suggests that firms have less ability to
give credit and are, on average, selling less (as also shown by the decrease in asset
turnover).
Figure 3.4b shows that in general innovative firms use less and give more trade credit
than non-innovative firms. The differences are more pronounced in net trade credit
(Figure 3.4d) and provide prima facie evidence that trade credit policies differ across
these two types of firm. This finding is in contrast to the proposition that firms with
innovative investments are subject to binding financial constraints, which would re-
sult in an increasing reliance on trade credit and less credit extended to customers.
value) are progressively explain less of the observed variations in financing structures.
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Figure 3.4 Trade credit, cash and other short-term liabilities
(a) AP & AR (ALL) (b) AP & AR (INN & NIN)
(c) NTC (ALL) (d) NTC (INN & NIN)
(e) Cash & OSTLIAB (ALL) (f) Cash & OSTLIAB (INN & NIN)
However, the informational advantages and control over the buyer hypothesis posits
that firms with unique products may be more willing to give credit to their customers
(Biais and Gollier, 1997; Brennan et al., 1988; Smith, 1987). Consistent with this
hypothesis, Stroebel (2015) presents a model showing that non-integrated lenders
charge comparatively higher interest rates than integrated lenders to compensate for
the high information asymmetry in collateral values. The comparative advantages of
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suppliers in collecting information on the credit worthiness of customers (with this
advantage increasing with product uniqueness) as Cuñat (2007) and Petersen and
Rajan (1997) highlight, may explain the relatively high trade credit being provided
by innovative firms (these are mostly the suppliers of unique or specialised products).
This prediction is tested in Chapter 6 by drawing comparisons of the determinants of
trade credit between innovative and non-innovative firms.
Important variations in trade credit also emerge during the recent global financial
crisis. The variability of accounts payable suggests that non-innovative firms use
more trade credit than innovative firms except for the early 1990s and late 2000s.
Figure 3.4b shows that innovative firms give more trade credit (accounts receivable)
than non-innovative firms. The difference in accounts receivable between these two
types of firms is higher during the early 1990s and late 2000s. These two periods co-
incide with major recessions in the UK. This suggests that innovative firms are more
willing to support their customers during crisis periods by offering goods on credit.
Further, the dynamics of accounts receivable suggests that there are time varying dif-
ferences on trade credit policies between non-innovative firms and innovative firms.
Figure 3.4e shows that other short-term liabilities are decreasing while cash is rel-
atively stable over time. The general decrease in other short-term liabilities that
occurs at the same time as the decrease in trade credit indicates the existence of a
positive visual association (complimentary relationship). However, results in the lit-
erature on how trade credit relates to short-term debt are rather mixed. One strand
suggests that they are substitutes (e.g., Dass et al., 2014; Meltzer, 1960) while the
other (e.g., Cuñat, 2007; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013; Love et al.,
2007; Wu et al., 2012) suggests that they are compliments. Similarly, Meltzer (1960)
and Yang (2011b) report that the relationship between trade credit and bank credit
varies over time with changes in monetary policy. The stability of cash in UK firms
over time shows no clear relationship with trade credit. Innovative firms consis-
tently have more cash and other short-term liabilities than non-innovative firms.
This comparatively high cash-holding suggests that flexibility is more important for
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innovative firms than non-innovative firms. This is consistent with O’Brien (2003)
who report that maintaining flexibility is critical for survival in highly competitive
innovative product markets. However, the relatively high other short-term liabilities
of innovative firms is inconsistent with the need to maintain flexibility by reducing
short-term debt and the need to match the maturity of assets to financing sources
(Diamond, 1991; Hart and Moore, 1994). Trends in other short-term liabilities, cash
and trade credit do not provide a clear visual relationship. Overall, the decrease in
trade credit is rather difficult to reconcile with changes in firm characteristics. This
warrants further analysis in Chapter 6 which investigates the changes in trade credit
and the determinants of trade credit.
3.4.5 Correlations
Table 3.4 presents the correlations between the variables used. As expected, the
leverage variables (total debt, net-debt, long-term debt, total liabilities) are positively
correlated with each other, except for short-term debt which is negatively correlated
with long-term debt. The negative correlation between these latter two variables
suggests that long-term and short-term debt are substitutes. Trade credit (accounts
payable) is negatively correlated with all leverage variables (except for total liabil-
ities) as is consistent with the proposition that trade credit is a substitute to other
financing sources (Dass et al., 2014; Meltzer, 1960). Similarly, accounts receivable
is negatively correlated with total debt, net-debt and long-term debt, while it is pos-
itively correlated with short-term debt, total liabilities and accounts payable. The
positive correlation is prima facie evidence that firms in the UK use financing from
short-term debt, total liabilities and accounts payable to increase the credit they give
to their customers.
Table 3.4 shows that leverage is negatively correlated with R&D, growth, profit and
earnings volatility, and positively correlated with size, capital expenditure, tangible
and intangible assets. The correlations are mostly of the signs expected, and consis-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































leverage variables and intangible assets is rather inconsistent with the proposition
that intangible assets should be financed with equity.27,28 It is reassuring to note that
all other independent variables are not highly correlated with leverage variables, ex-
cept for net-debt and cash which are by definition closely related.29
As expected, accounts payable is highly correlated with accounts receivable which
suggests that firms that give more trade credit in turn also buy goods on credit.
Both trade credit variables are negatively correlated with total debt, net-debt, other
short-term debt, cash, the presence of research and development, tangible assets, in-
tangible assets and size. Asset turnover, profit and earnings volatility are positively
correlated with accounts payable, while profit is negatively correlated with accounts
payable. This suggests that profitable firms provide more trade credit to their cus-
tomers as is consistent with studies in the US (e.g., Giannetti et al., 2011), the UK
(e.g., Kling et al., 2014) and China (e.g., Guariglia and Mateut, 2013; Wu et al., 2012).
All the other correlations are relatively low and appear to be within the acceptable
ranges, except for the measures of trade credit and asset turnover which are by defi-
nition closely related.
Appendix 3.C presents the time series plots of the correlation averages across firms.
The time series plots show that the correlations between leverage and firm charac-
teristics changes over time. Although there is a general negative correlation between
leverage and R&D, the time series plots of the correlations in Appendix 3.C shows
that the negative correlation increased from 1987 to 2002, with a marked decrease
from 2003 to 2011, and an increase thereafter. The decrease in the correlation sug-
gests a change in risk aversion to financing R&D with debt. There is a general in-
crease in the correlations between leverage and capital expenditure, except for short-
term debt and total liabilities. This shows that firms are increasingly depending on
27Falato et al. (2013) presents a model showing that the rising intangible capital is the main factor
causing the shrinkage in corporate debt and the secular increases in cash holdings.
28Several studies in the US report marked increases in cash holdings (e.g., Bates et al., 2009; Brown
and Petersen, 2011; Foley et al., 2007).
29Although the literature does not provide a guidance on the threshold that defines a high correla-
tion, this thesis implements a sensitivity analysis that involves dropping one of the variables in case
there is a very high pair-wise correlation.
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debt, in particular, long-term debt to finance further investments.
On average, Panel A in Appendix 3.C shows that the correlations between R&D and
leverage are increasing up to early 2000s, thereafter, they decrease until the onset
of the recent crisis, afterwhich, they increase again. Although capital expenditure
is generally positively related with leverage, it is negatively related with total lia-
bilities. Similar changes are also observable on the annual time series plots of the
correlations (Appendix 3.C) between leverage variables and other factors (size, tan-
gible assets, intangible assets, growth, profit, non-debt tax shield, asset turnover,
volatility). These changes suggests that the relationship between leverage variables
and firm characteristics changes over time.
The next section presents a discussion of the methodology used for the empirical
analyses in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
3.5 Methodology
This section provides a brief generic description of the models and estimation tech-
niques used in the analyses in this thesis. More specific and detailed descriptions are
provided in each of the subsequent three empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
The empirical analyses in this thesis use a combination of ordinary least squares with
fixed effects (OLS FE thereon) and system Generalised Method of Moments (system
GMM thereon) as the main estimation techniques.30 However, in order to ensure the
robustness of the results and facilitate comparison with prior studies, results using
other estimation techniques are also presented in the appendices where applicable.31
30Several empirical studies in corporate finance use similar estimation techniques (e.g., Byoun,
2008; Brav, 2009; Dang, 2013b; Faulkender et al., 2008; Flannery and Hankins, 2013; Huang and
Ritter, 2009; Oztekin and Flannery, 2012).
31The appendices present estimation results using ordinary least squares (OLS thereon) (Dang,
2013a; Dang et al., 2014a; Ghaly et al., 2015; Love et al., 2007), Anderson Hsiao Instrumental Vari-
ables (AH IV thereon) (Dang et al., 2014a), Instrumental Variable Generalised Method of Moments (IV
GMM thereon) (Baum et al., 2006), Difference Generalised Method of Moments (DIFF GMM thereon)
(Dang et al., 2012, 2014a) and Fractional Dependent Variable (DPF thereon) (Elsas and Florysiak,
2013).
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In Chapter 4, the probability of issuing or retiring debt and equity is estimated using
probit regressions with a binary dependent variable that is equal one if the event
occurs and zero otherwise (e.g., Hovakimian et al., 2001; Hovakimian and Vulanovic,
2010).
Using panel data allows the modelling of cross-sectional dynamics over time while
simultaneously controlling for the potential endogeneity of the variables used. The
simultaneity bias and autoregressive terms in dynamic panel data models render
OLS estimates biased and inconsistent (see, Kiviet, 1995), hence, the use of instru-
mental variable estimating techniques. However, Stock et al. (2002) highlight that
good instruments are difficult to find and, where available, the instruments may be
weak, resulting in misleading inferences. The analyses in this thesis use system
GMM estimation techniques proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998). These are implemented by the command 'xtabond2' in Stata. The
'xtabond2' was developed by Roodman (2006).
The system GMM estimation techniques use all moment conditions by combining
equations estimated in levels with those estimated in differences to increase effi-
ciency (see, Blundell and Bond, 1998). Further, the techniques remove unobserved
firm specific effects, potential endogenity problems and controls for heterogeneity
across firms.32 The second to the fifth lags are used as instruments for the endoge-
nous variables in the analyses in this thesis in order to mitigate instrument prolif-
eration ("too many instruments") and its consequences, which include over-fitting of
endogenous variables, bias of estimates, and weakening of the Sargan-Hansen test.
The Hansen-Sargan test (J test) for over-identifying restrictions (at the conventional
5% level), and the m2 test for the non-existence of the second order serial correlation
in the differenced residuals are used to test whether the models are correctly specified
and the instruments used are valid (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond,
1998). The J statistic for over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically distributed
32Endogeneity problems arise due to simultaneity, omitted variables, measurement errors, and
auto-regression with auto-correlated errors.
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as chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of
instruments and the number of parameters. The test for second-order serial corre-
lation of the residuals in the differenced equations (m2) is asymptotically normally
distributed under the null of no second-order serial correlation of differenced residu-
als.
Further detail of the methodology is provided in each chapter given that they differ
depending on the particular hypotheses being investigated. The following section
presents a summary and an overall structure of the remaining chapters.
3.6 Summary
This chapter presents an overview of the data, sample composition and the method-
ology used. The data shows that leverage has remained largely persistent and in-
creasing on average, despite the decrease in fixed capital expenditure and tangible
assets, and the increase in R&D and intangible assets. This suggests that an in-
creasing proportion of debt is financing intangible assets as shown by the increase
in the debt-to-collateral ratios. Comparisons of the basic statistics show that non-
innovative firms use relatively more leverage than innovative firms, with the differ-
ences in mean, being significant on total debt, net-debt and long-term debt. A further
examination of the time series plots of leverage shows that leverage of innovative
and non-innovative firms exhibits similar trends, except during the period from 2000
to 2013, when non-innovative firms have relatively more leverage than innovative
firms. This result suggests that innovative firms are able to access debt financing
despite the literature predicting that they should use more(less) equity (debt) financ-
ing. On average, the basic statistics and times series plots of leverage suggests the
need to examine the financing decisions of innovative and non-innovative firms in
order to gain a better understanding of the changing interdependence of financing
and investment decisions.
The rest of the this thesis are structured as follows: Chapter 4 presents the results
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of the comparisons of the financing structure between innovative and non-innovative
firms, Chapter 5 presents the results of the differences in leverage adjustments be-
tween innovative and non-innovative firms, Chapter 6 presents the results of the
differences in trade credit adjustments between innovative and non-innovative firms,
and Chapter 7 concludes by presenting an overview of the main findings of the thesis,
limitations and directions for future research.
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Appendix 3.B Variable distributions
The figures presents histograms for the variables used. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the period
from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope
through Datastream.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
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Appendix 3.B Variable distributions (continued)
(i) (j) (k)
(l) (m) (n) (o)85
Appendix 3.B Variable distributions (continued)
(p) (q) (r) (s)
(t) (u)
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Appendix 3.B Variable distributions (continued)











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3.C Correlations by year (continued)






























Appendix 3.C Correlations by year (continued)
























Appendix 3.C Correlations by year (continued)

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter examines the differences in financing decisions of innovative and non-
innovative firms in the UK over the period 1987-2013. The results of the analysis
show that there is a significant increase in R&D and decrease in collateral values
over time, which has not been matched by a corresponding decrease in leverage.
Leverage has remained persistent with an upward drift, which suggests that firms
in the UK are able to access debt financing despite the decrease in collateral values.
The results show significant time variation in the relationship between financing
and investment. Comparisons show that most of the determinants of capital struc-
ture have similar effects for innovative and non-innovative firms, except on capital
expenditure, tangible assets and intangible assets that significantly differ across the
two firm groups. Intangible assets and tangible assets have a significantly higher
positive effect on debt for innovative firms, while capital expenditure is only signif-
icant for non-innovative firms. The results also show that leverage increases with
intangible assets in a similar way as tangible assets and, more importantly, for inno-
vative firms with low collateral values. These results suggest that innovative firms
are able to access debt financing and that examining heterogeneity arising from cor-
porate investments is important in understanding the observed variations in capital
structure.
4.2 Introduction
What is the effect of the increase in R&D expenditures on debt financing? Do in-
novative and non-innovative firms adopt different financing structures? The need
to understand the financing of innovation, and how it differs from that of physical
capital investments is increasingly becoming important as economies transit from
manufacturing towards service and technology sectors.1 This transition in corporate
1Several studies report marked changes in firm characteristics and industrial compositions. For
example, Buera and Kaboski (2012) and Damodaran (2009) highlight the rising importance of the
service and technology sectors in advanced economies in the post-1950s period. Fama and French
(2004) and Fama and French (2005) report a surge in IPOs by young and new firms in the US over the
past decades. Almeida et al. (2004), Chen and Chen (2012) and Moshirian et al. (2013) report marked
decreases in investment-cash-flow sensitivity (ICFs). Similarly, US studies report secular increases in
cash holdings (e.g., Acharya et al., 2007, 2012; Ang and Smedema, 2011; Bates et al., 2009).
100
investments over the recent decades is marked by a surge in R&D to levels that now
match or exceed physical capital expenditure, and a fall in tangible assets, while in-
tangible assets increase greatly. For example, Borisova and Brown (2013) report a
fourfold (twofold) increase in R&D among young (mature) firms in the US from 5%
(3.5%) in 1980 to 20% (8%) in 2001, with R&D falling (increasing) to 14.4% (9.3%)
by 2008. In a study of R&D smoothing in the US, Brown and Petersen (2011) report
similar increases in R&D from 2% for the period 1970-1981 to 6.3% for the period
1982-1993, with R&D rising to 10.3% over the period 1994-2006. Brown and Pe-
tersen (2011) also report a significant decrease in capital expenditure from 7.2% to
5.4% over the period from 1970 to 2006. Similarly, Brown et al. (2012) report that
the mean of R&D (8.5%) of firms in Europe over the period 1995-2007 is larger than
that of physical capital investment (5.8%). Falato et al. (2013) and Sporleder et al.
(2002) report similar increases in R&D in the US. However, these marked changes
in corporate investments and their implications on corporate decisions have been
largely overlooked in the literature, with most research focusing on fixed capital in-
vestments. Yet, the upward trend in innovation and the decrease in fixed capital
investments and tangible assets appear to be a long-term phenomena.
The relationship between financing and investment decisions is a classical issue in
corporate finance, with Miller (1991) famously highlighting that managers should
not worry about "second order self-correcting activities" such as capital structure.
Similarly, Chava and Roberts (2008) and Stein (2003) highlight that the linkages
between financing and real decisions (such as investment, employment) in the pres-
ence of market imperfections is rather ambiguous, even after decades of concerted
research effort.2 The high information asymmetry, susceptibility to asset substitu-
tion problems, longer investment horizons and low pledgeable values that charac-
2Empirical studies examining these relationships between investment and financial decisions are
rather less developed as they often consider each corporate decision in isolation (Dang, 2011) or adopt
a ceteris paribus approach (Dammon and Senbet, 1988), which tends to overlook the interdependence
and simultaneity in corporate decisions. Results on the linkages between finance and investment
are mixed, with one strand of the literature reporting significant or insignificant linkages (Mauer
and Triantis, 1994), while the other either reports a positive (e.g., Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005) or a
negative relationship (e.g., Aivazian et al., 2005; Dang, 2011; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Lang et al.,
1996). These mixed results highlight the need for further research.
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terise innovative investments make capital structure of "first order importance" to
corporate decisions. Theory predicts that innovative investments should be financed
with equity, as R&D generate intangible assets which are a poor form of collateral
(see, Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). Similarly, the stakeholder co-investment theory of
Titman (1984) posits that firms with unique products are more likely to face binding
constraints.3 These predictions should result in innovative firms using less debt fi-
nancing relative to non-innovative firms.
The control rights proposition posits that in as much as the covenants associated
with debt affords closer monitoring of managers, the covenants inadvertently re-
strict strategic flexibility (the need to make regular interest and debt repayments)
(O’Brien, 2003) and harm innovation (by requiring disclosure of proprietary infor-
mation) (Buera and Kaboski, 2012). Furthermore, in the presence of information
asymmetry, equity financing is costly as it often involves dilution of ownership (see,
Aghion et al., 2004; O’Brien, 2003). According to David et al. (2008), debt financing
in the form relational debt is a more appropriate form of financing for innovation, as
relational lenders are concentrated (as opposed to fragmented transactional lenders)
and have information about the collateral values of innovation. Similarly, Stroebel
(2015) presents a model which shows that integrated lenders with a comparative
advantage in terms of information about collateral values give more loans (for inno-
vative projects) at relatively lower interest rates than non-integrated lenders. Chava
et al. (2013) also report results that lender expertise is important to the financing of
3Borisova and Brown (2013), Brown and Petersen (2009), Brown and Petersen (2011), Brown et al.
(2012), Buera and Kaboski (2012), Hall (2009), Itenberg and Stangebye (2013) and Moshirian et al.
(2013) report that the unique features of innovative investments (high information asymmetry issues,
asset substitution problems and low collateral values) subjects firms to binding credit constraints.
Consistent with these predictions, several empirical studies in the US report a negative relationship
between debt and R&D (e.g., Brown et al., 2009; Faulkender et al., 2012; Jung and Song, 2011). Also,
Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2014) report that real asset illiquidity increases the cost of capital. The
literature also suggests that firms use capital structure to strategically manage risk (Dierker et al.,
2013) or earnings volatility (Dang et al., 2014a), which implies that firms with innovate investments
may adopt conservative financing structures to counteract the high risks associated with their invest-
ments portfolios. Similarly, a study in the US over the twentieth century by Krainer (2014) reports
that managers make investment decisions consistent with the risk aversion of shareholders and use
capital structure to offset any changes in operating risk arising from changes in investment decisions.
Consistent with the pecking order theory, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) report that the presence
of financial constraints further strengthens the hierarchical preferences of financing sources with in-
ternal equity as the most preferred source of financing for firms with highly innovative investments.
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innovation. Combined, the existence of specialised lenders and innovation in capital
markets allows innovative firms to access debt financing.4 Further, the scale of inno-
vative investments may necessitate accessing capital markets more frequently as the
internal financing may be inadequate (see, Cornaggia et al., 2015; Hall and Lerner,
2010). These mixed predictions on the role of debt in financing innovation and the
rather persistent leverage against increasing R&D, and falling collateral values high-
light the need for further research.
To put the changes in the composition of corporate investments in the UK into per-
spective, between 1990 and 2000, R&D investments only accounted for 2%−4% of
total assets, with this proportion increasing considerably to a range between 5%−7%
from 1998 onwards until the onset of the recent global financial crisis.5 In contrast,
fixed capital expenditure which used to constitute the majority of corporate invest-
ments receded from averages just above 8% in the 80s and early 90s, to between
6% and 8% through 2000, and falling further below 6%, thereafter. However, Figure
3.1 in Chapter 3 shows that corporate debt levels have been rising throughout the
sample period, with the exception of short-term debt. The debt-to-collateral ratio in-
creases significantly over time, reaching a peak of 85%, 52%, 61%, 26%, and 203%
for total debt, net-debt, long-term debt, short-term debt and total liabilities in 2008
(around the crisis period), , respectively. The increase in leverage is consistent with
Graham et al. (2015), who report that corporate leverage has more than tripled over
the past century in the US.6 What explains these rather unexpected trends in financ-
ing and investment activities remains largely an empirical question, especially the
relationship between financing activities and real decisions in the presence of market
imperfections is rather ambiguous (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Stein, 2003).7
4Further, innovation in capital markets (in the form of new financing instruments) and the emer-
gence of specialised lenders allows access to financing that would not ordinarily exist for innovative
investments. A model of Michalopoulos et al. (2009) predicts that technological innovation and eco-
nomic growth will eventually stop unless there is continuous financial innovation.
5Ongoing advances in the technological sector indicate that the increase in intangible investments
is more of a long-term phenomenon (Michalopoulos et al., 2009).
6Further, Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 shows that the proportion of long-term debt is increasing in the
UK.as short-term debt is decreasing over time. This result is in contrast to Custódio et al. (2013) who
report marked decreases in debt with maturity greater than three years in the US from 53% in 1976
to 6% in 2008.
7Similar to the irrelevancy theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), the "separation principle" posits
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This chapter provides empirical evidence on the differences in financing decisions
of innovative and non-innovative firms in the UK over the period 1987-2013. To for-
mally examine these differences, the analyses in this chapter adopt a de-compositional
approach in dynamic leverage regressions estimated via system Generalised Meth-
ods of Moments (system GMM thereon). The adoption of a de-compositional approach
allows for an analysis of the components of leverage (total debt, net-debt, long-term
debt and total liabilities), while the system GMM estimation technique controls for
potential endogeneity and unobserved firm-specific effects.8 The main prediction is
that the coefficients on the determinants of leverage differ across the four components
of leverage, and between innovative and non-innovative firms. The second prediction
is that the relationship between investment and leverage has changed over time,
with innovative firms increasingly being able to access debt financing.9 In order to
investigate the changes in the relationship between leverage and the firm specific
characteristics, the analyses in this chapter estimate 5-year rolling regressions over
the period 1983 to 2013. In further examinations of the changes in the relationship
between leverage and the leverage determinants, the sample is divided into six non-
overlapping periods; 1987-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, and
2011-2013, upon which comparisons are drawn.
This chapter makes three contributions to the literature. First, the results show that
innovative and non-innovative firms have similar financing structures (capital struc-
ture and debt maturity) as is consistent with the hypothesis that there is an improve-
ment in access to financing for innovation. The similarities in debt financing remain
despite the overall negative effect of R&D on leverage. These similarities in financ-
that the financing and investment decisions are independent (Jackson et al., 2013). This prediction is
rather contrary to studies that have converged on the idea that the investment and financing decisions
inter-dependent in the presence of market imperfections (e.g., Kim, 1978; Krasker, 1986; Kraus and
Litzenberger, 1973; Miller, 1977; Myers, 1984; Scott, 1976).
8Sufi (2009) highlights that one major limitation of existing studies in the US on capital structure
is their apparent failure to recognise debt heterogeneity. This chapter extents this intuition by linking
the compositional changes in leverage to changes in corporate investments. Further, DeAngelo and
Roll (2015) and Welch (2004) also highlight that the components of leverage exhibit high variability
over time even though on aggregate leverage is relatively stable.
9Consistent with this predictions, Chava et al. (2013) report that loan spreads for US firms de-
crease significantly with patent citations.
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ing structure are not consistent with the predictions of the information asymmetry
theory, neither with the results of prior studies which suggest that firms with more
intangible assets should be financed with equity (e.g., Borisova and Brown, 2013;
Brown and Petersen, 2009, 2011; Hall, 2009). Rather, the result is consistent with
Chava et al. (2013), who report that lending institutions that specialise in financing
innovation recognise their collateral values, and avail credit at relatively favourable
rates. Similarly, Stroebel (2015) reports that integrated lenders who supposedly have
superior information about the collateral values of the firm's assets charge relatively
lower interest rates than non-integrated lenders. The relatively low debt financing
for innovative firms from 2001 to 2013 suggests an increase in risk aversion in the
post tech-bubble. This result is consistent with studies in the US that report in-
creases in idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Campbell et al., 2001; Kang et al., 2011). The low
debt financing for innovative firms from 2001 to 2013 show that managers counteract
increases idiosyncratic risk through reducing debt.
Second, the time varying coefficients of R&D, capital expenditure, tangible assets
and intangible assets, show that the relationship between leverage and investment,
or leverage and corporate assets, is rather dynamic. Consistent with the results
presented in this chapter, the relationship between leverage and investment differs
across the four measures of leverage (total debt, net-debt, long-term debt and total
liabilities) used in this analysis. Furthermore, our results show that the effects of
investment on leverage are neither persistently positive nor negative, but change
in both sign and significance over time and across the four different measures of
leverage. The observed time variation in the relationship between leverage and in-
vestment shed light on why prior studies report mixed results.10
Third, the negative-effect of R&D on leverage decreases during a time period when
innovative firms have roughly the same leverage as non-innovative firms. This de-
10The results on the linkages between investment and financing decisions are rather mixed as
Caglayan and Rashid (2014) and Lyandres and Zhdanov (2005) report a positive relationship, while
Aivazian et al. (2005), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Dang (2011) and Lang et al. (1996) report a
negative relationship.
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crease prior to the period 2005-2010 is consistent with Begenau and Palazzo (2015)
who suggest that banks that specialise in financing innovation recognise the value
of these investments, and advance credit at comparatively lower rates than other
lenders. Of particular interest, is also the positive relationship between leverage
and intangible assets, except on total liabilities. This positive relationship suggests
that intangible assets facilitate access to debt financing in a similar way as tangible
assets. The negative effect of tangible assets and intangible assets on total liabili-
ties is consistent with the prediction that firms with access to capital markets use
less short-term debt. Further, the results show that intangible assets and tangible
assets have a relatively higher positive effect on leverage for innovative firms than
non-innovative firms. This results suggests that collateral (both tangible assets and
intangible assets) plays a significant role in facilitating access to debt financing for
firms likely to face binding credit constraints. Overall, the effects of investment and
tangible/intangible assets on leverage are statistically significant, even after account-
ing for the dynamic nature of corporate decisions and other standard determinants
of capital structure.
The analysis in this chapter relates to studies on the relationship between finance
and investment activities.11 Prior studies largely focus on the relationship between
capital expenditure and leverage, while overlooking the large increase in R&D, and
the dynamic nature of the relationship between corporate investment and financing
activities.12 Further, prior studies assume that debt is homogeneous, but the results
in this chapter show that debt is rather heterogeneous with its components chang-
ing over time.13 Similarly, DeAngelo and Roll (2015) highlight that the stability of
leverage or the importance of firm fixed effects is a temporary phenomenon which
occurs at low levels of leverage, with most firms abandoning conservative financing
11Several studies examine the relationship between finance and investment activities (e.g.,
Aivazian et al., 2005; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Dammon and Senbet, 1988; Dang, 2011; DeAngelo
and Masulis, 1980; Lang et al., 1996; Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005; Mauer and Triantis, 1994; Stein,
2003).
12For prior studies on the relationship between investment and financing decisions, see Aivazian
et al. (2005), Dang (2011), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Lang et al. (1996), and Lyandres and Zhdanov
(2005).
13Rauh and Sufi (2010) highlight that debt is rather non-homogeneous, yet, the existing literature
assumes that debt is homogeneous.
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policies over time.14 This chapter adds new insights by highlighting that the rela-
tionship between leverage and firm specific factors changes over time and across the
four components of leverage.
This chapter complements the growing literature on R&D by providing results that
shows that changes in corporate investment affect the debt-equity choice.15 This
chapter also relates to recent studies in the US by Dudley (2012), Elsas et al. (2013)
and Whited (2006) on the effects of large corporate investments on capital structure.
This chapter builds on the results by Dudley (2012), Elsas et al. (2013) and Whited
(2006) by showing that in addition to the size of corporate investments, the forms
of corporate investments affect capital structure and heterogeneity in preferences
when accessing capital markets to financing investments. Further, the results from
the analysis in this chapter show that the relationship between leverage and invest-
ment is dynamic which helps in explaining the mixed results in the literature.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.3 presents the methodology
used, Section 4.4 discusses the the empirical results, Section 4.5 presents robustness
tests, and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.3 Methodology
Dynamic panel data models are used to investigate the determinants of leverage and
differences between innovative and non-innovative firms. The first part of the analy-
sis involves estimating a dynamic panel data model on firm specific factors. The sec-
ond part involves estimating the sensitivity of leverage to investment and corporate
assets using a series regressions over the periods 1987-1992, 1993-1998, 1999-2004,
2005-2010 and 2011-2013. The last section of the analysis involves estimating the
probability of issuing or retiring debt or equity using logistic regression models.
14Several studies report that leverage is rather stable and that fixed effects are important to the
understanding of the determinants of capital structure (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2008; Graham and
Leary, 2011; Hanousek and Shamshur, 2011; Lemmon et al., 2008; Parsons and Titman, 2007; Rauh
and Sufi, 2012).
15For studies on R&D, see Acemoglu et al. (2010), Borisova and Brown (2013), Brown et al. (2009),
Brown et al. (2012), Hall (2002), Hall (2009), Hall and Lerner (2010) and Moshirian et al. (2013).
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The baseline model in which leverage is specified as a function of lagged leverage and
firm specific factors is:
Lit =α+γLit−1 +βXit−1 +ζi +εit (4.1)
where Lit is the leverage of firm i at time/year t, α is a constant, γ is a coefficient
and β is vector of coefficients to be estimated, Lit−1 is lagged leverage, Xit−1 is a
vector of firm specific factors explained below, ζi represents time-invariant unobserv-
able firm-specific effects, and εit is an error term. The vector of firm specific factors,
Xit−1, includes R&D, capital expenditure (Capex), tangible assets, intangible assets
and control variables (growth, size, profit, non-debt tax shield (NDTS) and volatility).
The choice of these determinants of capital structure is motivated by the literate.16
The analysis in this chapter uses a de-compositional approach in which leverage is
defined as total debt, net-debt, long-term debt or total liabilities. The application of a
de-compositional approach on leverage is in line with Welch (2004) who highlight that
although leverage is relatively stable or persistent on aggregate (as Lemmon et al.
(2008) and Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) report), non-innovative and innovative
firms' components (long-term and short-term debt) vary over time.17 All variables
used are defined in Table 3.2 on page 46 in Chapter 3.
In order to investigate the differences between innovative and non-innovative firms,
Equation (4.1) is modified as follows:
Lit =α+γNINLNINit−1 +γINNLINNit−1 +βNINXNINit−1 +βINNXINNit−1 +ηi +ξit (4.2)
where Lit is the leverage of firm i at time/year t, α is a constant, γ is a coefficient and
β is vector of coefficients to be estimated, Lit−1 is lagged leverage, Xit−1 is a vector
of firm specific factors explained below, ηi represents time-invariant unobservable
16For a review of the reliable determinants of capital structure, see Frank and Goyal (2009),
Oztekin (2015) and Parsons and Titman (2007).
17DeAngelo and Roll (2015) report similar results which show that the observed stability in lever-
age is a temporary phenomenon, which only occurs at lower levels of leverage as firms actively adjust
capital structure in the long-run.
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firm-specific effects, and ξit is an error term. The focus of the analysis in Equation
(4.2) is on whether the coefficients on the determinants of leverage differ between
non-innovative (NIN) and innovative firms (INN). Equation (4.2) is used to analyse
the differences in the coefficients on R&D, capital expenditure, tangible assets and
intangibles assets between innovative and non-innovative firms. The advantages of
using Equation (4.2) over separate estimations of Equation (4.1) for innovative and
non-innovative firms is that Equation (4.2) has higher degrees of freedom and allows
for direct tests on the differential effects of the firm specific factors on leverage. Re-
sults from separate estimations of Equation (4.1) for non-innovative and innovative
firms are also presented for robustness.
This chapter also investigates the effects of corporate investments (R&D and Capex)
and (intangible and tangible) assets on the probability of issuing equity or debt (re-
purchasing equity or debt) by estimating the following logistic regression:
D∗it =λ0 +λXit−1 +νi +µit (4.3)
where D∗it is a dummy variable equal to one for firm i at time t if the firm issues equity
or debt (repurchases equity or retires debt), and zero otherwise, λ0 is a constant, λ is
a vector of parameter coefficients to be estimated, Xit−1 is a vector of firm specific fac-
tors explained below, µi represents time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects,
and νit is an error term. Consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2001), Hovakimian et al.
(2004), Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Leary and Roberts (2005) equity or debt is-
sues (repurchases) are defined in this chapter as any net change in equity or debt
from the previous period scaled by the beginning total assets in excess of 5%. The
vector of firm specific factors, Xit−1, includes R&D, capital expenditure (Capex), tan-
gible assets, intangible assets and control variables (size, profit, non-debt tax shield
(NDTS) and volatility).
The inclusion of the lagged dependant variable in Equations (4.1) and (4.2) renders
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates biased and inconsistent. Equations (4.1) and
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(4.2) are estimated using system GMM, which uses all moment conditions as it com-
bines equations estimated in levels with those in differences to increase efficiency.18
The system GMM estimation techniques allow for the use of first differenced and
lagged level variables as instruments to control for potential endogeneity problems
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).19 The Hansen test (J test) provides a test for the validity
of the instruments used (at 5% level), and is asymptotically distributed as chi−square
with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of instruments
and parameters. The Arellano and Bond (1991) test for second order serial correla-
tion in the differenced residuals (m2) is used to test for auto-correlation and provides
a further test on the correct specification of the empirical model. m2 is asymptotically
normal under the null of no second−order serial correlation of differenced residuals.
The m2 and J statistic are presented for all results estimated using system GMM.
4.4 Empirical results
The empirical results in this section are organised as follows: Section 4.4.1 analyses
the effects of R&D and capital expenditure (Capex) on leverage (total debt, net-debt,
long-term debt and total liabilities); Section 4.4.2 presents results on the differential
effects of R&D, capital expenditure (Capex), tangible assets, and intangible assets
on leverage between innovative (INN) and non-innovative firms (NIN); Section 4.4.3
presents results on the time varying effects of R&D, capital expenditure (Capex),
tangible assets and intangible assets on leverage, and Section 4.4.6 presents results
on the effects of R&D and capital expenditure (Capex) on the probability of issuing
(retiring or repurchasing) equity and debt.
18Estimates using OLS FE (fixed effects) and pooled OLS that excludes the lagged dependent vari-
ables are also presented in Appendix 4.C for robustness and to facilitate comparisons with prior stud-
ies.
19The instruments used are restricted to the second and fifth lags to address the problem of having
excessive instruments which proliferates as the sample size increases (Mehrhoff, 2009; Roodman,
2009; Vincent and Michaely, 2012).
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Table 4.1 Determinants of financing structure
The table presents the results of estimating Equation (4.1) that relates leverage to lagged leverage,
research and development (R&D), capital expenditure (Capex), tangible assets, intangible assets,
growth, size, profit, non-debt tax shield, and earnings volatility. TDA is total debt to total assets,
NDA is net-debt to total assets, LTDA is long-term debt to total assets and TLTA is total liabilities
to total assets. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data
on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2
in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope
through Datastream. The results are estimated via system GMM. The table reports the J statistic
from a test of the over identifying restrictions, and the J statistic is asymptotically distributed as
chi-squared under the null of instrument validity, and the test of second-order autocorrelation (m2)
in the first differenced residuals. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. All models include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Variables TDA NDA LTDA TLTA
Levit−1 0.758*** 0.683*** 0.711*** 0.755***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.044)
R&D -0.147*** -0.194*** -0.058** -0.314***
(0.034) (0.065) (0.023) (0.048)
Capex 0.116*** 0.161*** 0.060* 0.035
(0.036) (0.045) (0.031) (0.034)
Tangible 0.058*** 0.214*** 0.066*** -0.021
(0.012) (0.024) (0.010) (0.015)
Intangible 0.046*** 0.208*** 0.068*** -0.028**
(0.012) (0.023) (0.011) (0.014)
Growth 0.000 -0.004* 0.000 0.005*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Size 0.005*** 0.002** 0.005*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Profit -0.180*** -0.219*** -0.069*** -0.297***
(0.015) (0.022) (0.010) (0.021)
NDTS -0.281*** -0.382*** -0.175*** 0.220**
(0.061) (0.086) (0.053) (0.092)
Volatility -0.114*** -0.221*** -0.038* -0.128***
(0.027) (0.036) (0.020) (0.038)
Constant -0.009 -0.054** -0.049*** 0.037*
(0.013) (0.021) (0.011) (0.019)
N 7579 7579 7579 7579
m2 1.084 -0.592 1.007 0.222
p-value (0.278) (0.554) (0.314) (0.824)
J 66.227 68.627 67.640 69.781
p-value (0.606) (0.524) (0.558) (0.485)
4.4.1 Determinants of financing structure
Table 4.1 presents the results of Equation 4.1 which relates leverage (total debt, net-
debt, long-term debt and total liabilities) to R&D, capital expenditure (Capex), tan-
gible assets, intangible assets and other firm specific factors. Each column present
results with the dependent variable being total debt (TDA), net-debt (NDA), long-
term debt (LTDA) and total liabilities (TLTA), respectively.
The m2 and J statistic in Table 4.1 show that there are no concerns with second-
order auto-correlation and the validity of the instruments. The coefficients on lagged
leverage are consistently positive and significant across the four measures of leverage
(total debt, net-debt, long-term debt and total liabilities). This result suggests that
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leverage is persistent, and firms that have debt financing are more likely to continue
using debt financing in the future. Denis (2012), Hanousek and Shamshur (2011),
Lemmon et al. (2008) and Wu et al. (2012) also report high persistence in leverage. In
particular, Lemmon et al. (2008) highlight that firms in the US with high (low) lever-
age remain relatively highly (lowly) leveraged over time. The persistence in leverage
is attributed to firm specific effects which, according to Lemmon et al. (2008), ex-
plain much of the observed variation in capital structure. Similarly, Hanousek and
Shamshur (2011) report high persistence in leverage for firms in economies in tran-
sition (Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia).
Net-debt has relatively low persistence than other measures of leverage (total debt,
long-term debt and total liabilities). Acharya et al. (2007), Acharya et al. (2012), Ang
and Smedema (2011) and Bates et al. (2009) report that firms increase cash holdings
to preserve corporate flexibility, which would explain the relatively lower persistence
in net-debt.
The coefficients on R&D in Table 4.1 are consistently negative and significant. The
negative effect of R&D on leverage is relatively high on total liabilities, while it is
relatively low on long-term debt. This significant inverse relation between R&D and
leverage is in line with theoretical predictions that firms that are more prone to infor-
mation asymmetry, asset substitution, and poor collateral problems use less debt fi-
nancing (Brown et al., 2012; Borisova and Brown, 2013; Hall, 2009; Hall et al., 2009).
Similarly, Aghion et al. (2004) report that firms with huge investments in innovative
projects adopt more conservative financing structures in order to maintain strategic
flexibility which is likely to be constrained by restrictive debt covenants. According to
O’Brien (2003), strategic flexibility is more important to the survival of firms in com-
petitive innovative products market. The negative effect of R&D on leverage obtains
despite the similar trends in financing shown in Figure 3.1 (page 63) of Chapter 3.
The positive coefficients on capital expenditure shows that leverage increases with
capital expenditure (Capex). This coefficient is significant on total debt and net-debt,
while it is marginally significant on long-term debt and rather insignificant on total
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liabilities. This significant positive effect of capital expenditure on total debt is in line
with the literature (Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005; Caglayan and Rashid, 2014) and
suggests that further investments in physical assets support debt financing (Almeida
and Campello, 2007; Campello and Giambona, 2013). However, Aivazian et al. (2005),
Dang (2011), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Lang et al. (1996) report a negative
relation between capital expenditure and leverage.20 The increase in leverage with
capital expenditure is also consistent with Almeida and Campello (2007) who report
that pledgeable assets support debt financing. Overall, these findings suggest that
investment variables have a significant effect on leverage with the effect depending
on the type of investment.
It is interesting to note that tangible assets and intangible assets have similar signifi-
cant positive effects on leverage, except for total liabilities where the effect is negative
and only significant on intangible assets. The similar effects of intangible assets and
tangible assets are inconsistent with theoretical predictions that intangible assets
subject firms to binding credit constraints (Brown et al., 2012). The results in Table
4.1 shows that intangible assets support debt financing.21 The negative effect of in-
tangible assets on total liabilities suggests that firms tend to prefer long-term debt
and avoid short-term debt as it increases refinancing risks.
The results on the control variables (size, profit, non-debt tax shield and volatility)
are consistent across the different measures of leverage (total debt, net-debt, long-
term debt and total liabilities), with prior studies, and of the sign predicted by theory,
20The significant positive relation between capital expenditure and leverage is in line studies on
corporate investments dynamics that tests the over-investment proposition (Jensen, 1986; Lyandres
and Zhdanov, 2005). The positive relationship reported in the literature is consistent with the over-
investment proposition which predicts that firms with debt overhang may invest in further risky
projects as the profits or losses arising from these projects accrue asymmetrically. Equity holders
benefit more from profitable projects as interest on debt is fixed while due to limited liability, eq-
uity holders do not similarly share the burden of losses arising from unprofitable projects (Jensen,
1986; Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005). On the other hand, debt overhang concerns may lead to under-
investment as the profits from investments undertaken will largely accrue to debt-holders who have a
first claim to the assets of a firm in case of bankruptcy.
21Lim et al. (2014) report that intangible assets reported in the purchase price allocation data of
the bidding firms’ 10-Ks or 10-Qs in the US play a similar role as tangible assets in facilitating access
to debt financing. The analysis in this chapter extents on these results by showing that both acquired
and internally generated intangible assets support debt financing.
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except for growth and non-debt tax shield. Size has a consistent significant and pos-
itive effect on leverage, while profit and volatility have a significant negative effect
on leverage. The positive effect of size on leverage is consistent with the proposition
that the risk of bankruptcy is low for large firms (e.g., Elsas et al., 2013; Faulkender
et al., 2008, 2012; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Leary and Roberts, 2005). Large firms
have more assets with which to pledge as collateral to support borrowings. Lenders
are also more willing to advance credit to larger firms as information asymmetry
problems decrease with size (Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006; Vincent and Michaely,
2012). Further, the need to maintain a good credit history increases with size (repu-
tational concerns) which reduces the probability of default (Strebulaev and Kurshev,
2006).
The negative effect of profitability on leverage is consistent with the predictions of
the pecking order theory that retained earnings are preferred to external sources of
financing (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The negative effect of earnings
volatility is consistent with Antoniou et al. (2008), Dang et al. (2012), and Dang et al.
(2014a). According to Fama and French (2002), firms with high earnings volatility
have higher financial distress costs, hence, should use less debt financing. Similarly,
Krainer (2014) reports that managers choose investments that are consistent with
the risk aversion of shareholders and use capital structure to offset deviations from
the acceptable operating risk thresholds. The effects of growth and non-debt tax
shield on leverage are rather mixed. Growth has a marginally significant effect on
net-debt and marginally positive effect on total liabilities, while it has an insignif-
icant positive effect on total debt and long-term debt. The mixed and insignificant
results on growth are inconsistent with Frank and Goyal (2009) and Oztekin (2015)
who report significant effects of growth on leverage in the US and several countries,
respectively.
Non-debt tax shield has a significant negative effect on total debt, net-debt and long-
term debt, while it has a positive effect on total liabilities. The negative effect of
non-debt tax shield on leverage is consistent with the proposition that firms substi-
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tute debt tax shield for non-debt tax shield (Dang et al., 2012, 2014a; DeAngelo and
Masulis, 1980; de Miguel and Pindado, 2001; Leary and Roberts, 2005). The positive
effect of non-debt tax shield is inconsistent with the substitution hypothesis between
non-debt tax shield and debt tax shield, but consistent with Antoniou et al. (2008),
Frank and Goyal (2009) and Titman and Wessels (1988). According to Antoniou et al.
(2008), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Titman and Wessels (1988) the positive effect of
growth on leverage suggests that high-growth-firms tend to use more debt financing,
whereas theory posits that the use of leverage may subject high-growth-firms to un-
derinvestment problems arising from debt overhang concerns (Myers, 1977).
Overall, using a dynamic model of leverage, the results show that the coefficients
associated with tangible assets, intangible assets, growth and non-debt tax shield
differ across models. This observed variation provide evidence that leverage is not
homogeneous.22 The following section draws comparisons between innovative and
non-innovative firms from models estimated on total debt, net-debt, long-term debt
and total liabilities. The focus of the following section is on whether R&D, capital ex-
penditure, tangible assets and intangibles assets have differential effects on leverage
between innovative and non-innovative firms.
4.4.2 Determinants of financing structure: Innovative and non-
innovative firms
Table 4.2 presents the results of Equation 4.2 which relates leverage to R&D, capital
expenditure and other firm specific factors for innovative and non-innovative firms.
Also presented in Table 4.2 are the p-values for the t-tests of the differences in the
coefficients between innovative and non-innovative firms.
Table 4.2 shows relatively high persistence in leverage for non-innovative firms, ex-
cept for total liabilities. The significant difference in the persistence of leverage (TDA,
22According to Rauh and Sufi (2010), a major limitation of empirical studies on capital structure is




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NDA and LTDA) between innovative and non-innovative firms suggests that past
financing decisions are more important for non-innovative firms.23 The high per-
sistence in leverage for non-innovative firms is consistent with the proposition that
physical capital investments support debt financing (Almeida and Campello, 2007;
Campello and Giambona, 2013; Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, 2014). The insignificant
differences between innovative and non-innovative firms in the coefficient on lagged
total liabilities is consistent with the results in Table 3.3 and suggest that the two
firm-groups adopt similar financing structures (when considering total liabilities).
R&D has a significant and negative effect on total debt, net-debt, long-term debt and
total liabilities. The negative effects of R&D on leverage is consistent with the exist-
ing literature (e.g., Aghion et al., 2004; Dang et al., 2014a; Elsas and Florysiak, 2013;
Hall, 2002) which highlights that firms with innovative investments use less debt
financing. This is consistent with studies which report that the special features (high
information asymmetry, asset substitution problems, and poor collateral values) of
innovative investments are likely to subject firms to binding financial constraints
(Borisova and Brown, 2013; Brown and Petersen, 2009, 2011; Brown et al., 2012;
Moshirian et al., 2013). The negative effect of R&D on leverage which suggests that
innovative firms should adopt conservative financing structures is inconsistent with
the relatively high leverage of innovative firms as shown in Figure 3.1 (page 63) in
Chapter 3.
The effect of capital expenditure on leverage varies across the different measures of
leverage and between innovative and non-innovative firms. Consistent with Lyan-
dres and Zhdanov (2005), capital expenditure has a positive effect on leverage except
23Denis (2012), Hanousek and Shamshur (2011), Lemmon et al. (2008) and Wu et al. (2012) have
re-ignited the debate on the persistence in leverage. The results reported by Lemmon et al. (2008)
pervades the literature and suggests that much of the insights in the literature on the importance
of other factors in in explaining the variation corporate capital structure are rather misleading (as
the factors identified in the literature only explain a small proportion (6%) of the variations in capital
structure). Following Lemmon et al. (2008), Frank and Goyal (2009), Graham and Leary (2011),
Parsons and Titman (2007) and Sufi (2009) which have all emphasised the importance of firm fixed
effects in explaining the variations in corporate capital structure. However, DeAngelo and Roll (2015)
report that leverage vary greatly and is only stable at lower levels with the stability being a temporary
phenomenon.
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for non-innovative firms in the case of total liabilities where the effect is negative but
insignificant. The effect of capital expenditure on leverage is consistently insignifi-
cant for innovative firms, while it is significant for non-innovative firms. The differ-
ences on the effects of capital expenditure on leverage are significant on net-debt and
total liabilities, and only marginally significant on total debt and rather insignificant
on long-term debt. The mixed results in the literature may be explained in part by
the different definitions of leverage used in previous studies or the failure to take into
account the heterogeneity in the effects of firm specific factors across different firm
groups.24
The coefficients on tangible and intangible assets differ between innovative and non-
innovative firms. However, this difference is insignificant on total liabilities due to
the inclusion of non-financial factors in total liabilities. Rajan and Zingales (1995)
highlight that using total liabilities is misleading as the non-financing factors in-
cluded in total liabilities are mostly for transactional purposes and do not show
whether the firm is at risk of default. Consistent with theoretical predictions that
collateral reduce information asymmetry problems (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Le-
land and Pyle, 1977; Leland, 1998), tangible assets have a significant positive effect
on leverage (total debt, net-debt and long-term debt), with this effect being signifi-
cantly higher for innovative firms with less pledgeable assets. Consistent with the
results in Table 4.1, intangible assets facilitate access to debt financing for both inno-
vative and non-innovative firms. The positive effect of intangible assets on leverage
is consistently higher for innovative firm as they have a larger proportion of non-
physical assets as shown in Table 3.3 in Chapter 3. Further, the proportion of intan-
gible assets is increasing rapidly over time (Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3) which shows the
transition of economies towards service and technological sectors. This result high-
lights that the largely overlooked intangible assets in the literature is an important
24Similarly, Barclay et al. (2006) highlight that there is no particular economic reason to expect
the same results from studies that use different definitions of leverage (market leverage and book
leverage). The literature is divided with regards to the correct measure of leverage with one group
favouring market based measures (Dang et al., 2012; Frank and Goyal, 2007a; Welch, 2004), while the




Comparisons of the differences in the coefficients on control variables between inno-
vative and non-innovative firms show wide variations across the four measures of
leverage. There are significant differences on the effects of size and profit on net-
debt between innovative and non-innovative firms. Non-innovative firms increase
leverage (net-debt) with size, but this relationship is negative and insignificant for
innovative firms. Table 4.2 consistently show a significant and negative effect of
profitability on leverage, with this effect being significantly different between inno-
vative and non-innovative firms for net-debt. However, the differences in the coeffi-
cients on size and profit are not significant for the other measures of leverage. The
insignificant differences of the coefficients on size between non-innovative and in-
novative firms suggests that size plays a similar role in facilitating access to debt
financing, which is consistent with the literature (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009; Leary
and Roberts, 2005; Oztekin, 2015). The effects of growth, non-debt tax shield and
earnings volatility on leverage are not significantly different between innovative and
non-innovative firms. The differences in the coefficients of growth are rather in-
significant although Table 3.3 reports significant differences in growth rates between
innovative and non-innovative firms. Although volatility has a consistently negative
effect on leverage, this effect is significant on total debt and net-debt and on total
liabilities for innovative firms, but insignificant on long-term debt. The negative ef-
fects of earnings volatility on leverage in Table 4.2 is consistent with the theory that
predicts that firms use leverage to counteract increases in operating risk (Krainer,
2014). Overall, the comparisons of the differences on the effects of the control vari-
ables on leverage suggest that much of the variations in leverage between innovative
and non-innovative arises from differences in liquidity management policies, with in-
novative firms hoarding relatively more cash in order to increase financing flexibility.
The following sub-section investigates time variations of the effects of corporate in-
vestment (R&D and capital expenditure) and corporate assets (tangible and intangi-
ble assets) on leverage.
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Figure 4.1 Time variations of the coefficients on corporate investments
(a) TDA-R&D (b) TDA-Capex
(c) NDA-R&D (d) NDA-Capex
(e) LTDA-R&D (f) LTDA-Capex
(g) TLTA-R&D (h) TLTA-Capex
4.4.3 Time variations: Leverage, investment and corporate as-
sets
This section builds on the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 by investigating the time
variations of the sensitivity of leverage to corporate investments (capital expenditure
and R&D) (Figure 4.1) and the sensitivity of leverage to corporate assets (tangible
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assets and intangible assets) (Figure 4.2). The period 1987-2013 is marked by sev-
eral episodes of growth dynamics in corporate investments and assets. Figure 3.2
in Chapter 3 shows that the composition of corporate investments is changing, with
R&D increasing considerably over time while capital expenditure is decreasing. It
also shows that the proportion of collateral supporting debt financing is falling re-
sulting in an increases in debt-to-collateral ratios. Figure 4.1 plots the time series
values of the coefficients on R&D and capital expenditure over the period 1983-2013.
The time series plots are estimates of Equation (4.2) over five sub periods, which are
1987-1992, 1993-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2010 and 2011-2013.
The results in Figure 4.1a, 4.1c, 4.1e and 4.1g consistently show that R&D has a
negative effect on leverage. The results also show that a significant decrease in the
negative effect of R&D on leverage (total debt, net-debt and long-term debt) up to the
period 2005-2010, after which it increases significantly. This decrease of the coeffi-
cients on R&D suggests that innovative firms increased the use of debt financing and
is consistent with the trends on leverage in Figure 3.1 (page 63) of Chapter 3 show-
ing that innovative firms have similar capital structure as no-innovative firms. The
result also consistent with Chava et al. (2013) who report that lenders that specialise
in financing innovation in the US advance more loans and favourable rates than non-
specialist lenders. The increase in the coefficients on R&D after the period 2005-2010
highlight the increase in risk aversion post the global financial crisis. These results
show the importance of examining the dynamic nature of the relationship between
leverage and R&D as the economy is increasing shift towards service and technology
sectors.
Figures 4.1b, 4.1d, 4.1f and 4.1h show similar and significant time variation of the co-
efficients on capital expenditure. The coefficients on capital expenditure for all firms
are mostly positive, except total liabilities in Figure 4.1h, where the coefficient is neg-
ative for the period 2005-2010. Further, the results show an increasing positive effect
of capital expenditure on total debt (Figure 4.1b) and net-debt (Figure 4.1d) after the
period 1993-1998. This marked increase in the coefficients on capital expenditure
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occurs much later for long-term debt in Figure 4.1f and total liabilities Figure 4.1h.
These changes in the coefficients suggest that an increasing proportion of the physi-
cal capital expenditure is financed using debt. Comparisons between non-innovative
and innovative firms in Figures 4.1b, 4.1d, 4.1f and 4.1h show that the coefficients
on capital expenditure are significantly higher for non-innovative firms that face less
binding financial constraints. The results also show a decline in the positive effect of
capital expenditure on leverage for innovative firms, which turns to a negative effect
for total debt, long-term debt and total liabilities. This negative relationship between
leverage and capital expenditure for innovative firms suggest that overhang concerns
are more significant for firms that invest in innovation. The changes in the sign of the
coefficient on capital expenditure highlight that the mixed results in the literature
may be due to overlooked time and cross-sectional variations.25 These differences in
the coefficients on capital expenditure between innovative and non-innovative firms
are consistent with results in Table 4.2, and further show significant time variations
and heterogeneity across the two firm groups.
Figure 4.1 shows that the sensitivity of leverage to investment varies over time and
across the four measures of leverage, and between innovative and non-innovative
firms. The variations in the coefficients on investment variables (R&D and capital
expenditure) may help explain the mixed results reported in prior studies.26 The
results in Figure 4.1 also show that time variations and the choice of sample period
are likely sources of the mixed results in the literature. The observed time variations
in the coefficients highlight the need to examine how changes in the type of firms
over time (in addition to within firm changes) affect corporate decisions so as to gain
a better understanding of the evolution of the relationship between financing and
investment decisions.
25One group of studies reports a positive effect of capital expenditure on leverage (e.g., Caglayan
and Rashid, 2014; Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005), while another reports a negative effect (e.g., Aivazian
et al., 2005; Dang, 2011; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Lang et al., 1996).
26Several studies report mixed or insignificant linkages between investment an financing activities
(see, Aivazian et al., 2005; Caglayan and Rashid, 2014; Dang, 2011; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Lang
et al., 1996; Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005; Mauer and Triantis, 1994). Further, Chava and Roberts
(2008) and Stein (2003) highlight that the relationship between financing and investment decisions is
rather ambiguous.
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Figure 4.2 Time series plots of the coefficients on corporate assets
(a) TDA-Tangible assets (b) TDA-Intangible assets
(c) NDA-Tangible assets (d) NDA-Intangible assets
(e) LTDA-Tangible assets (f) LTDA-Intangible assets
(g) TLTA-Tangible assets (h) TLTA-Intangible assets
4.4.4 Time variations: Leverage and corporate assets
Figure 4.2 plots time series estimates of the coefficients on tangible and intangible
assets over the periods 1987-1992, 1993-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2010 and 2011-2013.
The figure shows that for three proxies of leverage (total debt, net-debt and long-term
debt), tangible and intangible assets have similar positive effects on leverage, except
when leverage is measured by total liabilities, which are mostly negative. The neg-
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ative effect of tangible and intangible assets on total liabilities suggests firms with
high collateral values (both tangible and intangible assets) rely less on non-financing
forms of short-term liabilities (such as trade credit) that are included in total liabili-
ties. The positive coefficients on intangible assets are consistent with those reported
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, and suggest that intangible assets support debt financing. This
positive effect of intangible assets on total debt, net-debt and long-term debt is sig-
nificant even though a small proportion of intangible assets are reported on corpo-
rate balance sheets (most intangible assets are off-balance sheet, with accounting
standards permitting limited recognition in restricted circumstances (ISA 38)). The
positive relationship between leverage and intangible assets is inconsistent with the-
oretical predictions that firms with high information asymmetry tend to adopt con-
servative financing structures.27
Comparisons of the coefficients on tangible assets and intangible assets between in-
novative and non-innovative firms show significant differences as is consistent with
results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Both intangible assets and intangible assets have a
significant positive effect on leverage (total debt, net-debt and long-term debt). This
shows that collateral plays a significant role in reducing information asymmetry risks
by enabling access to debt financing. The time series plots also show that the posi-
tive effect of tangible assets on leverage has increased over time, which suggests an
increasing role of collateral in reducing information asymmetry as economies transit
towards service and technology sectors. The results also further show that tangible
assets and intangible assets play significantly higher roles in reducing information
asymmetry risks for innovative firms than for non-innovative firms over time. Fur-
ther, there is a decrease in the coefficients on tangible assets for non-innovative firms,
but a significant increase for innovative firms. Similar changes are also observable
on intangibles assets, with increases in the positive effect on leverage up to the period
2005-2010, then significant decreases thereafter. This decrease in effect of intangible
assets on leverage show an increase in risk aversion post the global financial crisis.
27See studies by Borisova and Brown (2013), Brown and Petersen (2009), Brown and Petersen
(2011), and Brown et al. (2012).
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Overall, the changes in the coefficients show significant time varying effects of in-
tangible and tangible assets on leverage and that the role of collateral in alleviating
information asymmetry problems is significantly higher for innovative firms than for
non-innovative firms.
The following sub-section investigates the determinants of corporate debt maturity
and the differences in debt maturity between innovative and non-innovative firms.
4.4.5 Determinants of debt maturity
Table 4.3 presents the results of estimating Equations (4.1) and (4.2) that relate debt
maturity to lagged debt maturity, research and development (R&D), capital expen-
diture (Capex), tangible assets, intangible assets, growth, size, profit, non-debt tax
shield, and earnings volatility. The values in parentheses are the associated stan-
dard errors. All models include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported) to
control for firm-specific and time factors other than those included in the models that
might affect debt maturity.
Table 4.3 shows that the coefficients on most firm specific factors are largely consis-
tent with expectations. R&D, size, tangible and intangible assets have a significant
and consistent positive effect on debt maturity, while non-debt tax shield and volatil-
ity have an insignificant negative effect on debt maturity. The positive significant
coefficient on R&D is inconsistent with Custódio et al. (2013), who highlight that it
may be optimal for US firms to shorten debt maturity so as to take advantage of
refinancing opportunities arising in good macroeconomic states or when the credit
rating of the firm has improved. This result is consistent, however, with the model of
Diamond and He (2014) which posits that the maturity risk arising from short-term
debt has a stronger debt overhang effect on corporate investment than that arising
from long-term debt, with this effect being more pronounced for firms subject to high
information asymmetry. The increase in debt maturity with size is consistent with





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































US studies (e.g., Faulkender et al., 2008, 2012; Leary and Roberts, 2005). Further,
the increase in debt maturity with tangible and intangible assets is evidence that
the two forms of corporate assets play a similar role in facilitating access to debt fi-
nancing.28 The negative effect of non-debt tax shield and volatility on debt maturity
is consistent with firms substituting debt tax shield for non-debt tax shield, and the
need to avoid bankruptcy, which increases with earnings volatility.
Overall, the differences in the determinants of debt maturity between innovative
and non-innovative firms are insignificant, except for R&D. R&D has a significant
positive effect on long-term debt with maturity greater than one and three years, but
its effect diminishes with maturity. Further, the coefficients on lagged debt maturity
show low persistence in debt maturity for innovative firms than non-innovative firms
for debt with maturity greater than one year, but this difference reverses for debt
with maturity greater than three and five years. The change in persistence suggests
that innovative firms that use debt tend to prefer debt with long maturity relative
to short maturity. The preference for debt with long maturity is consistent with a
desire to reduce roll-over risk or high debt overhang associated with short-term debt.
Further, the positive effect of intangible assets is consistent with the results in Tables
4.1 and 4.2. These results show that intangible assets support debt financing with
this positive effect being relatively higher for innovative firms that have less tangible
assets.
4.4.6 Access to capital markets
This section investigates the determinants of equity and debt issues or repurchases.
Figure 4.3 presents time series plots of new equity and debt issues and repurchases.
The high frequency of equity and debt issues or retirements is apparent and shows
that firms in the UK actively adjust capital structure. This is inconsistent with a
28Appendix 4.B shows that debt maturity has been increasing in the UK. This increase in debt
maturity is inconsistent with Custódio et al. (2013) who report marked decreases in debt maturity in
the US over the period 1976-2008 due to the increase the proportion of small firms and firms with
high information asymmetry problems. In the presence of high information asymmetry, shortening
debt maturity is optimal as it allows for opportunities to refinance at lower costs if the conditions of
the firm or economic environment improves.
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Figure 4.3 The evolution of issues and repurchases
(a) Equity issues (b) Debt issues
(c) Equity repurchases (d) Debt retirements
study in the US by Lemmon et al. (2008) and in economies in transition by Hanousek
and Shamshur (2011), who report that leverage is largely persistent and stable over
time. In contrast to these two studies, DeAngelo and Roll (2015) report that firms
actively adjust capital structure, with similarities for firms that have the same ini-
tial capital structure disappearing over time. Figure 4.3 shows that innovative firms
have relatively high equity and debt issues or repurchases than non-innovative firms.
This result suggests that innovative firms are more active in adjusting capital struc-
ture, contrary to theoretical prediction by Dittmar and Thakor (2007) that equity
issues decrease with information asymmetry, while debt issues tend to increase with
information asymmetry. However, the regular access of capital markets by innova-
tive firms is consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory, which posits that
deviations from the target capital structure are more costly for firms with high in-
formation asymmetry. Further, the result also show that publicly listed innovative
firms face less credit constraints as they more able to access capital markets than
non-listed firms.
Table 4.4 presents the results of estimating multivariate logistic regressions of Equa-
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Table 4.4 Access to capital markets
The table presents estimation results of Equation (4.3) that relates the probability of issuing or re-
purchasing equity or debt to research and development (R&D), capital expenditure (Capex), tangible
assets, intangible assets, size, profit, non-debt tax shield, and earnings volatility. ALL represents all
firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for
innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least
five years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined
in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn
from Worldscope through Datastream. All models include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not
reported).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Equity and debt issues
Issue Equity Issue Debt
Variables ALL NIN INN ALL NIN INN
R&D 1.789*** 1.395*** -0.820 -1.204**
(0.525) (0.523) (0.576) (0.590)
Capex 1.833*** 1.663*** 2.113*** 3.027*** 3.093*** 3.165***
(0.413) (0.548) (0.638) (0.398) (0.528) (0.628)
Tangible -0.526*** -0.293 -0.803*** -0.033 -0.163 -0.065
(0.155) (0.226) (0.220) (0.140) (0.206) (0.199)
Intangible 0.467*** 0.554** 0.437** 0.163 0.313 0.049
(0.138) (0.233) (0.175) (0.127) (0.210) (0.165)
Size -0.076*** -0.058** -0.080*** -0.035*** -0.067*** -0.020
(0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) (0.012)
Profit 2.186*** 2.798*** 1.904*** 1.504*** 1.897*** 1.296***
(0.169) (0.313) (0.201) (0.182) (0.318) (0.220)
NDTS -2.121** -3.241** -1.705 -5.023*** -4.386*** -5.196***
(0.895) (1.383) (1.190) (0.876) (1.322) (1.190)
Volatility 0.920** 0.617 1.076** 0.121 -0.996 0.579
(0.359) (0.656) (0.428) (0.367) (0.655) (0.435)
Constant 0.968*** 0.523 1.293*** -0.294 0.188 -0.508**
(0.204) (0.353) (0.265) (0.179) (0.320) (0.227)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579 2945 4634
Panel B: Equity and debt repurchases
Repurchase Equity Retire Debt
Variables ALL NIN INN ALL NIN INN
R&D 0.734 0.753 -3.486*** -3.662***
(0.501) (0.506) (0.659) (0.682)
Capex -0.557 -0.480 -0.738 -0.781* -0.975* -0.918
(0.490) (0.679) (0.734) (0.452) (0.587) (0.714)
Tangible -0.136 -0.061 -0.135 0.078 0.317 -0.127
(0.166) (0.249) (0.232) (0.153) (0.210) (0.220)
Intangible -0.047 0.181 -0.205 0.084 -0.051 0.118
(0.145) (0.237) (0.191) (0.135) (0.212) (0.174)
Size 0.013 0.023 0.014 0.020* 0.006 0.026**
(0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.011) (0.021) (0.013)
Profit -1.195*** -1.273*** -1.152*** -1.726*** -1.960*** -1.538***
(0.172) (0.302) (0.208) (0.182) (0.307) (0.225)
NDTS 2.131** 2.803* 1.601 3.912*** 2.746** 4.859***
(0.937) (1.440) (1.266) (0.883) (1.296) (1.196)
Volatility 1.885*** 1.704*** 1.834*** 0.884** 1.056 0.848*
(0.390) (0.645) (0.499) (0.373) (0.645) (0.450)
Constant -1.407*** -1.341*** -1.648*** -1.161*** -1.216*** -1.086***
(0.210) (0.355) (0.292) (0.194) (0.323) (0.246)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579 2945 4634
tion (4.3) with a binary dependant variable taking the value of one each year a firm
issues or repurchases equity or debt, and zero otherwise. Issues or repurchases of
equity or debt are defined as any net change in equity or debt that is in excess of 5%
as in Hovakimian et al. (2001), Hovakimian and Vulanovic (2010) and Korajczyk and
Levy (2003). The results in Table 4.4 Panel A, show that the probability of conducting
129
new equity issues increases with R&D and capital expenditure, while the probabil-
ity of issuing debt decreases with R&D and increases with capital expenditure. The
positive effect of R&D on equity issues and negative effect on the probability of is-
suing debt is consistent with the proposition that firms with low collateral values,
and which are prone to information asymmetry and asset substitution problems face
binding financial constraints (see, Brown and Petersen, 2009, 2011; Moshirian et al.,
2013). According to O’Brien (2003), the need to preserve flexibility (by avoiding strin-
gent debt covenants associated with leverage) favours equity financing.
Capital expenditure has a consistent and significant positive effect on the probabil-
ity of issuing equity and debt. Investment in physical assets reduces information
asymmetry as collateral values increase. Similarly, Berger et al. (2011) report that a
decrease in information asymmetry among firms in the US reduces the need to pledge
more collateral. Further, Campello and Giambona (2013) recently report that tangi-
ble assets that are easily redeployable facilitate borrowings the most, especially, in
bad macroeconomic environments. Consistently, the positive effect of capital expen-
diture on the probability of issuing equity and debt is relatively higher for innovative
firms than non-innovative firms. This suggests that further investments in tangible
assets are more valuable in reducing information asymmetry for innovative firms.
The results on control variables are mixed. Tangible assets have a significant nega-
tive effect on new equity issues, but no significant effects on debt issues. This result
is surprising and inconsistent with Hovakimian et al. (2004) and Hovakimian and
Vulanovic (2010) who report a significant positive effect of tangibility on issuance
decisions of firms in the US. Intangible assets have a significant positive effect on
equity issues, with this effect being larger for innovative firms than non-innovative
firms. However, intangible assets have no significant effects on the probability of is-
suing debt. Size and non-debt tax shield have a consistently negative effect on equity
issues and debt issues. Profitability has a consistent and significant positive effect on
the probability of issuing debt and equity, while volatility has a positive significant
effect on equity issues, but this effect is rather insignificant for non-innovative firms.
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This result supports the pecking order theory, which posits that firms significantly
reduce external financing with increases in profitability. The effect of volatility on
debt issues is insignificant.
The results in Panel B show that there are no significant differences in the probabil-
ity of repurchasing equity or debt conditional on having new investments, except for
profitability and volatility. The insignificant coefficients mean that the probability of
conducting equity repurchases is not greatly influenced by R&D, capital expenditure,
size, tangible assets or intangible assets. The probability of repurchasing equity sig-
nificantly decreases with profitability, and increases with volatility as is consistent
with the need to reduce bankruptcy costs. The effects of the determinants of equity
repurchases are rather similar for innovative and non-innovative firms.
Overall, the results in Table 4.4 show that there are significant differences on the
determinants of the probability of issuing equity and debt, but not on repurchasing
debt or equity between innovative and non-innovative firms.
4.5 Robustness tests
This section presents a number of robustness checks. Table 4.5 presents estimation
results of Equation (4.2) in five sub-periods. Table 4.6 presents estimation results of
the probability of issuing equity and debt.
In order to analyse the sensitivity of the results to sample period selection, Table
4.5 presents results for five sub-periods. The overall sample period is divided into
four non-overlapping five-year sub-periods and a final three-year period (2011-2013).
The results in Table 4.5 show that there are significant changes in the coefficients on
the determinants of leverage over time. In particular, the negative effect of R&D on
leverage decreases up to the period 2005-2010, after which it increases significantly,
along with increased risk aversion in the post-global financial crisis period and with













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































capital expenditure are only significant for total debt and net-debt, with this signif-
icance changing over time. The capital expenditure has an insignificant effect on
long-term debt and total liabilities, which suggests that capital expenditure affects
capital structure decisions mostly through it's effect on short-term debt.29 Consis-
tent with the results in the previous sections of this chapter, tangible and intangible
assets have a significant and similar effect on leverage, except for total liabilities
where the effect of corporate assets is consistently negative and insignificant. This
shows that intangible assets support debt financing in a similar way as tangible as-
sets. Similar variations are observable on the coefficients on the control variables,
with size and profitability being the only factors that remain consistently significant
over time, except for net-debt.
Appendix 4.C presents the results of estimating Equation (4.2) using OLS, OLS
with fixed effects (OLS-FE), and the Anderson Hsiao Instrumental Variables (AH-
IV) method. The dynamic models in Appendix 4.D are estimations of Equation (4.2)
using Instrumental Variable GMM (IV-GMM), Difference GMM (DIFF-GMM), and an
unbalanced dynamic panel data with a fractional dependent variable (DPF thereon)
estimator.30 These results are presented to facilitate comparisons with previous stud-
ies that use a similar approach and for robustness. Overall, the results in Appendices
4.C and 4.D remain qualitatively similar in terms of both signs and significance,
which suggests that the results in this chapter are robust. Appendix 4.E shows that
the results remain qualitatively similar for the balanced sample in which firms with
any missing observation are excluded.
Table 4.6 presents the results of estimating Equation (4.3) that relates the probability
of issuing equity or debt to firm specific factors. The probability of issuing debt or
29Consistent with the result in Table 4.5, the plots time series correlations in Appendix 3.C show a
marked increase the correlation between short-term debt and capital expenditure for the period, with
the correlations for the rest of the sample period being insignificant and close to zero.
30A number of studies (e.g., Chang and Dasgupta, 2009; Elsas and Florysiak, 2011; Iliev and Welch,
2010) highlight the need to consider the fractional nature of leverage (leverage is ratio bounded in the
interval [0,1]) in dynamic models of capital structure so as not to overstate the results. According
to Elsas and Florysiak (2011) and Elsas and Florysiak (2013), the DPF estimator controls for the
fractional nature of leverage.
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Table 4.6 Access to capital markets : Other methods
The table presents the results of estimating Equation (4.3), the probability of issuing equity or debt
to research and development (R&D), capital expenditure (Capex), tangible assets, intangible assets,
size, profit, non-debt tax shield, and earnings volatility. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN
stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that
report R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data
on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are :d in Table 3.2, and are
winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream.
All models include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance
at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Issue Equity Issue Debt
Variables ALL NIN INN ALL NIN INN
R&D 3.163** 2.967** -1.461** -1.346**
(1.341) (1.410) (0.659) (0.666)
Capex 1.904*** 1.935*** 2.414*** 1.504*** 1.097* 2.115***
(0.502) (0.608) (0.878) (0.475) (0.628) (0.743)
Tangible -0.650*** -0.824** -0.665** 0.478*** 0.173 0.818***
(0.237) (0.351) (0.337) (0.177) (0.254) (0.253)
Intangible 0.654** 1.032*** 0.552 0.183 0.338 0.288
(0.261) (0.383) (0.347) (0.191) (0.282) (0.258)
Size 0.208*** 0.214*** 0.200*** 0.144*** 0.163*** 0.139***
(0.020) (0.039) (0.024) (0.013) (0.025) (0.016)
Profit 0.979*** 0.940* 1.021*** 0.175 0.808*** -0.148
(0.260) (0.507) (0.303) (0.186) (0.279) (0.227)
NDTS -0.163 1.948 -1.451 -2.587** -2.151 -3.620**
(1.357) (1.901) (1.916) (1.005) (1.443) (1.462)
Volatility 0.007 -2.145*** 1.241* -0.169 -0.591 -0.032
(0.597) (0.742) (0.675) (0.337) (0.592) (0.446)
Constant -2.507*** -2.833*** -2.053*** -1.269*** -1.268*** -1.404***
(0.369) (0.612) (0.447) (0.246) (0.444) (0.305)
N 7579 2945 4622 7579 2945 4603
equity is captured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm reports
debt or equity issues (Datastream account items WC04401 and WC04251) and zero
otherwise. The results in Table 4.6 are consistent with those of Table 4.4, except
for size which changes to have a positive effect on the probability of issuing equity
and debt. Consistent with the predictions of the information asymmetry model, the
probability of issuing equity increases with R&D while the probability of issuing debt
decreases with R&D. Similar to the results in Table 4.4, the probability of issuing debt
and equity increases with capital expenditure. This is consistent with the theoretical
predictions (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Leland, 1998)
that collateral reduces information asymmetry problems which increases flexibility
in adjusting capital structure. Overall, the results are robust to different sample
period selection, different estimation techniques, and variable definitions.
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4.6 Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter uses a de-compositional approach to investigate the dif-
ferences in financing decisions of innovative and non-innovative firms in the UK over
the period 1987-2013. This de-compositional approach allows for a more detailed
analysis of financing decisions and the determinants of leverage. If investment type
is of first order importance to corporate financial decisions, then the increase in R&D
and decrease in collateral values, should result in significant reductions in corporate
debt. Contrary to this prediction, leverage and debt maturity have remained per-
sistent in the UK, with an upward drift. This persistence indicates that innovative
firms are able to access debt financing in similar ways to non-innovative firms.
The results show that innovative and non-innovative firms adopt similar financing
policies, which suggests that innovative firms are able to access debt financing de-
spite their focus on investments in R&D and intangible assets. The analysis in this
chapter shows that R&D is inversely related to leverage, while capital expenditure
is positively related to leverage. This inverse relation between debt financing and
R&D supports the predictions of the information asymmetry theory that problems
(high information asymmetry, asset substitution, high specificity and low collateral
values) associated with intangible investments favour internal or equity financing
over debt financing. However, innovative firms follow similar financing structures
as non-innovative firms, but with relatively lower proportions of debt financing from
2000 onwards. The persistence in leverage and the similarity of financing structures
between innovative and non-innovative firms despite the increasing R&D expendi-
ture and decreasing collateral values, suggest that innovation is financed with debt.
This is contrary to the theoretical and empirical predictions that equity is the most
preferred source of financing for innovation (see, Brown et al., 2009; Brown and Pe-
tersen, 2014; Hall, 2002; Krainer, 2014; Parthiban et al., 2008). Further, the positive
relationship between intangible assets and leverage also suggests that intangible
assets play a similar role as tangible assets in facilitating access to debt financing.
Comparisons of the determinants of leverage show that capital expenditure has con-
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sistently insignificant effect on leverage for innovative firms, while it has a significant
positive effect for non-innovative firms. Similar significant differences are observable
on tangible assets and intangible assets. Both tangible assets and intangible assets
have a significantly higher positive effect for innovative firms than non-innovative
firms. These differences remain significant even after controlling for other standard
determinants of leverage, and suggests that accounting for the heterogeneity in cor-
porate investment is important in the understanding of between financing decisions.
The analysis in this chapter also presents evidence that there are significant time
variations in the effect of investment (R&D and capital expenditure) and corporate
assets (intangible/tangible assets) on leverage. The coefficients on R&D and capital
expenditure vary over time, for different measures of leverage, and across innovative
and non-innovative firms. These variations in part help explain the mixed results
reported in the literature. The results show a decreasing negative effect of R&D on
leverage up to the period 2005-2010, after which it increases significantly. This im-
plies an increase in the use of leverage by innovative firms. At the same time, the
positive effect of capital expenditure on leverage follows a general upward trend over
the period 1993 to 2013. This result suggests a significant decrease in debt over-
hang concerns as managers finance physical capital investments using debt. Similar
changes are also observed on corporate assets, with both intangible and tangible as-
sets having a consistent positive effect on leverage, but this effect is significantly
higher for innovative firms than non-innovative firms. The higher positive effect
of corporate assets on debt for innovative firms shows that collateral plays a more
significant role in facilitating access to debt financing for firms that face binding fi-
nancial constraints. Further, the results show that intangible assets are used as a
form of collateral similar to tangible assets in order to facilitate access to debt financ-
ing. These time and cross sectional variations in the coefficients on investment and
corporate assets show that the relationship between leverage and investment, and
between leverage and corporate assets is dynamic and differs across innovative and
non-innovative firms.
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Overall, the results show that investment and corporate assets have a significant
and dynamic effect on corporate financing decisions, even after controlling for stan-
dard determinants of capital structure. Further research on the interactions of fi-
nancing and investment decisions can add insights in understanding the time and
cross-sectional variations in capital structure.
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Appendices to Chapter 4
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Appendix 4.A Corporate debt and asset structure
ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D,
and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in
the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables
used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The
data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream.
(a) All (b) All
(c) NIN (d) NIN
(e) INN (f) INN
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Appendix 4.B Corporate debt maturity
ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D,
and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in
the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables
used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The
data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream.
(a) All
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The literature on the factors that affect target financing behaviour relate to one of
the most important issues in corporate finance. Yet, little is known about how corpo-
rate investments affect the speed of adjustment and the time variations in leverage
adjustment, with the literature having largely focused on quantifying the speed of ad-
justment. This chapter investigates the differences in leverage adjustments between
innovative firms and non-innovative firms in the UK over the period 1987-2013. The
chapter reports evidence of asymmetry and time variations in leverage adjustment
between and within firms that report R&D and those that do not report R&D. A com-
parison of the speed of leverage adjustment in both the cross-section and over time,
between innovative and non-innovative firms, reveals that innovative firms consis-
tently have a relatively higher speed of adjustment. This result suggests that the
benefits of adjusting towards the target are higher for firms that are likely to face
binding financial distress costs. Overall, the analysis reveals that heterogeneity in
corporate investments is an important factor to the understanding of asymmetry in
target financing behaviour.
5.2 Introduction
Despite advancements in the literature, a number of questions on how managers de-
cide on capital structure remain unresolved. Do firms have a target capital structure?
If they do, what is the speed of adjustment towards this target? Further, is this speed
constant or does it change over time? According to Huang and Ritter (2009), ques-
tions on target financing behaviour are among the most important issues in capital
structure research. However, Iliev and Welch (2010) have challenged this assertion
arguing that it tends to overstate the importance of target financing behaviour as
other competing theories (market timing or pecking order theory) do not predict the
existence of a target capital structure. Similarly, Myers (1984) highlights that if firms
take extended excursions away from their targets, then researchers should focus on
examining the factors that cause the excursions. The importance attached to the
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estimation of the speed of adjustment as evidenced by the growing literature arises
from its usefulness in sorting competing theories on capital structure. The literature
has evolved from merely establishing the existence of a target leverage to the actual
quantification of the speed of adjustment. This growth shows the importance that re-
searchers place in understanding the factors that may impede firms from adjusting
towards the optimal capital structure as predicted by the trade-off theory (e.g., Elsas
and Florysiak, 2011; Faulkender et al., 2012; Lemmon et al., 2008; Koufopoulos and
Lambrinoudakis, 2013).
The trade-off theory postulates that firms have a target capital structure that arises
as a result of balancing the tax shield and financial distress costs associated with
debt financing. A significant estimate of the speed of adjustment supports the exis-
tence of a target as predicted by the trade-off theory. In the absence of adjustment
costs, firms fully adjust towards the target.1 However, the existence of adjustment
costs impede the attainment of the target.2 The two other major competing theo-
ries on capital structure are premised on opposing predictions to the trade-off theory.
The pecking order theory postulates that the existence of information asymmetry re-
sults in distinctive ordering of preferences for different financing sources (internal
and external) (see, Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Following the predictions
of the pecking order theory, retained earnings are preferred to debt and equity, while
debt is preferred to equity, and equity is only used as a last resort when all other
sources have been exhausted. The market timing theory is based on the proposi-
tion that managers strategically time the issue (repurchase) of securities to coincide
with favourable (unfavourable) market conditions (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Heaton,
2002). The observed capital structure under the market timing theory is a result
of cumulative efforts by managers to exploit the perceived mispricing of securities
rather than an attempt to re-balance capital structure towards a target. According to
1For a review of the dynamic trade-off theory, see Fischer et al. (1989), Goldstein et al. (2001),
Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Strebulaev (2007).
2The nature of the adjustment costs have implications on the form of the leverage adjustments.
According to Leary and Roberts (2005), fixed adjustment costs generate infrequent but large adjust-
ments, while proportional adjustment costs generate small but more frequent leverage adjustments.
Adjustment costs are made up of implicit costs of deviating from target and explicit costs such security
issuance costs.
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Frank and Goyal (2009), attempts at developing a unified theory on capital structure
appear to be fruitful avenues for future research, but the daunting task of reconciling
the often competing theories (trade-off, marketing and pecking order theory) is the
major impediment.
The rather mixed empirical evidence on target financing behaviour, even within the
US market, in which the majority of studies on capital structure are concentrated,
show that much is yet to be resolved about capital structure. For example, Dang
et al. (2014a) (31% - 33%), Flannery and Rangan (2006) (34% - 36%), Huang and Rit-
ter (2009) (17% - 23%), Lemmon et al. (2008) (25%) and Lockhart (2014) (50% - 77%)
report moderate to high speeds of adjustment. A slow speed of adjustment is inconsis-
tent with the trade-off theory which postulates that firms have a target leverage (see,
Lemmon et al., 2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009). Contrary to studies that report mod-
erate to high speed of adjustment, Fama and French (2002) and Kayhan and Titman
(2007) report that US firms adjust leverage at a relatively slow rate of 7% - 18% and
8.3% - 10%, respectively. Similarly, Welch (2004) and Iliev and Welch (2010) report
limited or no evidence supporting active leverage adjustments in the US over the pe-
riods 1962–2000 and 1963–2007, respectively. Chang and Dasgupta (2009) and Chen
and Zhao (2007) also cast doubts on evidence supporting target financing behaviour
in separate studies in the US over the periods 1971-2004 and 1971-2002, respectively.
The wide variations in the estimates of the speed of adjustment from previous stud-
ies, reported in Appendix 5.A, highlight that questions on target financing behaviour
remain open to debate, especially for other economies with institutional and macroe-
conomic frameworks different from those of the US.3
To add to discourse in the literature, a survey of Chief Finance Officers (CFOs) in the
US by Graham and Harvey (2001) highlights wider discrepancies between prescribed
theoretical predictions and practice. In particular, Graham and Harvey (2001) report
that managers in the survey follow theory in capital budgeting (by evaluating new
3It is important to note that Antoniou et al. (2008) and Oztekin and Flannery (2012) report that
differences in the legal and institutional environments between the US and the UK explain some of
the observed variations in capital structure between the two economies.
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investment projects using discounted cash flow (DCFs) and net present value (NPV)
techniques), but often resort to rules of thumb on capital structure by seeking to
preserve financial flexibility instead of minimising weighted average cost of capital
(WACC). Buera and Kaboski (2012) also highlight that the literature has overlooked
the effects of the significant transition of economies from predominantly manufactur-
ing sectors towards technological and service based sectors on corporate decisions.
Similarly, Borisova and Brown (2013) report marked increases over the period 1980-
2008 in R&D in young US firms to levels that are four times that of capital expendi-
ture, while R&D is twice as high as capital expenditure for mature firms. Fama and
French (2004, 2005) also report an influx of new listings in the US by young and high
growth firms from 1980 to 2001. Consistent with the results in the US, Figure 3.2 in
Chapter 3 shows similar marked increases in R&D in the UK over the period 1987 to
2013. However, the effects of these changes in the composition of firms on corporate
financing decisions, in particular, on leverage adjustments, has largely been over-
looked. Borisova and Brown (2013) highlight that studies on intangible investments,
such as R&D, are rather limited with the literature having largely focused on capital
expenditure. Similarly, Buera and Kaboski (2012) highlight that studies in corporate
finance that only focus on changes within firms have overlooked the important effects
of changes in the composition of firms on the dynamics in cash holdings.
What are the effects of the increase in innovative investments on capital structure
decisions? This question remains unanswered as debt financing is largely persistent,
and has been increasing over time. Graham et al. (2015) report a threefold increase
in corporate debt financing by non-financial firms in the US over the past century.
Similarly, DeAngelo and Roll (2015) report a wholesale abandonment of conservative
financing policies in the US after the Second World War as economies started to re-
cover. Breitkopf and Elsas (2012) highlight that firms in the US are systematically
over-levered as their estimated loss-given-default are higher than that implied by the
current debt tax shield.4 The rising corporate debt levels is an empirical irregular-
4Studies in the US also report evidence of a marked increase in corporate gearing over the period
leading to the recent global financial crisis (e.g., Almeida et al., 2012; Campello et al., 2010, 2011a,b;
Carmassi et al., 2009; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011; Dang et al., 2014a; Kahle and Stulz, 2013;
153
ity that poses important questions on how changes in corporate investments impact
on capital structure. Furthermore, questions on how managers decide on capital
structure (Myers, 2003) and whether capital structure affects real decisions such as
investment decisions (Lang et al., 1996) or firm value (Korteweg, 2010; Van Binsber-
gen et al., 2010) still remain largely unresolved despite decades of extensive research.
If leverage has not subsided, does this imply that intangible investments are increas-
ingly being financed with debt?
Against this background, this chapter revisits questions on capital structure by in-
vestigating whether corporate investments cause heterogeneity in leverage adjust-
ments.5 This research is motivated by the lack of empirical evidence on how in-
vestment affect target financing behaviour, yet, there has been secular changes in
corporate investments, in particular, a marked increase in R&D in the US (see, Be-
genau and Palazzo, 2015; Brown and Petersen, 2009; Hall and Lerner, 2010).6 These
changes in corporate investments have empirically testable implications on target
financing behaviour:7 (i) the increase in operating risk of firms arising from inno-
vative investments should prompt firms to adopt conservative financing structures;8
(ii) since the costs of deviating from the target should increase with financial distress
costs, the increase in innovative investments should result in an increase in the speed
Miglo, 2013).
5The linkages between financing activities and real decisions (e.g., investment) in the presence of
market imperfection remain largely ambiguous (see, Chava and Roberts, 2008; Stein, 2003). Empirical
studies on the linkages between finance and investment report mixed results, with one strand of the
literature reporting significant or insignificant linkages (e.g., Mauer and Triantis, 1994), while the
other, either reports a positive (e.g., Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005; Rashid and Caglayan, 2012) or a
negative relationship (e.g., Aivazian et al., 2005; Dang, 2011; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Lang et al.,
1996).
6Recently, Krainer (2014) reports that events from the recent global financial crisis in the US
have highlighted the importance of the overlooked interaction between the financial and the real side
of an economy (private and public investments). Similarly, DeAngelo and Roll (2015) highlight the
need to devote more effort to investigate the effect of other factors such as investment, pay-out, and
capital market access in light of the failure of traditional factors to explain much of the observed
cross-sectional or time variations in capital structure.
7Appendix 5.B shows a marked increase in intangible assets and decrease in tangible assets over
the period 1983-2013.
8Innovative investments are associated with high information asymmetry, asset substitution,
longer investment horizons, and low pledgeable value issues is likely to subject firms to binding fi-
nancial constraints (e.g., Borisova and Brown, 2013; Brown and Petersen, 2011; Brown et al., 2012;
Moshirian et al., 2013). The ever increasing dominance of innovative investments, which have more
than doubled over the past decades, should lead to the adoption of more conservative capital struc-
tures as firms also use capital structure to strategically manage or counteract risks (Dierker et al.,
2013) or earnings volatility (Dang et al., 2014a).
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of adjustment; (iii) as firms use capital structure to respond to changes in operating
risk, innovative firms should show wider variability in the speed of adjustment than
non-innovative firms with lower operating risk.
To conduct the analysis on the heterogeneity in leverage adjustment arising from dif-
ferences in corporate investments, this chapter uses a series of dynamic panel data
models estimated on a sample of 817 firms in the UK over the period 1987-2013.
First, the sample is sub-divided into two groups: innovative firms, which report
R&D, and non-innovative firms that do not report R&D. This sub-division allows
for comparisons of target financing behaviour to be drawn between innovative and
non-innovative firms. Second, the target is estimated based on firm characteristics
identified in the literature to be the most reliable determinants of capital structure.9
Third, the estimates of the target capital structure are then used to investigate any
differences in the speed of adjustment between innovative and non-innovative firms.
Fourth, interaction terms between the deviation from target and the financing deficit
are introduced to investigate the effects of financing deficits on target financing be-
haviour. Finally, the analysis examines time variation in the speed of adjustment by
estimating dynamic panel models separately for innovative and non-innovative firms
over a 5-year rolling window.
The main empirical findings of the analysis in this chapter are as follows. Although
collateral has fallen and innovative investments have increased considerably, lever-
age has remained largely persistent, with a slight upward drift that is characterised
by temporary spikes. Over the period 1987-2013, firms in the UK increasingly shifted
towards long-term debt, and the proportion of short-term debt on corporate balances
became progressively smaller. The persistence and upward drift of leverage is rather
inconsistent with predictions that firms should de-lever to reduce the operating risk
arising from increases in innovative investments. According to Hall (2002), innova-
tive investments should, therefore, be mostly financed with equity since the use of
9See Frank and Goyal (2009) and Oztekin (2015) for a review of the most reliable determinants of
capital structure.
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debt often entails restrictive covenants which reduce strategic flexibility. The time
trend in leverage is largely similar across firms undertaking different forms of invest-
ment, with non-innovative firms (firms that do not report R&D) being more levered
than comparable innovative firms (firms that report R&D) only during the period
2000-2013. The similar trends in leverage of innovative and non-innovative firms
are inconsistent with the results reported from studies that use US data, which show
that firms with R&D use less debt (e.g., Fama and French, 2002; Buera and Kaboski,
2012; Hall, 2009). The low debt for firms that report R&D in the US could result
from the desire to preserve financial flexibility (through maintaining financial slack),
which is valuable due to the presence of investment options.10
The estimated average speed of adjustment from the analysis in this chapter is 34.9%
for the period 1987-2013. This result indicates that non-financial firms in the UK
take on average 3.23 years (or half-life of 1.61 years) to adjust leverage towards the
target.11 The moderate speed of adjustment of 34.9% supports the presence of adjust-
ment costs which impede firms from fully adjusting towards the target. This result
coincides with evidence from the US, and suggests that firms in the UK have a target
capital structure as predicted by the trade-off theory.12 However, this speed of ad-
justment is higher than that reported in the US studies by Fama and French (2002)
(7% - 18%) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) (8.3% - 10%), and is inconsistent with
Welch (2004) who reports limited or no adjustment at all in the US.13 The results
from the analysis in this chapter also show that modelling asymmetry in financing
decisions is important in the understanding of the heterogeneity in target financing
as firms with above-target leverage (44.2%) consistently have higher speed of adjust-
ment than firms with below-target leverage (27.8%). The relatively higher speed of
10According to O’Brien (2003), firms in highly competitive product markets in the US such as that
of information technology seek to maintain strategic flexibility.
11Using half-life convention, the time taken to adjust half of the deviation from target is calculated
as ln(0.5)/ln(1−λ), where λ is the estimated speed of adjustment.
12Prior US studies report ranges of the speed of adjustment between 0% and 40% (see, Dang et al.,
2014a; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Lemmon et al., 2008). Similarly, Faulk-
ender et al. (2012), Leary and Roberts (2005) and Strebulaev (2007) report that adjustment costs are
the major impediments to the attainment of the the target and that firms will only adjust towards the
target if the benefits outweigh the associated costs.
13Appendix 5.A presents a summary of the results of studies on target financing behaviour on the
US and other countries.
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adjustment for firms with above-target leverage is consistent with the proposition
that bankruptcy costs increase with debt, therefore, over-levered firms benefit rela-
tively more than under-levered firms from adjusting leverage towards the target.
Comparisons of the speed of adjustment between innovative and non-innovative firms
suggests that accounting for the types of investment that firms engage in, is impor-
tant in understanding the heterogeneity in target financing behaviour. The seem-
ingly contradictory trends on leverage carry over to target financing behaviour as
innovative firms consistently have a higher speed of adjustment than non-innovative
firms. The speed of adjustment for innovative firms is 44.8%, which implies that
these firms take on average 2.34 years (or a half-life of 1.17 years) to revert to the
target leverage, whereas non-innovative firms have a speed of adjustment of 28.3%,
which implies that these firms take 4.16 years (or a half-life of 2.08 years) to revert
to the target leverage. The difference becomes even more pronounced when asymme-
try in leverage adjustment is considered, as over-levered innovative (non-innovative)
firms have a speed of adjustment of 51.9% (34.9%) while under-levered innovative
(non-innovative) firms have a speed of adjustment of 37.5% (24.1%). This implies
that innovative firms with above-target and below-target leverage adjust at a rate
of one and half times as fast in comparison to non-innovative firms. The relatively
high speed for innovative firms suggests that the costs of deviating from the target
are relatively higher for firms facing potential financing distress costs, which moti-
vates them to more actively re-balance capital structure. This finding is new to the
literature as it shows that asymmetries arising from corporate investments are a
significant factor in understanding heterogeneity in target financing behaviour. The
differences in the speed of adjustment due to differences in the type of investment
remain significant even after controlling for other factors affecting capital structure
and the position (above or below-target) of the firm relative to the target.
An investigation of the variability of leverage adjustment over time reveals that
non-innovative and innovative firms consistently adopt diverging target financing
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behaviour.14 Throughout the period 1987-2013, the consistently higher speed of ad-
justment of innovative firms exhibits more variability than that of non-innovative
firms. Further, there seems to be three periods of distinctive patterns in the time
variation in the speed of adjustment. Over the period 1987-2001, innovative and non-
innovative firms have different target financing behaviour as the speed of adjustment
increases for innovative firms but decreases for non-innovative firms. In contrast, the
period 2001-2006 is marked by a pronounced decrease in the rate at which innovative
firms adjust leverage, with a slight increase for non-innovative firms. From 2006 to
2010, all firms report an increase in the speed of adjustment, but the increase is more
pronounced for innovative firms. The period beyond 2009 is marked by fluctuations in
the speed of adjustment. This result suggests that firms facing high bankruptcy costs
counteract the higher costs associated with using more debt financing by actively ad-
justing faster towards the target rather than by just adopting an overly conservative
financing structure.15 Overall, the asymmetry in the speed of adjustment suggests
that it is important to model heterogeneity arising from differences in corporate in-
vestments so as to gain a better understanding of financing decisions of firms that
engage in target financing behaviour.
The analysis presented in this chapter relates to Aghion et al. (2004) who report that
the probability of equity issuance in the UK increases with R&D, and that there is
a negative non-linear effect of R&D on leverage. However, this study differs from
Aghion et al. (2004) in that it investigates target financing behaviour and how the
speed of adjustment differs between innovative and non-innovative firms, rather than
focusing on how R&D affects the probability of issuing or repurchasing/retiring eq-
uity and debt. Adjustment costs should differ between innovative and non-innovative
14Time variations have largely been overlooked with a few US studies that have investigated het-
erogeneity focusing on cross-sectional variations capital structure (e.g., Byoun, 2008; Flannery and
Lockhart, 2009; Hovakimian et al., 2009; Lockhart, 2014; Warr et al., 2012). By analysing both cross-
sectional and time-varying heterogeneity in leverage adjustment, this chapter offers a more compre-
hensive analysis with new insights on the mixed results in the literature and UK where studies are
rather limited.
15Krainer (2014) develops a model that show that managers make investment decisions commen-
surate with the risk tolerance of the investors and use capital structure to offset any deviations from
the acceptable risk thresholds. This chapter provides empirical evidence consistent with the theoret-
ical predictions of the model as managers of innovative firms (whose investments are risky) adjust
leverage faster than those of non-innovative firms.
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firms, with the former benefiting more than the latter as they face higher financial
distress costs. This study also relates to the growing literature on R&D (e.g., Ace-
moglu et al., 2010; Borisova and Brown, 2013; Brown et al., 2012; Hall and Lerner,
2010; Moshirian et al., 2013). The chapter builds on this literature by showing that
the effects of innovative investments are not significant only on the debt-equity choice
but extends to several aspects of capital structure, in particular, target financing be-
haviour. The significant differences in the speed of adjustment that this chapter
reports show that the type of investment undertaken by firms has significant effects
on leverage adjustments.
This chapter complements prior effort on target financing behaviour by providing ad-
ditional empirical insights on asymmetry in leverage adjustments due to differences
in the forms of investment.16 Most studies are premised on the proposition of homo-
geneous leverage adjustments with only a few notable exceptions (e.g., Byoun, 2008;
Dang et al., 2014a; Elsas and Florysiak, 2011; Faulkender et al., 2008; Hovakimian
and Li, 2010; Lockhart, 2014). For example, Byoun (2008) was among the first group
of studies in the US to show that the speed of adjustment varies with leverage and
financing surplus or deficit. In addition to showing that the speed of adjustment is
significantly higher for firms with above-target leverage than firms with below-target
leverage as reported by Byoun (2008), the results from the analyses in this chapter
further show that the difference increases when modelling heterogeneity in corporate
investment. The results in this chapter also show that heterogeneity in corporate in-
vestment has a significant effect on target financing behaviour as innovative firms
adjust leverage one and half times faster than non-innovative firms whether they
are below or above-target. Dang et al. (2014a) report moderate evidence of cross-
sectional differences in the speed of adjustment in the US around the global financial
crisis based on growth, large investment, size, and earnings volatility. Similarly, El-
sas and Florysiak (2011) report significant heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment
based on industrial classifications, size, growth, leverage and default risk. This chap-
16The literature on target financing behaviour has been growing over time (see, Byoun, 2008;
Chang and Dasgupta, 2009; Dang et al., 2014a; Elsas and Florysiak, 2011; Faulkender et al., 2008;
Harford et al., 2009; Koufopoulos and Lambrinoudakis, 2013).
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ter presents evidence that leverage adjustments are significantly non-homogeneous
due to differences in initial deviation from target, and most importantly, differences
in corporate investments even after controlling for the factors identified by Dang et al.
(2014a) and Elsas and Florysiak (2011). The heterogeneity in corporate investments
and how it affects corporate decisions, in particular capital structure, remain largely
ambiguous and has been overlooked in the literature (see, Chava and Roberts, 2008;
Stein, 2003).
In addition to focusing on cross-sectional heterogeneity, this chapter also investigates
time variations in leverage adjustments. Time variations are informative on changes
in firm characteristics and the underlying macroeconomic conditions (e.g., Cook and
Tang, 2010; Hackbarth et al., 2006). Cook and Tang (2010) report evidence that
firms adjust faster (slower) in good (bad) macroeconomic environments. The evi-
dence presented in this chapter suggests that much of the adjustments are done by
innovative firms rather than non-innovative firms. Innovative firms are more active
in re-balancing capital structure as the costs of deviating form target are relatively
higher than for non-innovative firms. This chapter also relates to recent US studies
on the effects of large (lumpy) investments on capital structure (e.g., Dudley, 2012;
Elsas et al., 2013; Whited, 2006). Although Dudley (2012) reports that the speed
of adjustment increases with size of investment projects, they do not examine how
heterogeneity in corporate investment (innovative and non-innovative investments)
affect target financing behaviour.17 This study adds new insights on how different
forms of investment drive heterogeneity in capital structure through an explicit com-
parison between innovative and non-innovative firms.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.3 presents the methodology,
Section 5.4 discusses the the empirical results, Section 5.5 presents several robust-
ness tests, and Section 5.6 concludes and suggests areas for further research.
17Brown et al. (2012) highlight that prior studies have often treated the capital expenditure and
R&D similarly, overlooking the differences in their risk characteristics. They show that firms use cash
reserves to smoothen R&D expenditure and mostly equity if external financing is required.
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5.3 Methodology
In line with the literature, this analysis proceeds by estimating the speed of adjust-
ment using dynamic panel data models in a two-step procedure.18 The first step
estimates target leverage in two ways. The average target leverage for all firms is
estimated with the following equation:
Lit = γLit−1 +θXit−1 +ηi +ηt +ξit (5.1)
where Lit is the leverage for firm i at time t, γ is the first order autocorrelation of
leverage (1−γ is the speed of adjustment), θ is a vector of coefficient sensitivities to
the set of firm-specific characteristic variables Xit−1, ηi are unobservable firm spe-
cific effects, ηt are time-specific effects and ξit is an error term.19 The average target
leverage for all firms is then defined as L∗it = θ̂Xit−1. The implied speed of adjustment
for all firms is computed as 1−γ.
In all other cases when innovative firms are differentiated from non-innovative firms,
the following version of Equation (5.1) is used to estimate target leverage:
Lit = γ1LINNit−1 +γ2LNINit−1 +θNINXNINit−1 +θINNXINNit−1 +ζi +ζt +µit (5.2)
where, γ1 and γ2 are the first order autocorrelations for innovative firms and non-
innovative firms, respectively; θINN and θNIN are the sensitivities to firm-specific char-
acteristics of innovative and non-innovative firms, respectively; ζi are firm-specific
effects; ζt are time-specific effects; and µit is the error term. The target leverage
for innovative firms is computed as θINNXINNit−1, and that for non-innovative firms as
θNINXNINit−1. These are then stacked as the overall firm estimate for target leverage
L∗it. The focus of Equation (5.2) is on whether the coefficients differ between non-
innovative (NIN) and innovative (INN) firms.
18Dynamic panel data models are used by Dang et al. (2012), Dang et al. (2014a), Faulkender et al.
(2012), Lemmon et al. (2008), and Oztekin (2015) to estimate the speed of adjustment.
19The vector of lagged firm specific determinants of leverage, Xit−1, includes R&D, capital expendi-
ture (Capex), tangible assets, intangible assets, growth, size, profit, non-debt tax shield (NDTS) and
volatility.
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The target leverage (L∗it) computed above is used in the second step to estimate the
speed of adjustment as follows:
∆Lit =Lit −Lit−1 =λ(L∗it −Lit−1)+εit (5.3)
where ∆Lit, is the change in leverage from the previous year, λ is the measure of the
speed of adjustment and εit is an error term. If λ = 0, then there is no adjustment;
λ = 1 then there is full adjustment towards the target; and if 0 < λ < 1, then there is
partial adjustment, with the last being consistent with the existence of adjustment
costs.
To investigate the differences in the speed of adjustment between innovative and
non-innovative firms, Equation (5.3) is modified to include a dummy variable (RDD)
that takes the value of one for firms that report R&D and zero otherwise:
∆Lit = (λ1 +λ2 ×RDD)Devit +εit (5.4)
where λ1 is the measure of the speed of adjustment for all firms, λ2 is the measure of
the difference in the speed of adjustment between non-innovative (NIN) and innova-
tive firms (INN) and Devit =L∗it −Lit−1, is the deviation from target leverage.
Equations (5.1)− (5.3) are premised on the assumption that firms adopt homoge-
neous target financing behaviour. However, Dang et al. (2012), Flannery and Han-
kins (2013) and Huang and Ritter (2009) highlight that this assumption is rather
restrictive, as it fails to consider the asymmetry that characterises corporate financ-
ing behaviour. It is more reasonable and tractable to expect that over-leveraged and
under-leveraged firms may follow different target financing behaviour due to differ-
ences in adjustment costs or benefits of using leverage. There are only a few studies
that have considered the asymmetry in target financing behaviour explicitly (e.g.,
Byoun, 2008; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Faulkender et al., 2012; Shyam-Sunder
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and Myers, 1999). According to Byoun (2008) firms adjust leverage at a faster rate
when they have a financial deficit with below-target leverage or a financial surplus
with above-target leverage than when they have a financial surplus with below-target
leverage or a financial deficit with above-target leverage. Such asymmetries cannot
be examined by models that assume homogeneous target financing behaviour.
In order to examine asymmetry in leverage adjustments, a modified version of Equa-
tion (5.3) conditional on the initial deviation from the target is specified as follows:
∆Lit =λAbove1 DevAboveit +λBelow2 DevBelowit +εit (5.5)
where λAbove1 is the speed of adjustment for firms with above-target leverage, λ
Below
2 is
the speed of adjustment for firms with below-target leverage, DevAboveit is deviation from
target leverage for firms with leverage above the target, and DevBelowit is deviation from
target leverage for firms with leverage below the target. If adjustment is symmetric
as in Equation (5.1), then λAbove1 = λBelow2 , and firms above or below the target adjust at
the same rates. However, differences in firm characteristics and operating environ-
ments may result in asymmetries in target financing behaviour.
Further, Equation (5.5) is extended to investigate the differences between innovative
and non-innovative firms with above and below-target leverage as follows:
∆Lit = (λa1 +λb2 ×RDD)DevAboveit + (λc3 +λd4 ×RDD)DevBelowit +εit (5.6)
where λa1 is the speed of adjustment for all firms with above-target leverage, λ
b
2 is a
measure of the difference in the speed of adjustment between non-innovative and in-
novative firms with above-target leverage, λc3 is the speed of adjustment for all firms
with below-target leverage and λd4 is a measure of the difference in the speed of ad-
justment between non-innovative and innovative firms with below-target leverage. If
adjustment is asymmetric but with no differences between non-innovative and inno-
vative firms, then λb2 and λ
d
4 should be insignificant.
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In further analyses of the effects of financing deficits on target financing behaviour,
Equation (5.4) is modified to include a dummy variable, FDit, that takes the value of
one if a firm has a financing deficit and zero otherwise:
∆Lit = (λ11 +λ21 ×FDit)Devit +εit (5.7)
where λ11 is the measure of the speed of adjustment for all firms and λ21 is the
measure of the difference in the speed of adjustment between firms with a financing
deficit and firms that do not have a financing deficit.
Equation (5.7) is extended to investigate the differences between non-innovative and
innovative firms with a financing deficit (FDit) as follows:
∆Lit = (λ12 +λ22 ×FDit +λ32 ×FDit ×RDD)Devit +εit (5.8)
where λ12 is the measure of the speed of adjustment for all firms, λ22 is the measure
of the difference in the speed of adjustment between all firms with a financing deficit
and all firms that do not have a financing deficit and λ32 is the measure of the dif-
ference in the speed of adjustment between innovative firms with a financing deficit
and non-innovative firms that have a financing deficit.
In order to investigate the effects of a financing deficit on firms with above and below-
target leverage, Equation (5.5) is augmented with a dummy variable that is used to
examine the effects of financing deficits (FDit) on leverage adjustments as follows:
∆Lit = (λ13 +λ23 ×FDit)DevAboveit + (λ33 +λ43 ×FDit)DevBelowit +εit (5.9)
where λ13 is the speed of adjustment for all firms with above-target leverage, λ23 is
the measure of the difference in the speed of adjustment for all firms with above-
target leverage and a financing deficit, and all firms with above-target leverage but
do not have a financing deficit, λ33 is the speed of adjustment for all firms with below-
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target leverage, λ43 is the measure of the difference in the speed of adjustment for
firms all with below-target leverage and a financing deficit, and all firms with below-
target leverage but do not have a financing deficit.
Finally, Equation (5.9) is extended to investigate the effects of both the financing
deficit on leverage adjustments and the differences in leverage adjustments between
non-innovative and innovative firms as follows:
∆Lit = (λ14 +λ24 ×FDit +λ34 ×FDit ×RDD)DevAboveit
+(λ44 +λ54 ×FDit +λ64 ×FDit ×RDD)DevBelowit +εit
(5.10)
where Lit is the leverage for firm i at time t, λ14 is the speed of adjustment for firms
with above-target leverage, λ24 is the measure of the difference in the speed of ad-
justment for firms with above-target leverage and a financing deficit, and firms with
above-target leverage but do not have a financing deficit, λ34 is the measure of the
difference in the speed of adjustment for innovative firms with above-target lever-
age, and a financing deficit, and all firms with above-target leverage but do not have
a financing deficit, DevAboveit is deviation from target leverage for firms with leverage
above the target, λ44 is the speed of adjustment for all firms with below-target lever-
age, λ54 is the measure of the difference in the speed of adjustment for all firms with
below-target leverage and a financing deficit, and all firms with below-target leverage
but do not have a financing deficit, λ64 is the measure of the difference in the speed of
adjustment for innovative firms with below-target leverage, and a financing deficit,
and all firms with below-target leverage but do not have a financing deficit, DevBelowit
is the deviation from target leverage for firms with leverage below the target.
There are two alternative methods used for estimating the speed of adjustment (λ).
The first is a one-step approach that involves the joint estimation of the target lever-
age (L∗it) and the implied speed of adjustment (1− γ) in Equations (5.1) and (5.2)
by system Generalised Method of Moments (system GMM thereon). The second ap-
proach adopted in the estimation of Equations (5.3)−(5.10) involves a two-step proce-
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dure, where in the first step, the target leverage is estimated by system GMM based
on firm specific factors.20,21 The second step involves substituting the estimated tar-
get leverage into Equation (5.3) to estimate the speed of adjustment. Byoun (2008),
Fama and French (2002) and Faulkender et al. (2012) use a similar two-step proce-
dure to estimate the speed of adjustment. Although the one-step approach is more
efficient, the two-step procedure is preferred as it allows for modelling of asymme-
tries in leverage adjustments (see, Dang et al., 2014a; Flannery and Rangan, 2006;
Ozkan, 2001). Using the one-step approach to model asymmetries in leverage adjust-
ment does not allow for direct testing of differences in the speed of adjustment as this
would involve comparing estimates of the speed of adjustment across two models esti-
mated separately. The two-step procedure allows for direct tests of the differences in
the speed of adjustment. Having said that, the estimation results using the one-step
approach are also presented for robustness and for comparisons with prior studies
that use a similar approach. The inclusion of investment structure variables in the
estimation of the target leverage is aimed at testing whether differences in corporate
investments cause heterogeneous leverage adjustments.
Equations (5.1) and (5.2) are estimated by system GMM.22 Using simulations, Flan-
nery and Hankins (2013) conclude that the system GMM developed by Blundell and
Bond (1998) generally provides more consistent estimates than other methods used
20The target leverage, L∗it, is estimated including firm fixed effects as is consistent with recent
studies that report significant variations in target leverage attributable to firm fixed effects (e.g.,
Byoun, 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008). An estimate of the time-invariant
firm-fixed effects is obtained by estimating Equations (5.1) and (5.2) using system GMM. The predicted
residuals are then regressed on panel indicator variables. The fitted values from the second regression
of the residuals on the panel indicator variables are then used as estimates for the firm fixed effects.
21The estimated target leverage is restricted to be within the unit interval as some estimates may
inevitably lie outside this interval (e.g., Byoun, 2008; Dang et al., 2012; Faulkender et al., 2012; Hov-
akimian, 2004; Hovakimian and Vulanovic, 2010).
22The system GMM estimator is implemented using xtabond2 in Stata (Roodman, 2006). The
instruments used in this study are restricted to the second and third lags to address the problem of
having excessive instruments. Dynamic panel data estimators (DPD) such as the system GMM used
in this chapter are prone to problems of excessive instruments that proliferates as the sample size
increases (see, Vincent and Michaely, 2012). Roodman (2009) proposed two ways of addressing the
problem of excessive instruments. This involves either curtailing the instrument count by restricting
the number of lags used in each estimation or “collapsing” the instrument set, all of which will make
the instrument count linear in T. According to Mehrhoff (2009), restricting the the number of lags
used and “collapsing” the instrument set at the same time makes the instrument count invariant to
T.
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in the estimation of dynamic panel models in corporate finance.23 The system GMM
increases efficiency by combining equations estimated in levels with those in differ-
ences, and also controls for potential endogeneity problems as it allows the use of
first differenced and lagged level variables as instruments. According to Flannery
and Hankins (2013), endogeneity problems may arise due to simultaneity, omitted
variables, measurement errors, and auto-correlation in the errors.
The Hansen-Sargan test (J test) of over-identifying restrictions and the test for the
non-existence of first order (m1) and second order (m2) serial correlation in the differ-
enced residuals are reported. The J test is asymptotically distributed as chi-square
with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of instruments
and the number of parameters. The test for second-order serial correlation in resid-
uals of differenced equations, m2, is asymptotically normally distributed under the
null of no second-order serial correlation. However, Equations (5.3) - (5.9) are consis-
tently estimated by OLS with fixed effects and heteroskedasticity consistent errors
(see, Elsas et al., 2013; Faulkender et al., 2012; Warr et al., 2012). According to
Warr et al. (2012), estimating the speed of adjustment in the second stage of the two-
stage procedure by system GMM would gain little econometrically over using OLS.
Further, using OLS in the second stage allows for direct comparisons with previous
studies that have used a similar approach.24
5.4 Empirical results
The presentation of the empirical results is organised as follows: Section 5.4.1 presents
estimation results of the target leverage; Section 5.4.2 presents estimation results on
leverage adjustments using the two-step procedure and assuming symmetrical ad-
justments as well as difference in leverage adjustments between innovative firms
(INN) and non-innovative firms (NIN); Section 5.4.3 presents estimation results on
23The other methods used in estimating dynamic models include, ordinary least squares (OLS),
standard fixed effects (FE), long differencing (LD) (Huang and Ritter, 2009), difference GMM (DIFF
GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991), and least squares dummy variable (LSDV) (Kiviet, 1995).
24For robustness, estimates of the speed of adjustment using system GMM in the second stage of
the two-stage procedure are presented where appropriate.
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leverage adjustments assuming asymmetry in leverage adjustments; Section 5.4.4
presents estimation results on the effects of financing deficits on leverage adjust-
ments; and Section 5.4.5 presents results on the time variation in leverage adjust-
ments.
5.4.1 Determinants of target leverage
Table 5.1 presents the estimating results of Equations (5.1) and (5.2) that relate
leverage to lagged leverage, research and development (R&D), capital expenditure
(Capex), tangible assets, intangible assets, growth, size, profit, non-debt tax shield,
and earnings volatility. The first column, ALL, presents the results for all firms using
Equation (5.1). The second and third columns present results of Equation (5.1) esti-
mated separately for non-innovative (NIN) and innovative (INN) firms, respectively.
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 4.2 present results of estimating Equation (5.2)
for both innovative and non-innovative firms. The last column presents p-values for a
t-test of the difference in the coefficients (NIN-INN) of columns four and five. The val-
ues in parentheses are the associated standard errors. All models include firm fixed
effects and time dummies (not reported) to control for other excluded firm-specific
and time factors that might affect leverage.
Coefficient estimates on lagged leverage are highly significant in all columns, which
suggests that leverage is largely persistent. This indicates that prior debt financing
levels are an important factor affecting current leverage levels. Firms with current
debt financing are more likely to continue using debt financing in the future.25 The
implied speed of adjustment in Table 5.1, λ = 1−γ, for the full sample, ALL, is 24.2%.
Using half a life convention (ln(0.5)/ln(1−λ)), this slow to moderate speed of adjust-
ment implies that firms in the UK take 5 years (or a half-life of 2.50 years) on average
to revert to their target leverage.
More generally, the slow to moderate implied speed of adjustment using the one-step
25This result that is consistent with Lemmon et al. (2008) who report that capital structure of firms
in the US is highly persistent. Similarly, Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) report that the stability of
leverage ratios is relatively unaffected by changes in the economic environments.
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Table 5.1 The determinants of the target leverage
The table presents estimation results of Equations (5.1) and (5.2) that relate leverage to lagged lever-
age and lagged firm characteristics (research and development (R&D), capital expenditure (Capex),
growth, tangible assets (tangible), intangible assets (intangible), size, profit, non-debt tax shield, and
earnings volatility). ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that
do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists of
non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the period from
1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th
percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream. The results are estimated by
system GMM. The table reports the J statistic from a test of the over identifying restrictions, and the
J statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared under the null of instrument validity, and the
test of second-order autocorrelation (m2) in the first differenced residuals. Standard errors (in paren-
thesis) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. All models include firm fixed effects and
time dummies (not reported).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels,
respectively.
Variables ALL NIN INN NIN INN Diff
(p-value)
L it−1 0.758*** 0.823*** 0.676*** 0.840*** 0.675*** (0.005)
(0.032) (0.049) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042)
R&D -0.146*** -0.181*** -0.173*** (0.000)
(0.034) (0.041) (0.039)
Capex 0.114*** 0.143** 0.046 0.163*** 0.042 (0.063)
(0.036) (0.057) (0.039) (0.053) (0.040)
Tangible 0.058*** 0.037** 0.087*** 0.038** 0.089*** (0.014)
(0.011) (0.016) (0.024) (0.015) (0.017)
Intangible 0.046*** 0.033* 0.071*** 0.023 0.076*** (0.008)
(0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Growth 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 (0.554)
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Size 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** (0.500)
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Profit -0.180*** -0.206*** -0.176*** -0.197*** -0.170*** (0.359)
(0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
NDTS -0.283*** -0.238*** -0.255*** -0.300*** -0.209*** (0.405)
(0.061) (0.090) (0.094) (0.084) (0.075)
Volatility -0.114*** -0.130*** -0.105** -0.104*** -0.092** (0.828)
(0.027) (0.047) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040)
Constant -0.009 -0.004 -0.015 -0.018
(0.013) (0.026) (0.043) (0.015)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
m2 1.083 0.680 0.751 0.995
p-value (0.279) (0.497) (0.453) (0.320)
J 67.517 68.848 68.287 139.100
p-value (0.562) (0.517) (0.536) (0.506)
procedure for all firms is within the range documented in the literature. US studies
that report slow to moderate speed of adjustment include Dang et al. (2014a) (18.3%
- 52.8%), Faulkender et al. (2008) (21.3% - 33.9%), Faulkender et al. (2012) (21.9%
- 56.4%) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) (34.4%). The slow to moderate speed of
adjustment in the literature has largely been attributed to the presence of adjust-
ment costs (see, Leary and Roberts, 2005). In the presence of adjustment costs, firms
adjust leverage towards the target only if benefits outweigh the associated costs (see,
Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2008; Leary and Roberts, 2005). In contrast to stud-
ies that report significantly higher speed of adjustment, Fama and French (2002) and
Kayhan and Titman (2007) report relatively low rates of 7% - 18% and 8.3% - 10%,
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respectively. The rather low and insignificant speed of adjustment reported by the
latter studies in the US does not support the existence of a target capital structure
as postulated by the trade-off theory.26 The heterogeneity in the estimates of the
speed of adjustment, even within the US, highlights the need for further research
on the sources of the differences, and whether similar variations in target financing
behaviour obtain in other economies where studies are rather limited.
This chapter extends the literature by examining whether differences in the type of
investment that firms engage in is a source of heterogeneity in target financing be-
haviour. Consistent with the hypothesis that the types of corporate investment leads
to heterogeneity in leverage adjustments, the differences in the estimates of the im-
plied speed of adjustment (1−γ) from Equation (5.2) between non-innovative (third
column) and innovative (fourth column) firms are statistically significant. The esti-
mates of the implied speed of adjustment for non-innovative firms is 17.7% (1−0.823)
and for innovative firms is 32.4% (1−0.676). Whereas innovative firms take about
4 years (or a half-life of 1.76 years) to adjust towards the target leverage, non-
innovative firms take almost 8 years (or a half-life of 3.98 years). The fifth and sixth
columns show similar differences in the implied speed of adjustment (1−γ). The rel-
atively high implied speed of adjustment for innovative firms, which is almost twice
as fast as that of non-innovative firms, suggests that the costs of deviating form the
target capital structure are higher for innovative firms. These differences are prelim-
inary evidence that recognising heterogeneity in target financing behaviour arising
from differences in corporate investments is important in the understanding of vari-
ations in corporate capital structure.27
The results in Table 5.1 show a significant negative effect of R&D on leverage, which
is consistent with the financial constraint proposition (Brown et al., 2012; Borisova
26Similarly, Welch (2004) reports that firms in the US do not actively seek to re-balance capital
structure after experiencing shocks from changes in stock prices.
27Theories on information asymmetry posit that firms subject to information asymmetry face high
bankruptcy costs (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The significant difference on the implied
speed of adjustment shows the existence of asymmetry in target financing behaviour, as it is more
beneficial for innovative firms to more actively re-balance towards the target so as to reduce the costs
of deviating from the optimal capital structure.
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and Brown, 2013; Hall, 2009; Hall et al., 2009). Firms undertaking R&D tend to use
less debt on average as innovative investments are a poor form of collateral and are
more prone to information asymmetry and asset substitution problems (Aghion et al.,
2004). However, Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 shows that there are instances when inno-
vative firms have relatively higher leverage than non-innovative firms.28 In contrast,
fixed capital investments have a significant positive effect on leverage. This implies
that firms undertaking fixed capital investments are more likely to find it easier to
access financing from capital markets. Firms with innovative investments are sub-
ject to binding financial constraints which limits their access to capital markets (see,
Brown et al., 2012).
Estimates of the coefficients on the other factors used as control variables are gen-
erally consistent with the literature.29 Leverage is significantly positively related to
tangible assets, intangible assets and size, while it is negatively related to growth,
profitability and non-debt tax shield. The positive effect of tangible assets and size
on leverage is consistent with the proposition that larger firms with more pledge-
able assets find it easier to access capital (see, Almeida and Campello, 2007; Berger
et al., 2011; Campello and Graham, 2013; Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, 2014). Contrary
to the predictions of information asymmetry theories, the positive coefficient on in-
tangible assets suggests that intangible assets support debt financing.30 However,
the significantly positive relationship with intangible assets are consistent with Lim
et al. (2014) who purports that intangible assets reported in the purchase price al-
location data of the bidding firms'10-Ks or 10-Qs in the US are positively correlated
with debt.31 Recently, Begenau and Palazzo (2015) report that some informed or in-
28Estimates of the coefficients on R&D in Figure 4.1 (Chapter 4) reveals that although the rela-
tionship between leverage and R&D is mostly negative, it sometimes is smaller in magnitude and
insignificant in some cases.
29See studies on the determinants of capital structure (e.g., Cook and Tang, 2010; Dang, 2013a;
Elsas and Florysiak, 2013; Faulkender et al., 2008, 2012).
30Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3 shows that the proportion of intangible assets on corporate balance sheets
has increased substantially over time. However, extant studies have largely overlooked the role of
intangible assets in corporate financing decisions despite theoretical studies which show that contract
incompleteness and limited enforceability subject firms to binding financial constraints (see, Hart and
Moore, 1994; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
31A Form 10-K (10-Qs) is an annual (or quarterly) report that presents comprehensive information
on the company's performance for the period under review. Every listed company in the US is required
to submit Form 10-K (10-Qs) to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
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tegrated lenders recognise the value of specialised collateral and advance credit at
relatively lower rates than uninformed lenders who charge a premium to compen-
sate for the information asymmetry in collateral values. Consistent with the pecking
order theory, firms use profits to reduce debt (negative coefficient estimates) and sub-
stitute debt tax shield for non-debt tax shield (see, DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980).
The results in Table 5.1 are used to compute the target leverage, which is used in the
rest of this chapter. All the following sections use the two-step procedure to estimate
the speed of adjustment.
5.4.2 Symmetric leverage adjustments
This section examines whether firms engage in target financing behaviour and whether
this behaviour differs between innovative and non-innovative firms. Firms are also
divided into sub-samples based on whether they are above or below target lever-
age. Further sub-division into innovative (INN) and non-innovative (NIN) groups
are based on whether a firm reports R&D or not. Table 5.2 presents the estimation
results of Equations (5.3) and (5.4) that relate changes in book leverage (∆Lit) to the
deviation (Devit) from target leverage.
Table 5.2 reports highly significant coefficients on the deviation from the target lever-
age. This provides supporting evidence to the predictions of the trade-off theory that
firms actively re-balance capital structure. The significant speed of adjustment esti-
mated using the two-step procedure in Table 5.2 is consistent with estimates using
the one-step procedure in the previous section (Section 5.4.1). Under the dynamic
trade-off theory, firms make leverage adjustments only when the marginal benefits
associated with such adjustments outweigh the marginal costs. Using simulations,
Leary and Roberts (2005) show that different forms of adjustment costs affect tar-
get adjustment behaviour, as fixed adjustment costs generate infrequent but large
adjustments, and proportional adjustment costs generate small but more frequent
leverage adjustments.
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Table 5.2 Symmetric leverage adjustments
The table presents estimation results of Equations (5.3) and (5.4) that relate change in book leverage
to deviation of actual leverage from target leverage. RDD is a dummy variable taking the value of
one for innovative firms and zero otherwise. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for
non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D.
The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key vari-
ables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3.
All variables used are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope
through Datastream. All regressions include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported). Stan-
dard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate
significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Variables ALL NIN INN ALL
Devit 0.349*** 0.288*** 0.446*** 0.283***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
Devit ×RDD 0.165***
(0.022)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
Adj.R2 0.281 0.28 0.31 0.297
From the first column of Table 5.2, the estimate of the average speed of adjustment
for all firms is 34.9%, assuming homogeneous target financing behaviour. This slow
to moderate speed of adjustment can be attributed to the existence of adjustment
costs. Several models show that adjustment costs reduce the speed of adjustment
(e.g., Leary and Roberts, 2010; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Strebulaev, 2007).32 Us-
ing the half-life convention, this implies that, on average, firms in the UK take 3.22
years (or a half-life of 1.61 years) to adjust towards the target leverage. This slow
to moderate speed of adjustment is within the ranges reported in the literature (e.g.,
Antoniou et al., 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). However, Dang et al. (2012) and
Lockhart (2014) report relatively higher speeds of adjustment of 45% in the UK over
the period 1996–2003 and 50% - 77% in the US over the period 1996-2006. 33 There
are wide disparities in the speed of adjustment across studies even within the same
economy (studies in the US use similar data sets from Compustat files) (see, Elsas
and Florysiak, 2011). According to a review of the methods used in estimating dy-
32This result of slow to moderate speed of adjustment is consistent with recent studies that report
high leverage persistence in the US (see, Denis and McKeon, 2012; Lemmon et al., 2008), and other
economies in transition (see, Hanousek and Shamshur, 2011). Similarly, the slow to moderate speed of
adjustment is also consistent with Brav (2009) who reports a speed of adjustment of 10.2% - 22.5% for
firms in the UK over the period 1997-2003. Other studies in the UK report, for example, Dang et al.
(2012) (dynamic panel threshold models estimated using DIFF GMM) and Ozkan (2001) (dynamic
panel data models estimated using DIFF GMM) report relatively higher speeds of adjustment of 53%
- 59% and 56.9% over the periods 1996–2003 and 1984-1996, respectively.
33Dang et al. (2012) employ a dynamic panel threshold model in which the speed of adjustment is
estimated using difference GMM.
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namic panel data (DPD) models in corporate finance by Flannery and Hankins (2013),
the use of different estimation techniques (e.g., OLS, standard fixed effects (FE) es-
timation, difference GMM (DIFF GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991), system GMM
(SYS GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998) and long differencing (LD) (Hahn et al., 2007;
Huang and Ritter, 2009) and corrected least-squares (LS) (Kiviet, 1995)) is one source
of the observed disparities in the speed of adjustment across studies.34 Dang et al.
(2014b) further show that estimates of the speed of adjustment are understated and
overstated when using OLS and standard fixed effects (FE) techniques, respectively.
They conclude that estimates of the speed of adjustment using GMM are consistent,
while traditional methods such as least squares approach yield flawed estimates.35
Further, a comparison of the speed of adjustment shows that innovative firms (second
column) adjust leverage one and half-times faster than non-innovative firms (third
column). The fourth column shows that the difference in the estimate of the average
speed of adjustment between innovative and non-innovative firms (16.5%) is signif-
icant. This result highlights that the marked changes in the composition of firms,
which have been overlooked in the literature, affect target financing behaviour.36
Similarly, Buera and Kaboski (2012) highlight that studies on the US that ignore
changes within firms tend to overlook important effects of changes in the composi-
tion of firms on cash holdings. Prior studies use relatively shorter sample periods
which may not adequately examine changes in firm composition. The average life
of a US firm from the Compustat files is only 8-10 years (see, Dang et al., 2014a;
Flannery and Hankins, 2013). Hence, studying capital structure decisions for longer
periods, as done in this chapter, can help shed light on how changes in firm charac-
teristics affect corporate financing decisions.
The assumption of homogeneous target financing behaviour is rather restrictive as
34Appendix 5.A presents a list of studies on target financing behaviour in the US, the UK and other
countries.
35Dang et al. (2014b) also show analytical or bootstrap bias corrections approaches provide reliable
estimates of the speed of adjustment.
36For example, there is evidence that IPOs are now dominated by young high growth firms (e.g.,
Fama and French, 2001, 2005) and that there has been a marked increase in innovative firms over the
past decades (Brown and Petersen, 2009).
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it tends to overlook variations in both the costs and benefits of leverage adjustments
conditional on the initial deviation from the target leverage (see, Byoun, 2008; Dang
et al., 2012, 2014a; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). It is rather more reasonable to
assume that firms that are above the target leverage benefit more from leverage ad-
justments than firms that are below the target leverage since financial distress costs
increase monotonically with leverage (see, Byoun, 2008). For example, Mukherjee
and Wang (2013) report that the marginal costs of bankruptcy increase at a faster
rate with deviation from target leverage. Also, Korteweg (2010) present a model
which shows that the value function of a firm is increasing for firms below the tar-
get leverage, and decreases significantly with further increases in leverage. The next
section investigates heterogeneity in leverage adjustments depending on whether the
firm is above or below the target leverage and whether it reports R&D or not.
5.4.3 Asymmetric leverage adjustments
Table 5.3 presents the estimation results of Equations (5.5) and (5.6) that relate
changes in book leverage to the deviation from the target leverage. The tabulated
results are based on the assumption that firms undertake heterogeneous leverage
adjustments depending on whether the firm is above or below target leverage. The
results in the first, second and third columns are estimates from Equation (5.5), while
the results in the fourth column are estimates from Equation (5.6).
The results in the first column of Table 5.3 show that allowing for asymmetry in the
dynamic models reveals marked differences in target financing behaviour as firms
that are above-target leverage have a relatively higher speed of adjustment (44.2%)
compared to firms that are below-target leverage (27.8%). The reported speeds imply
that firms that are above-target leverage take 2.38 years (or a half-life of 1.19 years)
to adjust towards the target while firms that are below-target take 4.26 years (or a
half-life of 2.13 years) to adjust towards the target. The significant difference in the
speed of adjustment is consistent with the proposition that financial distress costs or
bankruptcy costs increase with leverage. Thus, firms that are above-target benefit
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Table 5.3 Asymmetric leverage adjustments
The table presents estimation results of Equations (5.5) and (5.6) that relate change in book leverage
to deviation of actual leverage from target leverage. RDD is a dummy variable taking the value of
one for innovative firms and zero otherwise. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for
non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D.
The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key vari-
ables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3.
All variables used are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope
through Datastream. All regressions include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported). Stan-
dard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate
significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Variables ALL NIN INN ALL
DevAboveit 0.442*** 0.359*** 0.515*** 0.349***
(0.019) (0.024) (0.028) (0.023)
DevAboveit ×RDD 0.170***
(0.035)
DevBelowit 0.278*** 0.245*** 0.374*** 0.241***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.032) (0.023)
DevBelowit ×RDD 0.134***
(0.038)
N 7579 2945 4632 7577
Adj.R2 817 0.286 0.313 0.301
more from adjustment than firms that are below-target. Byoun (2008), Faulkender
et al. (2012) and Korteweg (2010) report similar differences between firms with above
and below-target in the US. An alternative rationale which arises from the need to
preserve financial slack or flexibility deliberately by maintaining leverage below the
target, may also explain the low speed of adjustment for firms with below-target
leverage. de Jong et al. (2012), Denis (2011), Devos et al. (2012), Gamba and Triantis
(2008) and Varouj Aivazian (2002) also highlight that maintaining financial slack,
which can take the form of an untapped borrowing facility or excess cash, is optimal
if firms seek to maintain flexibility that allows them to invest in profitable future
opportunities.
A comparison across firm types reveals rather strikingly different results as innova-
tive firms consistently have higher speed of adjustment than non-innovative firms.
The estimation results of Equation (5.5) on separate sub-samples of firm types in the
second and third columns show that the speed of adjustment for innovative firms with
above-target leverage (51.5%) is higher than that of non-innovative firms with above-
target leverage (35.9%). Similar differences are also observed between innovative
firms with below-target leverage (37.4%) and non-innovative firms with below-target
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leverage (24.5%). The higher speed of adjustment for innovative firms is contrary to
the proposition that innovative investments (R&D) subject firms to binding financial
constraints, thereby, leading to slow speeds of adjustment. Rather, the evidence that
innovative firms have a relatively higher speed of adjustment is consistent with the
results shown in Figure 4.3 that innovative firms (with high growth rates) access
capital markets more frequently than non-innovative firms, thereby having more op-
portunities to implement leverage adjustments. Also, the higher speed of adjustment
for innovative firms suggests that high financial distress costs associated with inno-
vative investments may impose greater costs of deviating from the target leverage,
which forces firms to adjust capital structure more actively.
The differences in the speed of adjustment across firms of different types of invest-
ment are more pronounced and significant under the assumption of asymmetric lever-
age adjustments. Comparisons of the estimated speed reported in the fourth col-
umn of Table 5.3 suggests that innovative firms with above-target leverage have a
17.0% faster speed of adjustment than non-innovative firms with above-target lever-
age. The estimated speeds imply that innovative firms with above-target leverage
take 1.9 years (or half-life of 0.95 years) on average to adjust towards the target,
whereas non-innovative firms with above-target leverage take 3.22 years (or half-life
of 1.61 years). Comparisons of firms with below-target leverage show that innova-
tive firms have relatively higher speed of adjustment (37.5% which translates to 2.94
years or half-life of 1.47 years) than non-innovative firms (24.1% which translates to
5.02 years or half-life of 2.51 years). Thus, innovative firms adjust faster whether
they are below or above-target.37 These significant differences in speeds suggest that
firms that face higher bankruptcy costs adjust faster towards the target, and that
models of leverage adjustments that do not account for asymmetry overlook impor-
tant dynamics on target financing behaviour.
The next sub-section further investigates the differences in leverage adjustments
37A study on the US by Dierker et al. (2013) investigating whether firms adjust leverage to manage
risk reports results that are consistent with those reported in this section as firms with high risk adjust
faster than firms with low risk.
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between innovative firms and non-innovative firms by examining effects of financing
imbalances on the speed of adjustment.
5.4.4 Financing deficits and leverage adjustments
This section investigates the effects on leverage adjustments of cash-flow imbalances,
which take the form of financing surpluses or deficits. Following Byoun (2008) and
Faulkender et al. (2012), financing imbalances offer convenient opportunities to ad-
just leverage at relatively lower costs as the firms need to issue large amounts of
debt/equity to cover the financing deficit. This section extends these findings by ex-
amining whether the effects of financing deficits differ systematically between firms
with above-target leverage and those with below-target leverage, and between non-
innovative and innovative firms.
Table 5.4 presents the estimation results of Equations (5.7) and (5.8) in Panel A, and
Equations (5.9) and (5.10) in Panel B that relate changes in book leverage to the devi-
ation from the target leverage. The results in Panel A are based on the assumption of
symmetric target financing behaviour, while the results in Panel B are based on the
assumption of asymmetric target financing behaviour. The results in the first, second
and third columns of Panel A are estimates from Equation (5.7), while the results in
the fourth column are estimates from Equation (5.8). The results in the first, second
and third columns of Panel B are estimates from Equation (5.9), while the results in
the fourth column are estimates from Equation (5.10). The effects of the financing
deficit on leverage adjustment in Table 5.4 is examined by using the financing deficit
dummy variable (FDit) that takes the value of one if a firm has a financing deficit
and zero otherwise.
The estimated coefficients on the effects of the financing deficit on leverage adjust-
ment in Panel A are rather insignificant, except those reported in the fourth column.
Focusing on the results in the fourth column of Panel A, the presence of a financing
deficit reduces the speed of adjustment for non-innovative firms by 10% (an increase
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Table 5.4 Leverage adjustments and financing deficits
The table presents estimation results of Equations (5.7) and (5.8) in Panel A, and Equations (5.9)
and (5.10) in Panel B that relate change in book leverage to deviation of actual leverage from target
leverage. RDD is a dummy variable taking the value of one for innovative firms and zero otherwise.
FDit is a dummy variable taking the value of one for firms with a financing deficit and zero otherwise.
ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D,
and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the
UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables
used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3. All variables used are winsorised at the 1th and
99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream. All regressions include
firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported). Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent
levels, respectively.
Panel A: Symmetric leverage adjustments with financing deficits
Variables ALL NIN INN ALL
Devit 0.359*** 0.310*** 0.427*** 0.359***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012)
Devit ×FDit -0.028 -0.053* 0.071 -0.100***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.049) (0.028)
Devit ×FDit ×RDD 0.237***
(0.052)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
Adj.R2 0.282 0.283 0.311 0.292
Panel B: Asymmetric leverage adjustments with financing deficits
Variables ALL NIN INN ALL
DevAboveit 0.375*** 0.304*** 0.442*** 0.371***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.031) (0.020)
DevAboveit ×FDit 0.235*** 0.212*** 0.243*** 0.162***
(0.034) (0.041) (0.051) (0.040)
DevAboveit ×FDit ×RDD 0.145**
(0.058)
DevBelowit 0.354*** 0.330*** 0.411*** 0.356***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.035) (0.019)
DevBelowit ×FDit -0.155*** -0.149*** -0.106* -0.184***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.062) (0.029)
DevBelowit ×FDit ×RDD 0.136**
(0.057)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
Adj.R2 0.308 0.312 0.324 0.311
of 1.5 years or a half-life of 0.75 years) compared to the 35.9% (3.12 years or a half-
life of 1.56 years) reported when there is no financing deficit. However, the presence
of a financing deficit increases the speed of adjustment of innovative firms to 49.6%
(35.9% - 10.0% + 23.7%). The increase in the speed of adjustment with a financ-
ing imbalance is consistent with the proposition that financing imbalances offer an
opportunity to adjust leverage at relatively low cost than would be the case with-
out a deficit (e.g., Byoun, 2008; Dang et al., 2014a; Faulkender et al., 2012). This
higher speed of adjustment for innovative firms with a financing deficit shows that,
in the UK, it is innovative firms rather than non-innovative firms that use most of
the opportunities presented by a financing imbalance to re-balance capital structure.
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This difference in the speed of adjustment between innovative and non-innovative
firms conditional on the presence of a financing deficit highlights another source of
asymmetry in target financing behaviour that has not be considered in the literature.
The increase in the speed of adjustment for innovative firms with financing deficits
is also consistent with the hypothesis that the shortfall in financing offers an oppor-
tunity to adjust leverage while simultaneously accessing capital markets to finance
profitable investments.38 According to Byoun (2008), the benefits arising from com-
bining financing the investment opportunities and adjusting leverage are more likely
to outweigh the costs associated with accessing capital markets to make leverage
adjustments, especially, with the increasing levels of debt. After incorporating the ef-
fects of financing imbalances on leverage adjustments, innovative firms have a speed
of adjustment (2.02 years or half-life of 1.01 years) that is twice as fast as that of non-
innovative firms (4.62 years or half-life of 2.31 years). This difference in the speed
of adjustment suggests the existence of heterogeneous target financing behaviour
conditional on investment types, which becomes more pronounced in the presence of
financing imbalances. This result shows that recognising the effect of different forms
of investment on target financing behaviour is an important factor in understanding
the observed variations in leverage adjustments in addition to the factors already
identified in the literature.39
Panel B of Table 5.4 presents results on the effects of financing imbalances on firms
with above and below target leverage. Financing deficits have a consistent positive
and significant effect on the speed of adjustment for firms with above-target lever-
age. The effect is higher for innovative firms that have a speed of adjustment of
67.8% (1.44 years or half-life of 0.72 years) relative to 53.3% (2.18 years or half-life of
1.09 years) for non-innovative firms. While the effects of a financing deficit on lever-
38Borisova and Brown (2013) and Brown et al. (2012) report US firms engaging in R&D are subject
to financing constraints, which increase the cost of capital. The benefits of accessing capital markets
are more likely to outweigh the costs when firms need to adjust leverage while they have a financing
imbalance.
39For a review of factors affecting financing decisions, see, inter alia, Frank and Goyal (2009) and
Oztekin (2015).
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age adjustments is consistently negative for firms with below-target leverage, it is
significant for non-innovative firms and rather marginally significant for innovative
firms. Using the half-life convention, the result in the last column of Panel B implies
that firms without a financing deficit and below-target leverage take 3.16 years (or a
half-life of 1.58 years) (35.6%) to adjust towards the target leverage. Non-innovative
firms with similar conditions take 7.16 years (or a half-life of 3.58 years) (17.2%)
while innovative firms take 3.7 years (or a half-life of 1.85 years) (30.8%). Similar to
the results in Panel A, the result in Panel B shows that financing imbalances have a
different effect on the speed of adjustment for innovative and non-innovative firms.
Prior studies on target financing behaviour have also not examined how different
forms of investment affect the incentive to take advantage of financing imbalances
when adjusting leverage. The results in Table 5.4 contribute new insights by showing
that investment types, which have been overlooked in the literature, are a significant
source of the observed heterogeneity in target financing behaviour.
The next section examines time variation in leverage adjustments over the period
1987 to 2013.
5.4.5 Time variation in leverage adjustments
This section builds on the above results by examining time variation in leverage ad-
justment. Figure 5.1 plots the speed of adjustment (λ) and the deviations from target
leverage (Devit) obtained from estimations of Equation (5.3) over a 5-year rolling win-
dow for the period 1987-2013. The speed of adjustment is estimated separately for
all firms (ALL), non-innovative firms (NIN) and innovative firms (INN).
Figure 5.1 reveals several new important dynamics on target financing behaviour.
First, consistent with the results in Tables 5.1 - 5.4, Figure 5.1a shows that non-
innovative and innovative firms adopt different financing behaviour. The speed of
adjustment of innovative firms is consistently higher than that of non-innovative
firms. The difference in the speed of adjustment narrows over the 5-year rolling win-
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Figure 5.1 The evolution of leverage adjustments
(a) Speed of adjustment (b) Deviation from target leverage
dows from 1997 to 2006, increases temporarily thereafter, but decreases again over
the period encompassing the global financial crisis.40 The trade-off theory postulates
that firms balance the debt tax-shield with financial distress costs. When financial
distress costs are high, firms respond by adopting a conservative capital structure.
However, Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 presents evidence inconsistent with these impli-
cations, as innovative firms have similar debt levels as non-innovative firms (which
face low financial distress costs). Rather, the evidence in Figure 3.1 of Chapter 3,
taken together with the time series variations in the speed of adjustment (Figure
5.1), suggests that firms counteract the high bankruptcy costs associated with using
debt financing by adjusting faster towards the target. This result is consistent with
the theoretical prediction of the model of Krainer (2014) which shows that managers
use capital structure to offset any deviations in operating risk from the thresholds
that are acceptable to the shareholders.
Second, the speed of adjustment changes over time and exhibits relatively higher
variability for innovative firms compared to non-innovative firms.41 This high vari-
ability suggests that the reported changes in adjustment speeds around macroeco-
40Appendices 5.C and 5.E show the time series differences in the speed of adjustment between
innovative and non-innovative firms, and it corroborates the results in Figure 5.1a. The trend line
of the differences in the speed of adjustment in Appendix 5.C reveal a clear increase in differences
over the 5-year rolling windows from 1987 to 2001 and the narrowing of the difference thereafter until
2006. Onwards, the trend line suggests that window periods that include the recent-crisis increased
the differences in leverage adjustment.
41Appendix 5.C shows that the variability of the speed of adjustment of innovative firms is twice
as high as that of non-innovative firms.
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nomic events in the US by Cook and Tang (2010) could very well be due to adjust-
ments by managers of innovative firms. Cook and Tang (2010) report that firms in
the US adjust leverage faster (slower) in good (bad) macroeconomic environments.42
The trends in the speed of adjustment in Figure 5.1a add new insights as it shows
that much of the adjustments are done by firms (innovative) that face high costs of
deviating from the target leverage.43 The costs of deviating from target tend to in-
crease with operating risk and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. Figure 5.1a
shows that the overlooked differences in corporate investments give rise to both cross-
sectional and time series heterogeneity in leverage adjustments.44
Third, Figure 5.1b reveals that, on aggregate, firms in the UK are mostly under-
levered relative to the target (L∗it −Lit−1 > 0), except during the periods 1993-1994,
2002-2005 and 2009-2011. A superimposed plot of GDP growth shows that periods
of negative growth precede large temporary negative shocks in the deviation from
target (L∗it −Lit−1 < 0) over the periods 1993-1994 and 2009-2011. The post-negative
growth in GDP periods are marked by a reversal in deviation from target as firms
become systematically under-levered.45 The period from 2002 to 2005 is uniquely
marked by an above average growth in GDP that coincides with a temporary nega-
tive shock in the deviation from target. The above-target leverage observed during
42Consistent with the result in Figure 5.1a, Appendix 5.I in which the speed of adjustment obtained
from estimations of Equation (5.3) in 5 year rolling windows over the sample period is stacked in a
vector Ψt that is regressed on a set of macroeconomic variables, Zt-1 (in Equation (5.11)), shows that
the speed of adjustment of innovative firms is more sensitive to changes in macroeconomic conditions
(GPD growth (GDPg), changes in interest rates (∆IR) and inflation) than that for non-innovative
firms.
43Appendix 5.D present plots of the mean target leverage (Panel A) and descriptive statistics of
the target leverage (Panel B). Consistent with the prediction that innovative investments should be
financed using equity (see, inter alia, Brown et al., 2009; Hall, 2002; Hall and Lerner, 2010), the
results in Panel A and B show that innovative firms have a lower target leverage than non-innovative
firms. Panel B also shows similar variation in the target leverage which suggests that the financing
decisions (target financing behaviour) of innovative firms are influenced by the same factors as that of
non-innovative firms.
44Byoun (2008), Flannery and Lockhart (2009), Hovakimian et al. (2009), Lockhart (2014) and
Warr et al. (2012) report that financial constraints and credit-lines give rise to differences in the speed
of adjustment. They show that unconstrained firms with credit-lines adjust faster than constrained
firms without credit-lines. However, these studies have not explicitly examined time series variation
in the speed of adjustment and how investment types affect target financing behaviour.
45The evolution of the deviation from target is consistent with the prediction of the dynamic con-
tingent model of Bhamra et al. (2010) that leverage is pro-cyclical during refinancing periods but it is
generally counter-cyclical in aggregate dynamics. Similarly, DeAngelo et al. (2011) report that firms
in the US deliberately deviate from the target leverage by issuing transitory debt to fund investments.
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this period is consistent with the predictions of the market timing theory that firms
time the issuance of securities (in this case debt) to coincide with favourable macroe-
conomic environments.46 Campello and Graham (2013) report similar results that
market timing increased significantly in the run-up to the tech-bubble or dot-com
boom in the US. Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4 shows that the proportion of firms issuing
securities increased significantly over the period 2004-2006.
Overall, the results in Figure 5.1 provide new and strong evidence of cross-sectional
heterogeneity in target financing behaviour linked to investment type. The under-
standing of cross-sectional heterogeneity in corporate decisions arising from differ-
ences in investments is important as economies are transiting from predominantly
manufacturing sectors towards technological and service sectors, which brings a host
of new challenges to traditional collateral-based financing.47 Time variation in lever-
age adjustment has largely been overlooked in the literature. The results reported
in this section suggest the existence of significant time variation in leverage adjust-
ment. Further, this time variation is more pronounced for innovative firms than
non-innovative firms. This result is new to the literature and, taken together with
the relatively high speed of adjustment for innovative firms, conforms to the hypoth-
esis that firms that are subject to high financial distress costs (with high operating
risk) are more pro-active in re-balancing capital structure. These results are impor-
tant as they show that corporate investments (in addition to the other factors already
identified in the literature) are a significant and persistent source of heterogeneity
in leverage adjustments. The time series variation in the speed of adjustment also
sheds light on why results from studies over different sample periods are decidedly
mixed in the US.
46For a review of studies on market timing, see Alti (2006), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Butler et al.
(2011), Campello and Graham (2013), Chen and Chen (2012), Dittmar and Thakor (2007), Elliott et al.
(2008) and Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008).
47The financing of innovative investments which are characterised by high information asymmetry,
asset substitution problems, long investment horizons and low collateral values due to high specificity
remain largely a challenge that has to be addressed at government level particularly in the UK which
lags behind other advanced economies. The need to understand the linkages between investment and
financing activities and how they impact on financial stability and economic growth has never been
more clear than in the aftermath of the recent global financing crisis where over-indebtedness was one
of the main causes of the problems.
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Table 5.5 Leverage adjustments: Other methods
The table presents estimation results of equations that relate change in book leverage to deviation
of actual leverage from target leverage. Results in Column I are estimated from Equation (5.4) and
results in Column II are estimated from Equation (5.6), with all equations being estimated using Fama
and MacBeth (1973) (FM). Results in Column III are estimated from Equation (5.4) and results in
Column IV are estimated from Equation (5.6), with all equations being estimated using system GMM
(SYS GMM). RDD is a dummy variable taking the value of one for innovative firms and zero otherwise.
ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D,
and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in
the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables
used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3. All variables used are winsorised at the 1th and 99th
percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream. The table reports the J statistic
from a test of the over identifying restrictions, and the J statistic is asymptotically distributed as
chi-squared under the null of instrument validity, and the test of second-order autocorrelation (m2)
in the first differenced residuals. All regressions include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not
reported). Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Variables I II III IV
Devit 0.240*** 0.221***
(0.009) (0.023)








DevBelowit ×RDD 0.161*** 0.138***
(0.029) (0.032)
Method FM FM SYS GMM SYS GMM






This section presents a number of robustness checks. First, Table 5.5 presents esti-
mation results of Equations (5.4) and (5.6) using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) (FM)
procedure and system GMM (SYS GMM) to check the sensitivity of the results to the
choice of the estimation method. In Table 5.5, the first and second columns are esti-
mated using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-pass procedure, while the results in
the third and fourth columns are estimated using system GMM.
The results presented in Table 5.5 remain qualitatively similar to those reported
in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Innovative firms (columns I and III) consistently exhibit a
higher speed of adjustment than non-innovative firms. Also, firms with above-target
leverage have a relatively higher speed of adjustment than firms with below-target
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leverage (columns II and IV), which is consistent with prior studies and results in
Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 of this chapter.48 The results in columns II and IV also show
that innovative firms consistently adjust faster than non-innovative firms whether
they are below or above-target leverage.49,50 The results in Table 5.5 show that the
differences in the speed of adjustment between innovative and non-innovative firms
are robust to different estimation methods.
Finally, this section examines the sensitivity of the results to different measures of
leverage, as there is an ongoing debate on the definition of leverage. For example,
Barclay et al. (2006), Fama and French (2002) and Graham and Harvey (2001) prefer
book-based measures, while Dang et al. (2012), Frank and Goyal (2007a) and Welch
(2004) prefer market-based measures.51 Instead of using total debt (TDA) as in the
previous sections, Equations 5.1 and 5.2 are estimated in Table 5.6 using long-term
debt (LTDA) as leverage. A significant coefficient on lagged long-term debt implies
that firms have a target debt maturity. Estimates of the coefficients on lagged long-
term debt from the one-step approach in Table 5.6 are highly significant. The implied
speed of adjustment of 28.8% on long-term debt for all firms, ALL, in Table 5.6 is rel-
atively higher than that reported in Table 5.1 for total debt (24.2%). This implied
speed of adjustment (λ = 1−γ) towards the target debt maturity is slow to moder-
48Similarly, Byoun (2008), Faulkender et al. (2012) and Warr et al. (2012) report significant asym-
metries in the speed of adjustment between above-target and below-target leverage in the US over the
period 1971-2003, 1965-2006 and 1971-2008, respectively.
49Appendix 5.H shows the results estimated using an unbalanced dynamic panel data with a frac-
tional dependent variable (DPF) estimator. Chang and Dasgupta (2009), Elsas and Florysiak (2011)
and Iliev and Welch (2010) highlight that empirical studies that fail to consider the fractional nature
of leverage (leverage is ratio bounded in the interval [0,1]) tend to overstate estimates of the speed of
adjustment. According to Elsas and Florysiak (2011), the DPF estimator is a doubly-censored tobit
estimator ([0,1]), which relies on a latent variable approach to explicitly account for the fractional
nature of leverage. The DPF is implemented in this chapter using Stata xttobit. Drobetz et al. (2015)
and Elsas and Florysiak (2011, 2013) use a similar approach.
50Similarly, Appendix 5.H shows that there are significant differences in the speed of adjustment
between innovative and non-innovative firms, even after taking into consideration the fractional na-
ture of leverage.
51Barclay et al. (2006) highlight that there is no particular economic reason to expect the same or
similar results when comparing the results that use market-based and book-based measures of lever-
age. Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that the appropriate measure of leverage depends on
the objectives of the study. However, Bessler et al. (2011), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Stonehill
et al. (1975) argue that managers base their decisions on book-based measures rather than market-
based measures of capital structure that are affected by other events unrelated to the company (stock
market shocks).
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Table 5.6 Debt maturity adjustments: Non-innovative versus Innovative
firms
The table presents estimation results of Equations (5.1) and (5.2) that relate long-term debt to lagged
long-term debt, research and development (R&D), capital expenditure (Capex), tangible assets, in-
tangible assets, growth, size, profit, non-debt tax shield, and earnings volatility. ALL represents all
firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for
innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least
five years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in
Appendix 3.2, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope
through Datastream. The results are estimated by system GMM. The table reports the J statistic
which is a test of the over identifying restrictions, and the J statistic is asymptotically distributed as
chi-squared under the null of instrument validity, and the test of second-order autocorrelation (m2)
in the first differenced residuals. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. All models include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Variables ALL NIN INN NIN INN Diff
(p-value)
LTDAit−1 0.712*** 0.818*** 0.599*** 0.793*** 0.610*** (0.002)
(0.031) (0.048) (0.038) (0.045) (0.039)
R&D -0.059** -0.063*** -0.062*** (0.008)
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Capex 0.056* 0.099* 0.044 0.099* 0.021 (0.220)
(0.031) (0.060) (0.031) (0.057) (0.032)
Growth 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.985)
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Tangible 0.067*** 0.051*** 0.097*** 0.051*** 0.087*** (0.061)
(0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Intangible 0.069*** 0.047*** 0.083*** 0.045*** 0.089*** (0.024)
(0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Size 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** (0.886)
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Profit -0.069*** -0.081*** -0.063*** -0.078*** -0.059*** (0.359)
(0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011)
NDTS -0.178*** -0.185* -0.203*** -0.212** -0.147** (0.542)
(0.053) (0.095) (0.075) (0.091) (0.063)
Volatility -0.037* -0.058 -0.010 -0.050 -0.005 (0.263)
(0.020) (0.041) (0.024) (0.033) (0.032)
Constant -0.049*** -0.058* -0.085*** -0.057***
(0.011) (0.032) (0.031) (0.013)
SOA (λ) 0.288 0.182 0.401 0.207 0.390
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
m2 1.005 1.918 -0.349 1.146
p-value (0.315) (0.055) (0.727) (0.252)
J 70.774 79.458 82.215 158.856
p-value (0.452) (0.206) (0.151) (0.131)
ate as is consistent with prior studies in the US.52,53 The relatively few studies that
52Several studies in the US report slow to moderate speed of adjustment using booked-based mea-
sures of leverage (e.g., Dang et al., 2014b; Hanousek and Shamshur, 2011; Hovakimian and Li, 2011;
Huang and Ritter, 2009; Lemmon et al., 2008), and using both booked and market based measures of
leverage (e.g., Fama and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Hovakimian and Li, 2010; Kayhan
and Titman, 2007).
53Similar slow to moderate speeds of adjustment are also observable on net-debt (NDA) and total
debt (TDA) in Appendices 5.F, 5.G and 5.H as is consistent with the existence of adjustment costs.
Using net-debt, the results in Appendix 5.F (one-step approach) show that the implied speed of ad-
justment is slow to moderate (19.9% - 41.4%) and that innovative firms (19.9%) consistently adjust
faster than non-innovative firms (41.4%). Similar differences in the speeds of adjustment are also
shown in Appendix 5.G using the two-step approach. These similar results (Appendices 5.F and 5.G)
show that the differences between innovative and non-innovative firms remain statistically signifi-
cant when using net-debt as leverage, and whether the one-step or the two-step approach is used.
The implied speed of adjustment towards the target total debt (second column), target net-debt (sixth
column) and target debt maturity (tenth column) in Appendix 5.H for all firms, ALL, is 29.3%, 39.9%
and 29.1%, respectively. These results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5.1 (24.2%)
and 5.2 (34.9%), which shows that the differences in the speed of adjustment between non-innovative
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examine whether firms have a target debt maturity report similar slow to moderate
speed of adjustment due to the presence of adjustment costs. For example, Byoun
(2008) reports a speed of adjustment of 21% - 24% for firms in the US adjust over the
period 1971-2003, while Antoniou et al. (2006) report speed of adjustment of 33% -
34% in the UK, 51% - 54% in Germany and 53% - 55% in France over the period 1969-
2000. Antoniou et al. (2006) conclude that the lower speed of adjustment of firms in
the UK (when compared to France and Germany) is due to the low costs of deviat-
ing from the target debt maturity relative to costs of adjusting towards the target.
In contrast to Antoniou et al. (2006) and Byoun (2008), Ozkan (2000) reports higher
speeds of adjustment (32% - 46%) for firms in the UK over the period of 1983–1996,
and concludes that firms in the UK face significant costs of deviating from target debt
maturity structure. The results presented in the third and fourth columns of Table
5.6 show that the difference in the speed of adjustment between non-innovative firms
(18.2%) and innovative firms (40.1%) is highly significant. Similarly, the results in
the fifth (20.7%) and sixth (39%) columns estimated using Equation (5.2) show signif-
icant differences in the speed of adjustment between innovative and non-innovative
firms. This result suggests that the two types of firms have different debt maturity
targets and costs of adjustments.
Overall, the results in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 confirm that the findings in this study
are robust to alternative estimation methods and definitions of leverage, and that
innovative and non-innovative firms have different target financing behaviour.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter examines the differences in leverage adjustments between innovative
and non-innovative firms. The analysis in this chapter is motivated by the significant
changes in corporate balance sheets as marked by an increase (decrease) in intangible
firms and innovative firms are robust to the choice of the definition of leverage (total debt, long-term
debt and net-debt) and the use of either the one-step or the two-step approach in the estimation of the
speed of adjustment. Appendix 5.A also presents a list of studies on target financing behaviour which
shows wide variation in the estimates of the speed of adjustment across studies, countries and over
time.
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(tangible) investments. These changes should result in the adoption of conservative
financing policies as the literature has established that intangible investments sub-
ject firms to binding financial constraints and that firms use capital structure to man-
age operating risks. However, it is not clear why leverage has remained relatively
persistent and rising in general, and whether the forms of corporate investment are
a source of the observed heterogeneity in target financing behaviour. This chapter
contributes to the literature by examining whether firms engage in target financing
behaviour, and if innovative firms (invest in R&D) and non-innovative firms (do not
invest in R&D) differ in this behaviour. This chapter also examines asymmetry and
time variations in leverage adjustments conditional on whether a firm is above or
below target leverage, and whether it has a financing deficit or not. If the forms of
investment undertaken by firms are of first order importance in setting corporate
financing policy, then, the increase in intangible investments coupled with the con-
current decrease in tangible investments should affect the speed of adjustment and
target financing behaviour. The differences in corporate investment should result
in heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment between innovative and non-innovative
firms. In order to examine the differences and time variation in the speed of adjust-
ment, the analyses in this chapter estimate a series of dynamic panel data models on
innovative firms and non-innovative firms in the UK over the period 1987-2013.
The results show that the behaviour of firms that engage in target financing is consis-
tent with the predictions of the trade-off theory. The estimated speed of adjustment
is slow to moderate, which is consistent with the existence of adjustment costs and
previous studies in the US. This chapter presents evidence that accounting for asym-
metry in target financing behaviour is important as firms with above-target leverage
have a relatively higher speed of adjustment than firms with below-target leverage.
Further, analyses in this chapter show that the speed of adjustment increases with
the existence of a financing deficit as is consistent with the proposition that firms use
the opportunity presented by the need to refinance or fund investment to also adjust
leverage towards the target. Comparisons of leverage adjustments between innova-
tive and non-innovative firms show significant differences as innovative firms consis-
189
tently have a higher speed of adjustment than non-innovative firms. The relatively
higher speed of adjustment for innovative firms is inconsistent with the proposition
that firms that are subject to financial constraints have less flexibility in adjusting
leverage, but is consistent with the proposition that firms adjust leverage to manage
risk. As innovative firms have relatively high costs of bankruptcy, they tend to ben-
efit more from keeping leverage close to the target. The differences in the speed of
adjustment become even more pronounced if asymmetry in leverage adjustment and
financing imbalances are taken into consideration. This result is new to the liter-
ature on target financing behaviour and show that innovative firms appear to take
advantage of most of the opportunities presented by a financing imbalance to adjust
leverage whether they have above or below-target leverage. These results are robust
to the inclusion of other factors that have been associated with target financing be-
haviour.
Finally, the chapter presents evidence of significant time variation and asymmetry
in leverage adjustment. The time series analyses show that there are significant
differences in the speed of adjustment between innovative and non-innovative firms
over time, with innovative firms consistently adjusting faster than non-innovative
firms. The results also show that speed of adjustment of innovative firms exhibits
greater variation than that of non-innovative firms. This provides further evidence
that much of the observed re-balancing of capital structure is done by innovative
firms which face higher operating risks and costs of deviating from target. The time
variation in the speed of adjustment also suggests that the mixed results in the lit-
erature on the rate at which firms adjust leverage could be due to the changes in
the speed of adjustment over time and the failure to consider heterogeneity in target
financing behaviour conditional on the forms of corporate investment.
Overall, the results show that the forms of investment have a significant effect on
leverage adjustment, and are important in the understanding of the asymmetry in
target financing behaviour. Further research should examine heterogeneity in corpo-
rate decisions arising from different forms of investment as economies transit from
190
predominantly manufacturing sectors towards technological and service based sec-
tors.
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Appendix 5.B Tangible and intangible assets
ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D,
and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in
the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables
used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The





Appendix 5.C Differences in speed of adjustment
The figure presents the differences in the speed of adjustment between innovative (INN) and non-
innovative (NIN) firms. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms
that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists
of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the period from
1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the
1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream.
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Appendix 5.D Evolution of target leverage
Panel A plots the mean target leverage. Panel B presents number of observations (N), mean, median,
standard deviation (Stdev), 25th, 75th percentiles and the differences in target leverage (L∗it) between
innovative (INN) and non-innovative (NIN) firms. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands
for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report
R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key
variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter
3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through
Datastream.
Panel A: Target leverage
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of target leverage
Group N Mean SE Stdev [ 95% Conf. Interval ]
ALL 8,396 0.289 0.003 0.256 0.283 0.294
NIN 3,304 0.308 0.005 0.279 0.298 0.317
INN 5,092 0.276 0.003 0.239 0.270 0.283
Diff (NIN-INN) 0.031 0.020 0.042
p-value (0.000)
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Appendix 5.E Time variations in speed of adjust-
ment
The table presents estimation results of Equations (5.3) and (5.5) that relate change in book leverage
to deviation of actual leverage from target leverage. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN
stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that re-
port R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key
variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter
3. All variables used are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from World-
scope through Datastream. All equations are estimated by OLS, and all regressions include industrial
and time dummies (not reported). Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Symmetric adjustments Asymmetric adjustments
Panel A: ALL




1987-1990 0.288*** 744 0.30 0.270*** 0.333*** 744 0.30
(0.021) (0.030) (0.055)
1991-1995 0.291*** 2156 0.30 0.219*** 0.368*** 2156 0.31
(0.014) (0.022) (0.027)
1996-2000 0.315*** 1742 0.26 0.245*** 0.431*** 1742 0.27
(0.022) (0.032) (0.041)
2001-2005 0.285*** 1236 0.29 0.232*** 0.346*** 1236 0.30
(0.019) (0.030) (0.038)
2006-2010 0.309*** 1124 0.36 0.253*** 0.380*** 1124 0.37
(0.020) (0.036) (0.030)
2011-2013 0.317*** 577 0.38 0.280*** 0.358*** 577 0.38
(0.026) (0.044) (0.045)
1987-2013 0.297*** 7579 0.31 0.242*** 0.372*** 7579 0.31
(0.008) (0.013) (0.015)
Panel B: NIN
1987-1990 0.274*** 306 0.36 0.241*** 0.360*** 306 0.36
(0.028) (0.040) (0.082)
1991-1995 0.231*** 922 0.28 0.191*** 0.280*** 922 0.29
(0.016) (0.026) (0.031)
1996-2000 0.209*** 691 0.19 0.160*** 0.322*** 691 0.20
(0.023) (0.033) (0.042)
2001-2005 0.242*** 434 0.35 0.217*** 0.276*** 434 0.35
(0.024) (0.042) (0.047)
2006-2010 0.245*** 394 0.39 0.231*** 0.269*** 394 0.39
(0.024) (0.046) (0.037)
2011-2013 0.267*** 198 0.42 0.274*** 0.259*** 198 0.41
(0.034) (0.055) (0.067)
1987-2013 0.236*** 2945 0.31 0.207*** 0.282*** 2945 0.31
(0.009) (0.015) (0.009)
Panel C: INN
1987-1990 0.343*** 438 0.25 0.370*** 0.288*** 438 0.25
(0.036) (0.060) (0.064)
1991-1995 0.432*** 1234 0.37 0.313*** 0.530*** 1234 0.38
(0.024) (0.038) (0.039)
1996-2000 0.480*** 1051 0.36 0.494*** 0.466*** 1051 0.36
(0.032) (0.054) (0.063)
2001-2005 0.352*** 802 0.29 0.292*** 0.401*** 802 0.29
(0.034) (0.055) (0.058)
2006-2010 0.416*** 730 0.39 0.347*** 0.475*** 730 0.39
(0.028) (0.053) (0.043)
2011-2013 0.450*** 379 0.41 0.375*** 0.533*** 379 0.42
(0.051) (0.097) (0.075)
1987-2013 0.407*** 4634 0.34 0.355*** 0.459*** 4634 0.34
(0.013) (0.023) (0.024)
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Appendix 5.F Net-debt adjustments: One-step ap-
proach
The table presents estimation results of Equation (5.1) that relates net-debt to lagged net-debt and
lagged firm characteristics (research and development (R&D), capital expenditure (Capex), growth,
tangible assets intangible assets, size, profit, non-debt tax shield, and volatility). ALL represents all
firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands
for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at
least five years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are
defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is
drawn from Worldscope through Datastream. The results are estimated by system GMM. The table
reports the J statistic which is a test of the over identifying restrictions, and the J statistic is asymp-
totically distributed as chi-squared under the null of instrument validity, and the test of second-order
autocorrelation (m2) in the first differenced residuals. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. All models include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not
reported).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Variables ALL NIN INN NIN INN Diff
(p-value)
NDAit−1 0.683*** 0.778*** 0.579*** 0.801*** 0.586*** (0.002)
(0.036) (0.059) (0.045) (0.057) (0.041)
R&D -0.198*** -0.226*** -0.210*** (0.001)
(0.064) (0.069) (0.061)
Capex 0.165*** 0.216*** 0.063 0.235*** 0.059 (0.038)
(0.045) (0.069) (0.059) (0.064) (0.058)
Growth -0.004* -0.007** -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 (0.507)
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Tangible 0.210*** 0.114*** 0.305*** 0.120*** 0.334*** (0.000)
(0.023) (0.028) (0.049) (0.024) (0.038)
Intangible 0.204*** 0.112*** 0.299*** 0.124*** 0.306*** (0.000)
(0.023) (0.030) (0.036) (0.027) (0.032)
Size 0.002** 0.002 0.000 0.004*** -0.001 (0.000)
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Profit -0.222*** -0.262*** -0.191*** -0.262*** -0.188*** (0.043)
(0.022) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023)
NDTS -0.373*** -0.228* -0.297** -0.300** -0.370*** (0.647)
(0.085) (0.123) (0.129) (0.119) (0.106)
Volatility -0.228*** -0.202** -0.249*** -0.201*** -0.243*** (0.596)
(0.036) (0.085) (0.032) (0.073) (0.032)
Constant -0.051** -0.041 -0.026 -0.056**
(0.021) (0.052) (0.068) (0.026)
SOA (λ) 0.317 0.222 0.421 0.199 0.414
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
m2 -0.596 -0.235 -0.675 -0.655
p-value (0.551) (0.814) (0.513) (0.513)
J 68.815 72.430 67.967 140.283
p-value (0.518) (0.398) (0.547) (0.477)
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Appendix 5.G Net-debt adjustments: Two-step ap-
proach
The table presents estimation results of Equation (5.3) that relates change in book net-debt to devi-
ation of actual net-debt from target leverage. RDD is a dummy variable taking the value of one for
innovative firms and zero otherwise. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-
innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The
sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over
the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are
winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream.
All regressions include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported). Standard errors (in paren-
thesis) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one,
five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Symmetric net-debt adjustments
ALL NIN INN ALL
Devit 0.423*** 0.371*** 0.481*** 0.360***
(0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Devit ×RDD 0.126***
(0.028)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
Adj.R2 0.296 0.297 0.307 0.302
Panel B: Asymmetric net-debt adjustments
ALL NIN INN ALL
DevAboveit 0.486*** 0.415*** 0.544*** 0.402***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.048) (0.036)
DevAboveit ×RDD 0.146**
(0.058)
DevBelowit 0.386*** 0.348*** 0.440*** 0.337***
(0.022) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030)
DevBelowit ×RDD 0.108**
(0.043)
N 7579 2945 4632 7577

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 5.I Sensitivity of leverage adjustments to
macroeconomic shocks
The table presents estimation results of Equation 5.11 that relates the speed of adjustment to macroe-
conomic variables.
Ψt = η0 +ϑZt−1 +µt (5.11)
where Ψt is the vector of the speed of adjustment obtained from estimations of Equation 5.3 in 5 year
rolling windows over the sample period, η0 is a constant, ϑ is a vector of parameter coefficients, Zt-1 is
a vector of proxies for macroeconomic shocks described below, and µt is the error term. Zt-1 includes av-
erages changes in macroeconomic variables in Panel A and averages proxies of macroeconomic shocks
estimates from an autoregressive model of macroeconomic variables in Panel B. The macroeconomic
variables include Gross Domestic Product growth (GDPg), changes in real interest rate (∆IR) and
the inflation rate (Inflation). ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative
firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample
consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the
period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3. The data is
drawn from Worldscope through Datastream. The results are estimated by OLS. Standard errors re-
ported in parenthesis are based on Newey and West (1987), which account for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Simple averages Panel B: Autoregressive averages
ALL NIN INN ALL NIN INN
GDPg -0.886** -0.958** -1.726** -1.392** -0.837* -4.356***
(0.339) (0.418) (0.667) (0.492) (0.461) (1.233)
∆IR 2.449*** 1.033 6.815*** 2.286** -0.087 7.461***
(0.659) (0.797) (1.735) (0.919) (0.679) (1.961)
Inflation -0.539** 0.338 -1.186** -1.472** 2.388*** -7.106***
(0.237) (0.368) (0.501) (0.619) (0.443) (1.266)
Constant 0.345*** 0.256*** 0.516*** 0.305*** 0.240*** 0.429***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
N 23 23 23 23 23 23
Adj.R2 0.420 0.471 0.431 0.307 0.620 0.642
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Chapter 6





Using a sample of 817 non-financial firms in the UK, the analysis presented in this
chapter examines the determinants of trade credit, the time variations in the sen-
sitivity of trade credit to cash and short-term debt, and trade credit adjustments.
Comparisons between innovative and non-innovative firms are made throughout. Al-
though trade credit has decreased in the UK over the period 1987-2013, firms in the
UK remain net suppliers of trade credit. Evidence is also presented suggesting that
innovative firms use (give) less (more) trade credit than non-innovative firms. Fur-
ther, evidence is also presented that the trade-off between short term debt and trade
credit, and between cash and trade credit vary over time (switching from a compli-
ment to a substitute or vice versa) and across innovative and non-innovative firms.
There is also evidence that firms adjust towards a target credit level at a slow-to-
moderate speed, which would be consistent with the existence of adjustment costs.
Innovative firms consistently adjust faster than non-innovative firms which suggests
that they benefit more from re-balancing trade credit towards the target. Overall,
the results show that there is significant heterogeneity in trade credit polices and
asymmetry in trade credit adjustments conditional on investment types.
6.2 Introduction
Trade credit is an important form of short-term financing, especially for financially
constrained firms and during periods characterised by contractions in bank lending.1
Despite this importance, there are relatively few comprehensive studies on trade
credit.2 Several questions on trade credit remain unanswered. What determines
1Rajan and Zingales (1995) report that in 1991 trade credit represented 17.8% of US firms' assets,
22% in the UK and over 25% for other countries. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) report that
trade credit accounted for 25% of firms' total assets in France, Germany, and Italy. Aktas et al. (2012)
report that trade credit has averaged between 10% and 15% of total assets in the US. A study of small
business in the US by Petersen and Rajan (1997) report that trade credit is the single most important
component of short-term financing as it accounts for 17% of current assets. Wu et al. (2012) report
similar results in China, with trade credit between 11% and 15% of total assets.
2Petersen and Rajan (1997) attribute the few studies on trade credit to the lack of information.
Some databases do not report variables on trade credit, and when reported, it often lacks detail to
facilitate testing of theoretical propositions.
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trade credit?3 Is trade credit a substitute or a compliment to traditional sources of
short-term financing?4 The literature has also overlooked the heterogeneity in trade
credit arising from differences in firm characteristics, in particular, the type of in-
vestment that firms undertake. Yet, investment types have significant effects on
operating risks and capital structure, which will also affect decisions on whether to
give or take trade credit.5
The analysis in this chapter fills this gap in the literature by investigating the de-
terminants of trade credit, the relationship between trade credit and other forms
of short-term financing, dynamic adjustments in trade credit, and the differences
in trade credit policies between innovative and non-innovative firms. This chap-
ter contributes to the ongoing debate on whether trade credit is a substitute or a
complement to other forms of financing by examining the time variation of the re-
lationship between trade credit and other short-term liabilities, and between trade
credit and cash.6 Yang (2011b) reports that the relationship between bank credit and
trade credit changes with the monetary policy in the US from 1986 to 2006. They re-
port that the substitution (complimentary) effect dominates in periods of tight (loose)
3Empirical evidence on trade credit is rather mixed and more confined to the US which limits its
generalisability to other economies that have different legal, institutional and macroeconomic environ-
ments. Furthermore, it has not been fully established why firms continue to use trade credit as a form
of financing even though it is relatively more expensive than other forms of short-term financing. For
example, Lin and Chou (2015) estimate that the implied interest rate on a “1/10 net 30” trade credit
contract to be around 18.25% in China over the period 2006-2012, while Ng et al. (1999) report implied
costs above 42% from a survey of credit managers of 2,538 firms in the US. A model of Wilner (2000)
also estimate relatively high implied interest rates on trade credit contracts. Similarly, Biais and Gol-
lier (1997) and Kling et al. (2014) report that there exists a substitution effect between trade credit
and traditional forms of financing, with mostly the former being substituted for the latter, as trade
credit is a relatively more expensive form of short-term financing. Despite the theoretical predictions
that trade credit is only used after all other forms of financing have been exhausted (see, Petersen and
Rajan, 1994, 1995), Wilner (2000) reports that even financially unconstrained firms which have the
ability to obtain better credit terms from banks still extensively use trade credit.
4The short term nature and high implicit interest on trade credit (Ng et al., 1999; Wilner, 2000),
should all discourage reliance trade credit, with firms substituting trade credit for other forms of fi-
nancing. However, existence of financial constraints which preclude financially weak firms from access
corporate debt markets should result in trade credit being a compliment rather than a substitute to
other forms of short-term financing. Cuñat (2007) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) report that suppliers
with comparative advantages in evaluating their customers may borrow from lending institutions at
relatively better terms than their customers, and in turn give credit to financially constrained cus-
tomers.
5Krainer (2014) develops a model which shows that managers use capital structure to manage
operating risk and ensure that it is within the thresholds commensurate with the shareholders' risk
tolerance.
6Results on the relationship between trade credit and short-term debt are rather mixed (see, inter
alia, Ferrando and Mulier, 2013; Giannetti et al., 2011; Love et al., 2007; Yang, 2011b).
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monetary policy. Similarly, Meltzer (1960) reports that the monetary cycle has a sig-
nificant effect on the relationship between trade credit and short-term debt. Also, the
role of trade credit in firm financing changes in the presence of financial constraints.7
This leads to two opposing empirically testable hypothesis on trade credit. First,
firms subject to binding credit constrains often use more trade credit which results
in the complementary effect (a positive relationship is predicted) predominating the
substitution effect. When comparing innovative and non-innovative firms, the com-
plementary effect should be significantly higher for innovative firms that are more
likely to face binding credit constraints.8 This comparison allows for an analysis of
how the relationship between trade credit and other forms of short-term financing
differs conditional on investment types and across firms.
Second, the presence of innovative investments (with long investment horizons) should
discourage the use of trade credit as it is a relatively expensive form of short-term
financing (see, inter alia, Lin and Chou, 2015; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995). Fur-
ther, this short-term nature of trade credit financing reduces flexibility, which is crit-
ical for survival in competitive innovative markets (O’Brien, 2003). Firms subject
to high operating risk should adopt conservative financing structures (see Krainer,
2014), hence, rely less on trade credit financing. This should result in a significant
negative relationship between short-term debt and trade credit (accounts payable)
for innovative firms. When examining trade credit extended (accounts receivable),
the specialised nature of the investments and products of innovative firms may ne-
cessitate the provision of trade credit as a form of warranty on product quality. Ac-
cording to Antràs and Foley (2011), Lee and Stowe (1993) and Long et al. (1993),
7Borisova and Brown (2013) report that R&D subject firms to binding financial constraints. Pe-
tersen and Rajan (1994, 1995, 1997) and Wilner (1997) also report that financially constrained firms
rely more on trade credit than unconstrained firms. Similarly, Huyghebaert (2006) report that start-
ups use more trade credit as consistent with the existence of binding financial constraints. Following
on these results, financially constrained firms may view trade credit as a complement to other forms
of financing while unconstrained firms are likely to use short-term debt as a substitute to trade credit.
8Consistent with this prediction, a model of Wilner (2000) posits that financially constrained firms
are more willing to pay higher implied rates in trade credit contracts as they anticipate larger rene-
gotiation concessions from long-term or more dependent suppliers in case of bankruptcy. A model
of Fabbri and Menichini (2010) also predicts that financially constrained firms take trade credit to
exploit the supplier' s advantage in liquidating repossessed assets. Further, suppliers tend to grant
more concessions in case of financial distress than would be granted by lenders in competitive credit
markets (see, Evans, 1998; Wilner, 2000).
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trade credit is used as a form of guarantee on the quality of the products sold as it
allows the buyer to try the product before making a payment. This should result in a
positive relationship between trade credit extended and short-term debt, which will
be significantly higher for innovative firms than non-innovative firms.9 This chapter
empirically tests these predictions by drawing comparisons between innovative and
non-innovative firms over time.
Further, prior studies have overlooked the dynamic nature of trade credit policies.10
This chapter examines dynamic adjustments in trade credit as the decision to extend
(use) trade credit is influenced by both past and future conditions. The existence of
adjustment costs result in slow speeds of adjustment as reported in the literature on
capital structure.11 A slow speed of adjustment (high persistence) implies greater
reliance on trade credit, while a high speed of adjustment (low persistence) indicates
less reliance on trade credit.12 The main prediction from this analysis is that in-
novative firms should have a higher speed of adjustment as they benefit more from
actively adjusting towards the target than non-innovative firms.13 The focus on the
differences between innovative and non-innovative firms is motivated by the need to
understand the implications of the shifts in the economy from predominately man-
ufacturing industries towards service and technology based industries on corporate
decisions.14
9However, Long et al. (1993) highlight an opposing proposition that more reputable suppliers need
not give trade credit as their reputation dispenses with the need to provide a product warranty (in the
form of trade credit).
10For studies that examine the determinants of trade credit, see, Dass et al. (2014), Lin and Chou
(2015), Love et al. (2007), Klapper et al. (2012), Mizen (2008), Wu et al. (2012) and Yang (2011a).
11Models on the dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure by Fischer et al. (1989), Goldstein
et al. (2001), Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Strebulaev (2007) attribute the slow adjustment to the
existence of adjustment costs, with managers only adjusting when benefits outweigh costs of adjusting
capital structure. Similarly, Faulkender et al. (2012), Leary and Roberts (2005) and Strebulaev (2007)
report that adjustment costs are the major impediments to the attainment of the the target capital
structure.
12The level of persistence in trade credit can be used as an indicator of financial constraints and also
for testing whether firms actively adjust towards the target A low level of persistence in trade credit
indicates that firms more actively re-balance towards the target, while a high persistence results in
a slow or insignificant speed of adjustment. Firms with high persistence take or give more on trade
credit over time.
13Firms that have intangible investments and subject to information asymmetry problems face
high bankruptcy costs (see, Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), which implies that they face higher
costs of deviating from the target.
14Buera and Kaboski (2012) highlight that the literature has overlooked the effects of the sig-
nificant transition of economies from mostly manufacturing sectors towards technological and service
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Using a sample of 817 firms (8 396 firm-year observations) over the period 1987 to
2013, the analyses in this chapter show that there are secular decreases in trade
credit. Accounts payable (accounts receivable) gradually decreased from a peak of
17.4% (26.8%) in 1996 to a low of 9.4% (14.5%) in 2009. In accounts receivable (AR),
this decrease is relatively more pronounced for non-innovative firms from 2006 to
2011, which extend progressively less trade credit than innovative firms. The rel-
atively higher trade credit extended (AR) by innovative firms is rather inconsistent
with the proposition that firms that invest in innovation face binding financial con-
straints that may reduce their ability to extend credit to their customers.15 This
high trade credit extended by innovative firms is consistent with the proposition that
suppliers of specialised products have comparative advantages in liquidating goods
repossessed from their customers in case of default (see, inter alia, Fabbri and Meni-
chini, 2010; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). These comparative advantages enable sup-
pliers to offer more credit at better terms than institutional lenders, who have to
charge a premium in the presence of information asymmetry. Similar decreases as
those on trade credit (accounts payable and accounts receivable) are also observed
on net trade credit, with innovative firms consistently extending more credit than
non-innovative firms. Despite these decreases in trade credit, it remains an impor-
tant form of financing (averaging 13.4% for accounts payable and 22.8% for accounts
receivable), with listed firms in the UK being net trade credit suppliers throughout
the sample period.
The analysis in this chapter also presents evidence that the role of trade credit in
based sectors on corporate decisions. Borisova and Brown (2013) also report marked increases in R&D
for young US firms to levels that are four times that of capital expenditure, while R&D is twice as high
as capital expenditure for mature firms over the period 1980-2008 . Similarly, Fama and French (2004,
2005) report an influx of new listings by young and high growth firms in the US from 1980 to 2001.
15Studies in the US by Brown and Petersen (2014) (2004-2010) and Borisova and Brown (2013)
(1980-2008) report that R&D subjects firms to binding financial constraints. Similarly, Petersen and
Rajan (1997) report that US firms that are subject to binding financial constraints over the period 1970
to 1987 extend less trade credit. However, using a sample of 17 European countries (including the UK,
France and Germany) over the period 1995-2007, Brown et al. (2012) report very high R&D intensities
for young publicly trade firms in the UK and Sweden. They argue that going public reduces the effects
of financial constraints which enables firms to increase investments. Bernstein (2015) also reports
that going public enables firms to attract human capital and increases flexibility in their corporate
strategies.
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firm financing in the UK differs conditional on whether or not a firm invests in R&D.
Short-term debt and accounts payable are mostly substitutes, while short-term debt
and accounts receivable are compliments. The negative relationship between ac-
counts payable and other short-term liabilities is consistent with the substitution
hypothesis. This posits that firms with access to other forms of financing rely less on
the relatively expensive trade credit financing. Comparisons between non-innovative
and innovative firms show that the negative effect of other short-term liabilities is
significantly higher for non-innovative firms than for innovative firms. This result
suggests that non-innovative firms can more readily reduce trade credit than inno-
vative firms as they face less binding credit constraints. Cash has a negative effect
on trade credit, except for its insignificant and positive effect on accounts payable of
non-innovative firms. This positive relationship between cash and trade credit sug-
gests that non-innovative firms do not use cash to reduce trade credit even though it
is considered to be an expensive form of short-term financing. The significantly high
negative effect of cash on trade credit for innovative firms suggests that innovative
firms with more liquid assets use less trade credit. This is consistent with the propo-
sition that trade credit is an expensive form of financing (see, Lin and Chou, 2015;
Ng et al., 1999) and that its short-term nature tend to restrict strategic flexibility.16
Further, the results show that other short-term liabilities have a significant positive
effect on trade credit, while cash has a negative effect. This suggests that firms with
access to other forms of short-term financing extend more trade credit (accounts re-
ceivable).17 The results also show that the positive relationship between trade credit
and other short-term liabilities is only significant for innovative firm. Accordingly,
evidence is presented that it is mostly innovative firms that use their access to other
forms of short term debt to increase the trade credit they extend to their customers.
This is consistent with the trade credit proposition that trade credit is used to allevi-
16O’Brien (2003) reports that strategic flexibility is important for survival in competitive markets
for innovation. This implies that firms in innovative markets will use less trade credit as it is difficult
to roll-over. Similarly, Kahl et al. (2015) report that trade credit is often difficult to get when needed
most in tight credit markets, and when credit quality deteriorates.
17Cuñat (2007) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) also report that firms in the US with access to bank
loans tend to extend more trade credit.
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ate imperfections in the product markets, but reveals that this role is more prominent
(as shown by the results) for firms that undertake innovative investments. The sig-
nificantly higher negative relationship between trade credit extended and cash for
innovative firms is consistent with the proposition that cash is more valuable for
firms with R&D expenditure as they use it to smooth transitory finance shocks.18
Similar results are also observed on net trade credit. This evidence suggests that the
nature of investments undertaken by firms is important to the decision of granting or
taking trade credit.19 These results are robust to different estimation methods and
definitions of trade credit.
The results from the analyses in this chapter also show that there are significant time
variation and asymmetry in the relationship between trade credit and other forms of
short-term financing (short-term debt and cash), and that firms have a target trade
credit level. Although the relationship between trade credit and other short-term lia-
bilities is significant and consistently negative, it is rather weak for innovative firms
that are more likely to face binding financial constraints. The results also show that
the relationship between trade credit (accounts payable) and cash, between trade
credit extended (accounts receivable) and other short-term liabilities, and between
trade credit extended and cash change in sign and significance. These significant
time and cross-sectional variations in the relationship between short-term debt and
trade credit could explain the mixed results in the literature.20 The changes occur
mostly for non-innovative firms that face less binding credit constraints and have
more flexibility in choosing the form of financing.
Finally, an examination of trade credit adjustments show that UK firms adjust at
18Brown and Petersen (2011) report that firms in the US use cash holdings to smooth their R&D
expenditure. This increases the incentive to hoard cash for innovative firms as they may face binding
financial constraints (see, Brown et al., 2009).
19The heterogeneity between innovative and non-innovative firms on trade credit is consistent with
several studies reporting significant linkages between the product market and capital structure (see,
inter alia, Campello, 2003; Hackbarth et al., 2012; Istaitieh and Rodríguez-Fernández, 2006; Kovenock
and Phillips, 1995; Rauh and Sufi, 2012; Spence, 1985).
20For example, Giannetti et al. (2011) report a positive relationship between trade credit and bank
loans, while Yang (2011b) report that the relationship is positive in a loose monetary regime and
negative in tight monetary regime.
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a slow-to-moderate speed (20.1%) as is consistent with the existence of adjustment
costs. Comparisons of trade credit adjustments show significant asymmetries in
trade credit (accounts payable) adjustments as innovative firms adjust at a speed
of 23.7%, while non-innovative firms adjust at a speed of 16.2%. There are simi-
lar and significant differences in the speed of adjustment on trade credit extended
(accounts receivable). Non-innovative firms adjust trade credit extended at a speed
of 12.9%, which is 9.4% lower than that of innovative firms. This relatively high
speed of adjustment on trade credit for innovative firms than non-innovative firms
is consistent with results on leverage adjustments in Chapter 5. These differences
in adjustment speeds of trade credit suggest that innovative firms benefit more from
adjusting towards the target than non-innovative firms. Further, firms that invest in
innovation face high bankruptcy costs, which increase the costs of deviating from the
target trade credit level. These results further show that there is significant hetero-
geneity in trade credit policies between innovative and non-innovative firms.
The analysis in this chapter relates to Petersen and Rajan (1997) who examine the
factors affecting trade credit policies of small businesses in the US over the period
1988-1989. They report that financially constrained firms use more trade credit, with
suppliers prepared to lend to these firms given their comparative advantages in ac-
cessing information and liquidating repossessed assets in case of default. In addition
to the factors studied by Petersen and Rajan (1997), the analysis in this chapter
investigates the role of the different forms of investment on trade credit. One ra-
tionale is that the investment types subject firms to different operating risks, hence
are financed through heterogeneous financing means (see, inter alia, Brown and Pe-
tersen, 2011; Brown et al., 2012; Hall, 2009; Hall and Lerner, 2010). The results
in this chapter are inconsistent with Petersen and Rajan (1997) as they show that
supposedly constrained firms (innovative firms) give (use) more (less) trade credit. It
is consistent, however, with the informational advantage proposition that suppliers
are better positioned to assess the credit quality of their customers. The analysis
presented in this chapter also relates to a group of studies on the relationship be-
tween trade credit and short-term debt (see, inter alia, Guariglia and Mateut, 2013;
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Bougheas et al., 2009; Love et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2012). This analysis contributes
to these studies by investigating the time variation in trade credit, and whether the
substitution or the complementary effect dominates over time. Further, the analysis
also adds to the literature by examining trade credit adjustments which have been
overlooked by previous studies. The results show that firms slowly adjust towards
the target trade credit level as is consistent with the existence of adjustment costs
and the focus on actively managing financing sources in order to maximise firm value.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.3 presents the methodology
used, Section 6.4 discusses the the empirical results, Section 6.5 presents robustness
tests, and Section 6.6 concludes.
6.3 Methodology
Four separate panel data models are used to investigate the determinants of trade
credit (accounts payable and accounts receivable) and dynamic adjustments in trade
credit. The first model is;
TCit =β0 +βXit−1 +ηi +ηt +εit (6.1)
where TCit is the ratio of accounts payable to total assets (AP) or accounts receivable
to total assets (AR) for firm i at time t, β0 is a constant, β is a vector of parameter
coefficients, Xit−1 is a vector of lagged firm specific factors (explained below), ηi is the
firm specific effect, ηt represents time-specific effects and εit is an error term. Xit−1
includes, short-term debt, cash, tangible assets, intangible assets, sales growth, size,
profit, asset turnover and volatility.
In all other cases, the following version of Equation (6.1) is used to examine dif-
ferences between innovative and non-innovative firms, and to estimate target trade
credit:
TCit = γ0 +θNINXNINit−1 +θINNXINNit−1 +ζi +ζt +µit (6.2)
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where γ0 is a constant; θINN and θNIN are the sensitivities to firm-specific characteris-
tics of innovative and non-innovative firms, respectively; ζi are firm-specific effects;
ζt are time-specific effects; and µit is the error term. The focus of Equation (6.2) is on
whether the coefficients differ between non-innovative (NIN) and innovative (INN)
firms. Equation (6.2) is also used to compute the target trade credit. The target trade
credit for innovative firms is computed as θ̂
INNXINNit−1, and that for non-innovative firms
as θ̂
NINXNINit−1. These are then stacked as the overall firm estimate for the target trade
credit TC∗it.
The target trade credit (TC∗it) computed above is used in this second step to examine
whether firms in the UK adjust towards a target credit level as follows:
∆TCit =TCit −TCit−1 =λ(TC∗it −TCit−1)+εit (6.3)
where ∆TCit, is the change in trade credit from the previous year (TCit −TCit−1), λ
is the measure of the speed of adjustment and εit is an error term. If λ = 0, then
there is no adjustment; λ = 1 then there is full adjustment towards the target; and if
0<λ < 1, then there is partial adjustment.
To investigate differences in the speed of adjustment between innovative and non-
innovative firms, Equation (6.3) is modified to include a dummy variable (RDD) that
takes the value of one for firms that report R&D and zero otherwise:
∆TCit = (λ1 +λ2 ×RDD)Devit +εit (6.4)
where λ1 is the measure of the speed of adjustment for non-innovative firms, λ2 is the
measure of the difference in the speed of adjustment between non-innovative (NIN)
and innovative firms (INN) and Devit = TC∗it −TCit−1 is the deviation from target
trade credit.
Equations (6.1) - (6.4) are estimated using OLS. Several studies on trade credit use a
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similar approach (e.g., Giannetti et al., 2011; Love et al., 2007; Klapper et al., 2012).
OLS is used due to data limitations which prevent the use of system GMM tech-
niques, but, where appropriate, results estimated using other techniques are pre-
sented for robustness.21,22
6.4 Empirical results
This section is organised as follows: Section 6.4.1 presents results on the effects of
cash and other short-term liabilities on accounts payable, and the differential effects
between innovative and non-innovative firms; Section 6.4.2 presents results on the
effects of cash and other short-term liabilities on accounts receivable, and the dif-
ferential effects between innovative and non-innovative firms; Section 6.4.3 presents
results on the time varying effects of cash and other short-term liabilities on trade
credit; and Section 6.4.4 presents results on trade credit adjustments.
6.4.1 Accounts payable, cash and short-term debt
Table 6.1 presents the estimating results of Equations (6.1) and (6.2) that relate ac-
counts payable (AP) to firm specific factors. The second, third and fourth columns
present the estimating results of Equation (6.1) separately for all firms (ALL), non-
innovative firms (NIN) and innovative firms (INN), respectively. The fifth column
(ALL) presents the estimating results of Equation (6.2) that allows for direct testing
of the differences in the coefficients between non-innovative and innovative firms. All
the estimated models include industry and time dummies.
The result in the second column shows a significant negative effect of other short-
21The system GMM estimation approach requires the use of lags as instruments for the endogenous
variables, which greatly reduces the sample size. Further, the results obtained using system GMM
fail the Hansen-Sargan test (J-test) of over-identifying restrictions, and the tests for the non-existence
of first order (m1) and second order (m2) serial correlation in the differenced residuals.
22The other estimation techniques used for robustness are OLS with Newey-West standard er-
rors (NEWEY), Fama and MacBeth (1973) (FM) procedure and the DPF estimator (see, Elsas and
Florysiak, 2011, 2013) (DPF). According to Elsas and Florysiak (2011), the DPF estimator is a doubly-
censored tobit estimator ([0,1]), which relies on a latent variable approach to explicitly account for
the fractional nature of ratios. The DPF approach is implemented in this chapter using Stata xttobit.
Drobetz et al. (2015) and Elsas and Florysiak (2011, 2013) use a similar approach.
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Table 6.1 Accounts payable
The table presents the results of estimating Equations (6.1) and (6.2) that relate trade credit (AP or
AR) to firm characteristics. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative
firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample
consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the
period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are
winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream.
All models include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance
at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
ALL NIN INN NIN INN Diff
(p-value)
Ostliab -0.071*** -0.134*** -0.026* -0.141*** -0.028* (0.000)
(0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015)
Cash -0.044** 0.063 -0.106*** 0.047 -0.100*** (0.001)
(0.021) (0.038) (0.025) (0.039) (0.021)
Tangible -0.057*** -0.031 -0.090*** -0.050** -0.074*** (0.323)
(0.017) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017)
Intangible -0.059*** -0.046 -0.087*** -0.050** -0.080*** (0.215)
(0.020) (0.031) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020)
Size -0.002** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003** -0.002* (0.332)
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Profit -0.102*** -0.133*** -0.082*** -0.136*** -0.080*** (0.083)
(0.015) (0.024) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019)
AssetTurn 0.097*** 0.112*** 0.074*** 0.109*** 0.077*** (0.001)
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
Volatility -0.04 -0.049 -0.023 -0.068 -0.013 (0.408)
(0.029) (0.051) (0.029) (0.059) (0.027)
Constant 0.094*** 0.062* 0.065** 0.036
(0.022) (0.034) (0.031) (0.023)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
Adj.R2 0.576 0.648 0.530 0.591
term liabilities on accounts payable. This result is consistent with the substitution
hypothesis that firms with access to other forms of financing (e.g., long-term debt) use
less trade credit (e.g., Meltzer, 1960). However, Guariglia and Mateut (2013) report a
complimentary effect between short-term debt and trade credit. The complimentary
effect would suggest that firms use both short-term debt and trade credit even though
trade credit is considered to be a relatively expensive form of financing according to
Lin and Chou (2015) and Ng et al. (1999). Table 6.1, second column, shows that the
coefficient on cash is negative and significant, which suggests that firms with better
liquidity positions tend to reduce the other relatively expensive short-term sources
of financing (such as trade credit). This is inconsistent with Bougheas et al. (2009)
who report a positive relationship between cash and trade credit (accounts payable)
for private firms in the UK over the period from 1993 to 2003. The difference in the
results with those of Bougheas et al. (2009) shows that public listed firms in the UK
are better positioned to access other sources of financing. This enables them to re-
duce reliance on trade credit as consistent with the proposition of having comparative
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advantages in accessing capital markets.
Comparisons of the effect of other short-term liabilities and cash on trade credit be-
tween innovative and non-innovative firms in the fifth and sixth columns show sig-
nificant differences. Other short-term liabilities have a higher negative effect on
trade credit for non-innovative firms than for innovative firms. The third and fourth
columns that report separate estimations of Equation (6.1) show similar results. This
indicates that firms with access to other short-term financing, such as non-innovative
firms, substitute these for the relatively expensive trade credit. Consistent with this
result, Ng et al. (1999) estimate that the implied interest rate on a “1/10 net 30” trade
credit contract costs 18.25% in the US.23 Similarly, a theoretical model by Biais and
Gollier (1997) show that there is a significant substitution effect between trade credit
and traditional forms of financing. The results in the fifth and sixth columns further
show that most of the substitution is done by non-innovative firms, which have better
access to other forms of financing.
Similar significant differences between innovative and non-innovative firms are also
observed on the effects of cash on trade credit, with the exception that cash has an
insignificant complementary effect on trade credit for non-innovative firms. This pos-
itive relationship between cash and trade credit for non-innovative firms suggests
that non-innovative firms do not use the excess cash they generate to reduce trade
credit. The results of estimating Equation (6.1) separately for non-innovative and
innovative firms in the third and fourth columns show similar differences, with the
coefficients being slightly higher than those reported in the fifth and sixth columns
using the integrated model (Equation (6.2)). The positive effect of cash on trade credit
(for innovative firms) is consistent with Love et al. (2007) on the emerging markets
of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (1994 - 2001), Wu et al.
(2012) on listed firms in China (2000-2007) and Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-
23A “1/10 net 30” trade credit contract means that discount of 1% can be taken if the payment is
made within 10 days and if the full credit period is used, the full payment is due in 30 days. The cost
of credit is usually calculated as: Discount %/(1 - Discount %)*(360/(Full credit period days - Discount
days).
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Garriga (2013) on firms in the US (2005 - 2010). However, this positive effect is
inconsistent with Bougheas et al. (2009) who investigate trade credit decisions of pri-
vate firms in the UK. They argue that private firms in the UK use cash to reduce the
relatively expensive trade credit financing. The difference in the results presented
in Table 6.1 from those reported by Bougheas et al. (2009) suggests that listed non-
innovative firms in the UK have less incentive to use cash to reduce trade credit (in
contrast to private firms). This may be due to their ability to negotiate preferential
credit terms given that they are listed and have better credit quality.
Coefficient estimates of the control variables are generally consistent with theoreti-
cal predictions and prior studies on the US, except for size (see, Abdulla et al., 2014b;
Guariglia and Mateut, 2013; Kling et al., 2014; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Tangible
assets, intangible assets, size, profit and volatility have a negative and significant
effect on accounts payable, while asset turnover has a positive effect. Firms with
tangible assets are more able to access other forms of financing, hence use less trade
credit. Trade credit appear to decrease with intangible assets, which also suggests
that intangible assets play a similar role as tangible assets in facilitating access to
other forms of debt financing.24 The availability of other forms of financing to large
and profitable firms reduces the need to use trade credit, which is considered to be
relatively more expensive (see, inter alia, Ng et al., 1999; Wilner, 2000). The nega-
tive effect of earnings volatility (volatility) on trade credit shows that firms with high
operating risks tend to use less trade credit as it tends to be difficult to get, especially
when credit quality deteriorates or in tight credit markets. This result is consistent
with Kahl et al. (2015) who report that firms in the US (over the period 1991-2008)
with high roll-over risk rely more on bank credit and use less short-term debt (com-
mercial paper). The differences of the effects of the control variables on trade credit
between innovative and non-innovative firms are rather insignificant, except for as-
set turnover and profit which are higher for non-innovative firms than innovative
24Lim et al. (2014) report that both tangible and intangible assets are positively related to debt
financing for firms in the US, contrary to the theoretical prediction that intangible assets are mostly
financed with equity. Theories by Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) predict that intangible assets which
are subject to high information asymmetry problems are a poor form of collateral and subject firms to
binding credit constraints.
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firms. This shows that the control variables have a roughly similar effect on trade
credit policies of both innovative and non-innovative firms.
Overall, the results show significant differences on the effect of other short-term li-
abilities and cash on trade credit between innovative and non-innovative firms. The
main contributions from the results is that other forms of short-term financing are
used as substitutes to trade credit, with the substitution effect being significantly
higher for non-innovative firms (which face less binding credit constraints) than in-
novative firms. The negative relationship between cash and trade credit shows that
firms use the excess cash to reduce trade credit financing. This is due to trade credit
being a less preferred form of short-term financing, as it is relatively more expensive
and difficult to get when credit quality deteriorates and credit markets are tight. Sim-
ilar differences are also observed in the relationship between cash and trade credit,
with an insignificant complimentary effect for non-innovative firms and a significant
substitution effect for innovative firms. This suggests that the reported negative re-
lationship in the literature is mostly due to innovative firms that use the excess cash
to reduce the relatively expensive and restrictive trade credit financing.
6.4.2 Accounts receivable, cash and short-term debt
Table 6.2 presents the estimating results of Equations (6.1) and (6.2) that relate ac-
counts receivable (AR) to firm specific factors. The second, third and fourth columns
present the estimating results of Equation (6.1) separately for all firms (ALL), non-
innovative firms (NIN) and innovative firms (INN), respectively. The fifth and sixth
columns present the estimating results of Equation (6.2) that allows for direct testing
of the differences in the coefficients between non-innovative and innovative firms. All
the estimated models include industry and time dummies.
The second column shows that other short-term liabilities have a significant positive
effect on trade credit, while cash has a significant negative effect. This result indi-
cates that firms that have access to short-term debt extend more trade credit, which
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Table 6.2 Accounts receivable
The table presents the results of estimating Equations (6.1) and (6.2) that relate trade credit (AP
or AR) to firm characteristics. ALL represent all firms (ALL) in the sample, non-innovative firms
(NIN) are firms that do not report R&D, and innovative firms (INN) are firms that report R&D. The
sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over
the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are
winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream.
All models include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance
at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
ALL NIN INN NIN INN Diff
(p-value)
Ostliab 0.053*** 0.043 0.061*** 0.028 0.059*** (0.377)
(0.015) (0.028) (0.017) (0.028) (0.018)
Cash -0.177*** -0.077* -0.253*** -0.080* -0.248*** (0.001)
(0.027) (0.044) (0.034) (0.045) (0.027)
Tangible -0.228*** -0.186*** -0.286*** -0.199*** -0.276*** (0.040)
(0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026)
Intangible -0.192*** -0.180*** -0.228*** -0.159*** -0.239*** (0.016)
(0.023) (0.029) (0.034) (0.031) (0.025)
Size -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.007*** (0.018)
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Profit -0.018 -0.054* 0.015 -0.063** 0.008 (0.059)
(0.017) (0.030) (0.018) (0.030) (0.021)
AssetTurn 0.082*** 0.097*** 0.058*** 0.091*** 0.066*** (0.025)
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012)
Volatility -0.019 -0.076 0.021 -0.114 0.035 (0.099)
(0.037) (0.080) (0.036) (0.079) (0.042)
Constant 0.284*** 0.245*** 0.382*** 0.326***
(0.029) (0.042) (0.035) (0.027)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
Adj.R2 0.616 0.637 0.632 0.623
is consistent with the US studies of Cuñat (2007) and Petersen and Rajan (1997).
They report that firms with better access to capital markets use this comparative
advantage to benefit their customers by extending more trade credit. The negative
effect of cash on accounts receivable (trade credit extended) is consistent with Dass
et al. (2014) in emerging markets and Wu et al. (2012) for firms in China. Similarly,
Bougheas et al. (2009) (private firms in the UK) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) (small
firms in the US) also report a negative relationship between cash and trade credit ex-
tended. The negative effect of cash on trade credit shows that firms in the UK have
to reduce trade credit (accounts receivable) in order to increase cash holdings.
The effect of other short-term liabilities on accounts receivable is positive, with no
significant differences between innovative and non-innovative firms. The higher pos-
itive coefficient on other short-term liabilities suggests that innovative firms provide
more trade credit (AR) to their customers. This is consistent with US studies that
report higher trade credit extended in specialised industries than standardised in-
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dustries (e.g., Guariglia and Mateut, 2013; Giannetti et al., 2011). The provision of
relatively more trade credit by innovative firms is also consistent with the theoreti-
cal predictions that suppliers have informational advantages over traditional lenders,
with these informational advantages being more pronounced for firms producing spe-
cialised products as highlighted by Guariglia and Mateut (2013) and Giannetti et al.
(2011).25 Also, Begenau and Palazzo (2015) report that some informed lenders in
the US recognise the value of specialised collateral and advance credit at relatively
lower rates than uninformed lenders who charge a premium to compensate for the
information asymmetry in collateral values. Cash has a significantly higher negative
effect on accounts receivable of innovative firms than for non-innovative firms. This
difference suggests that cash is more valuable for innovative firms as it is used to
smoothen shortfalls in cash-flows needed to finance further investments (see, Brown
and Petersen, 2011). This high negative coefficient on cash for innovative firms sup-
ports the recently observed increase in cash-holdings among firms in the US, which
has been attributed to an increase in operating risk and intangible investments (see,
Acharya et al., 2007; Ang and Smedema, 2011).
Coefficient estimates of the control variables are mostly consistent with those in the
literature, except for earnings volatility. The positive relation between trade credit
and earnings volatility suggests that firms that have volatile profits may use trade
credit to make up for the shortfall in cash-flows. Similarly, Borisova and Brown
(2013) and Brown and Petersen (2011) report that firms in the US that invest in
R&D use cash or proceeds from sales of fixed assets to smoothen shortfalls in cash-
flows. A positive relation between trade credit and earnings volatility may occur if
earnings volatility limits access to short-term debt, which may force firms to rely
more on trade credit. Also, the high asset specificity for innovative firms may result
in increased use of trade credit as the specialised nature of the collateral has more
value to suppliers than other institutional lenders (such as banks) (see, Petersen and
Rajan, 1997). Further, the differences in the effects of the control variables on trade
25See, Biais and Gollier (1997), Brennan and Schwartz (1984), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and
Smith (1987).
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credit (AR) between innovative and non-innovative firms are significant, which shows
that these firms have heterogeneous trade credit policies as is also consistent with
the results in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.4 (in Chapter 3).
The results show that it is mostly innovative firms in the UK that borrow to fi-
nance trade receivables, which is in line with prediction that firms with better ac-
cess to capital markets extend more trade credit to their customers (see, Petersen
and Rajan, 1997). Although non-innovative firms use other short-term financing
sources to increase trade credit extended, this increase is insignificant. The results
further indicate that innovative firms have to reduce trade credit extended signifi-
cantly more than non-innovative firms in-order to save cash. The differences between
non-innovative and innovative firms suggest that investment types are an important
source of heterogeneity in trade credit and on how it relates to cash and short-term
debt.
6.4.3 Time variations
This section builds upon the results in Table 6.1 by examining the time variation in
the sensitivity of trade credit (AP and AR) to cash and other short-term liabilities
(Ostliab). Figure 6.1 plots the time series of the sensitivities of trade credit from
estimating Equation (6.1) for all firms and Equation (6.2) for innovative and non-
innovative firms. The results are based on six non-overlapping sub-periods (1987-
1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010 and 2011-2013). The sensitivity
of trade credit to cash and other short-term liabilities is estimated separately for all
firms, non-innovative and innovative firms over the six sub-periods.
Figure 6.1 shows that the sensitivities of trade credit to cash and other short-term
liabilities vary significantly over time.26 For all firms (ALL), Figure 6.1a and 6.1c
show that cash and other short-term liabilities appear as substitutes to trade credit
(AP), except over the period 2001-2005 when cash assumes a complimentary role to
26Appendix 6.B shows the variation and differences in the sensitivity of trade credit to cash and
other short-term liabilities.
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Figure 6.1 The sensitivity of trade credit over time
(a) AP-Ostliab (b) AR-Ostliab
(c) AP-Cash (d) AR-Cash
trade credit. The negative relationship between trade credit (AP) and other short-
term liabilities is in line with studies in the US (e.g., Love et al., 2007; Yang, 2011b),
but inconsistent with Biais and Gollier (1997), Giannetti et al. (2011) and Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) who report that they are compliments. The result in
Figure 6.1a suggests that the variation in the relationship between short-term debt
and trade credit (AP) could explain the mixed results in the literature. The mostly
negative relationship between trade credit (AP) and cash for all firms in Figure 6.1a
is consistent with the proposition that firms with better liquidity positions tend to
rely less on trade credit as it is a relatively expensive form of short-term financing.
Comparisons of the sensitivity of trade credit (AP) to cash and other short-term liabil-
ities show marked differences between innovative and non-innovative firms. Figure
6.1c shows that cash has a positive effect on trade credit (AP) for non-innovative
firms (for four out of the six periods), while it has a negative effect for innovative
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firms. This implies that cash assumes different roles for non-innovative and innova-
tive firms, with innovative firms using cash to reduce trade credit (AP) while non-
innovative firms use trade credit (AP) to increase cash. Although other short-term
liabilities are mostly substitutes to trade credit (AP) in Figure 6.1a, this negative
effect is significantly higher for non-innovative firms as is consistent with previous
results in Table 6.1. This is empirical evidence of significant heterogeneity in the
relationship between trade credit (AP) and cash or trade credit (AP) and other short-
term financing sources conditional on investment types.
Figure 6.1b shows that other short-term liabilities have a positive effect on accounts
receivable (AR), with this relationship changing to negative for non-innovative firms
from 2001 to 2013. This suggests that it is mostly innovative firms that use their
better access to other sources of financing to extend more trade credit to their cus-
tomers. Although the results in Figure 6.1d are consistent in sign, comparisons show
that cash has a significantly higher negative effect for innovative firms than non-
innovative firms. The high negative effect of cash shows that innovative firms have
to reduce trade credit significantly (more than non-innovative firms) in order to in-
crease cash. This variation in the sensitivity of trade credit shows that the relation-
ship between trade credit and cash, and trade credit and short-term debt changes
over time and differs between innovative and non-innovative firms.27
Overall, the results in Figure 6.1 show that there are significant differences between
innovative and non-innovative firms, as well as time variations in the sensitivity of
trade credit to cash and other short-term liabilities.
6.4.4 Trade credit adjustments
This section investigates the differences in trade credit adjustments between inno-
vative and non-innovative firms. The possible existence of a target trade credit level
27Appendix 6.C presents the estimating results of Equations (6.1) and (6.2) using 3 year sub-
periods. These results are generally in line with those reported in Figure 6.1, except that they show
more variation in the sensitivity of trade credit to cash and other short-term liabilities. Similar, sig-
nificant differences between innovative and non-innovative firms is also observed in the sensitivity of
net-trade credit to cash and other short-term liabilities in Appendix 6.E.
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Table 6.3 Trade credit adjustments
The table presents the results of estimating Equations (6.3) and (6.4) that relate changes in trade
credit (∆AP or ∆AR) to deviation from target trade credit (Devit). ALL represents all firms in the
sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative
firms that report R&D. RDD a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that report
R&D and zero otherwise. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five
years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in
Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from
Worldscope through Datastream. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. All models include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Accounts payable adjustments
ALL NIN INN ALL
Devit 0.201*** 0.170*** 0.238*** 0.162***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017)
Devit ×RDD 0.075***
(0.028)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
Adj.R2 0.141 0.100 0.184 0.144
Panel B: Accounts receivable adjustments
ALL NIN INN ALL
Devit 0.174*** 0.132*** 0.233*** 0.129***
(0.023) (0.015) (0.044) (0.015)
Devit ×RDD 0.094*
(0.049)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
Adj.R2 0.06 0.051 0.075 0.064
is premised on the proposition that firms seek to optimise the trade-off between the
costs and benefits of giving or using trade credit so as to maximise firm value. The
second, third and fourth columns of Table 6.3 present estimation results of Equa-
tion (6.3) separately for all firms, non-innovative and innovative firms, respectively.
The fifth column presents estimation results of Equation (6.3) which include the in-
teraction term, Devit ×RDD, in order to examine the differences in the adjustment
behaviour of firms that report R&D. All models in Table 6.3 include firm fixed effects
and time dummies.
The results in the second column of Table 6.3 (Panel A) show that all firms adjust to-
wards the target trade credit at a slow-to-moderate rate of 20.1% for accounts payable
(AP). This suggests that there are significant adjustment costs that result in firms
"taking extended excursions away from their targets" as highlighted by Myers (1984)
on capital structure. The significant speed of adjustment also suggests that firms
have a target trade credit level, with non-innovative firms adjusting at a lower speed
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than innovative firms. The results in the fifth column are consistent with the ini-
tial proposition that innovative firms benefit relatively more from adjusting towards
the target. These results show that innovative firms adjust at a speed of 23.7%,
which is 7.5% faster than non-innovative firms (16.2%). The results of estimating
Equations (6.3) separately for non-innovative firms in the third column (17%) and
innovative firms in the fourth column (23.8%) show similar significant differences in
the speed of adjustment as that reported in the fifth column. This relatively higher
speed of adjustment indicates that trade credit is less persistent from one year to the
next for innovative firms, as it is a relatively expensive form of short-term financ-
ing. This low persistence for innovative firms is consistent with the proposition that
these firms tend to avoid short-term debt (such as trade credit) that restricts flexi-
bility (see, O’Brien, 2003) and is often difficult to get (especially when credit quality
deteriorates) (see, Kahl et al., 2015). Overall, the main contribution to the literature
from the results in Panel A is that the benefits arising from adjusting trade credit
towards the target are asymmetric conditional on investment types, with innovative
firms benefiting more than non-innovative firms. This difference in the speed of ad-
justment indicates that the overlooked investment types are an important source of
heterogeneity in trade credit adjustments.
The results in Panel B for accounts receivable (AR) also show similar slow-to-moderate
speeds of adjustment (as those reported in Panel A for accounts payable). The speed
of adjustment of AR for all firms (in the second column) is 17.4%, while non-innovative
(innovative) firms adjust at a slow-to-moderate speed of 0.132 (23.3%). Similarly, the
results in the fifth column show that innovative firms (22.3%) are more active in re-
balancing trade credit towards the target than non-innovative firms (12.9%). The
relatively higher speed of adjustment for innovative firms (which is 9.4% faster than
for non-innovative firms) is consistent with the initial predictions in this chapter and
the results in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.4 of Chapter 3, which show that innovative firms
extend more trade credit (accounts receivable) than non-innovative firms.28 This re-
28Appendix 6.D presents results on net trade credit adjustment. The results show that all firms
adjust net trade credit at a slow-to-moderate speed (25.1%) and that innovative firms consistently
adjust faster than non-innovative firms towards a target. This slow-to-moderate speed is consistent
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sult supports the proposition that trade credit is used to alleviate imperfections in the
product markets as it allows customers to try the product before making a payment
(see, Antràs and Foley, 2011; Lee and Stowe, 1993; Long et al., 1993). The relatively
higher speed of adjustment for innovative firms further implies that the option to
take trade credit is more valuable for innovative products, as it allows suppliers to
use trade credit extended as a form of warranty on product quality.29,30
Overall, the results in Table 6.3 show that investment types are an important source
of heterogeneity in trade credit adjustments. Understanding how investments in
innovation impact on other corporate financing decisions (such as trade credit) is be-
coming more important with the increasing dominance of the technology and service
sectors. Further, these results add new insights on the overlook interdependence of
financing and investment decisions.31
6.5 Robustness
This section presents robustness tests. First, using net trade credit as the dependent
variable, this section re-estimates Equations (6.3) and (6.4) (in Table 6.4) that relate
net trade credit (NTC) to firm characteristics. Net trade credit is defined as the dif-
ference between accounts receivable and accounts payable.32 The focus on net trade
credit is motivated by Guariglia and Mateut (2006) who argue that it is a more com-
prehensive measure as firms do not only limit themselves to receiving trade credit
(accounts payable), but also extend trade credit (accounts receivable). The policies on
with the results in Table 6.3. The fifth and sixth columns show that innovative firms adjust net trade
credit at a higher speed of 16.8% while non-innovative firms adjust at a speed of 33.3%. Similar
differences are also observed in the third and fourth columns that present the estimating results of
Equation (6.3) separately for non-innovative and innovative firms.
29According to Long et al. (1993), firms use trade credit extended as a form of guarantee for product
quality. This helps in alleviating information asymmetry in the product markets in a similar way that
trade credit reduces information asymmetry in the capital markets (supplier based lending (see, Biais
and Gollier, 1997)).
30O’Brien (2003) highlights that firms in competitive markets for innovation need to constantly
change their strategies in order to survive (strategic flexibility).
31See, inter alia, Buera and Kaboski (2012), Chava and Roberts (2008) and Stein (2003).
32Other studies have used accounts payable and receivable scaled by sales and cost of goods sold
as the measure for trade credit (e.g., Abdulla et al., 2014a; Aktas et al., 2012; Garcia-Appendini and
Montoriol-Garriga, 2013; Giannetti et al., 2011; Love et al., 2007). However, this study uses net trade
credit for robustness tests as it is more informative (Guariglia and Mateut, 2006).
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Table 6.4 Net trade credit
The table presents the results of estimating Equations (6.3) and (6.4) that relate net trade credit (NTC)
to firm characteristics. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms
that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists
of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the period from
1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the
1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream. Standard errors (in
parenthesis) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. All models include firm fixed effects
and time dummies (in the rela).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels,
respectively.
ALL NIN INN NIN INN Diff
(p-value)
Ostliab 0.124*** 0.177*** 0.087*** 0.169*** 0.086*** (0.019)
(0.017) (0.029) (0.019) (0.030) (0.019)
Cash -0.132*** -0.140*** -0.147*** -0.127*** -0.148*** (0.639)
(0.023) (0.040) (0.029) (0.040) (0.025)
Tangible -0.172*** -0.155*** -0.196*** -0.149*** -0.202*** (0.082)
(0.022) (0.032) (0.026) (0.028) (0.022)
Intangible -0.133*** -0.134*** -0.142*** -0.109*** -0.159*** (0.099)
(0.021) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.021)
Size -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.005*** (0.038)
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Profit 0.084*** 0.079** 0.097*** 0.073** 0.088*** (0.705)
(0.018) (0.037) (0.020) (0.035) (0.020)
AssetTurn -0.015** -0.015** -0.016* -0.019*** -0.011 (0.363)
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Volatility 0.021 -0.027 0.044 -0.046 0.048 (0.355)
(0.045) (0.084) (0.050) (0.086) (0.054)
Constant 0.191*** 0.183*** 0.316*** 0.289***
(0.027) (0.043) (0.032) (0.025)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
Adj.R2 0.341 0.357 0.327 0.348
accounts receivables and accounts payable differ as firms have an inventive to delay
making payments to their suppliers and require early or prompt receipts from their
customers.33 However, in this analysis, the definition of net trade credit of Guar-
iglia and Mateut (2006), which involves subtracting accounts payable from accounts
receivable, is used for robustness. The second, third and fourth columns in Table
6.4 present the estimating results of Equation (6.1) separately for all firms (ALL),
non-innovative firms (NIN) and innovative firms (INN), respectively. The fifth and
sixth columns present the estimating results of Equation (6.2) that allows for direct
testing of the differences in the coefficients between non-innovative and innovative
firms. The values in parentheses are the associated standard errors. All models in-
clude firm fixed effects and time dummies to control for other excluded firm-specific
and time factors that might affect trade credit.
33Similarly, Barclay and Smith (1995) argue that there is no economic rationale to expect the same
results from different definitions of a variable (such as when leverage when it is measured based on
market or book value). The same arguments can be made when using net trade credit to measure







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results in Table 6.4 show that other short-term liabilities have a positive effect
on net trade credit, while cash has a negative effect. Comparisons of the effect of
other short-term liabilities on net-trade credit (fifth and sixth columns) show sig-
nificant differences between innovative and non-innovative firms, with the positive
effect being higher for non-innovative firms. This indicates that short term debt is
used to finance trade receivables, with non-innovative firms channelling more of the
short-term borrowings towards extending more trade credit to their customers. This
is inconsistent with the results reported in Table 6.2 and Figure 3.4e. Rather, Figure
3.4e shows that innovative firms have more other short-term liabilities, which could
be used to increase the trade credit they extend to their customers. While the results
in Table 6.4 show that cash has a significantly higher positive effect on net trade
credit for non-innovative firms, Table 6.2 shows that the difference is rather insignif-
icant even though this positive effect is higher for innovative firms. This difference
in the results is caused by the inclusion of accounts payable (AP) in net-trade credit.
Cash has a consistently negative effect on net trade credit. This shows that firms
have to reduce the trade credit they extend to their customers in order to increase
cash holdings. In contrast to the results in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the difference on the
effect of cash on net trade credit between innovative and non-innovative firms is in-
significant although it is slightly higher for innovative firms. The negative effect of
cash on trade credit is consistent with Dass et al. (2014) and Wu et al. (2012) who
report similar results for firms in emerging markets and firms in China, respectively.
The results on other determinants are generally in line with those reported previ-
ously in this chapter (Section 6.1 and 6.2).
Finally, this section examines the sensitivity of the results to other estimation tech-
niques (OLS with Newey-West standard errors (NEWEY), Fama and MacBeth (FM)
(see, Fama and MacBeth, 1973) and DPF (see, Elsas and Florysiak, 2011, 2013)). The
focus on the three techniques is motivated by the on ongoing debate in the literature
on the most appropriate estimation techniques in corporate finance (see, inter alia,
Dang et al., 2014b; Elsas and Florysiak, 2008; Flannery and Hankins, 2013). Ta-
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ble 6.5 shows limited differences across the three different estimation techniques.34
Panel A shows that other short-term liabilities have a consistent negative effect on
accounts payable as is consistent with the results in Table 6.1. This indicates that
other-short-term liabilities are a substitute to trade credit (accounts payable). The
results also show this negative effect differs significantly between innovative and
non-innovative firms as reported in Table 6.1. Cash has a consistently negative ef-
fect on accounts payable for innovative firms, while it has an insignificant positive
effect for non-innovative firms, except for the negative coefficient estimated using
the DPF. The positive effect of cash on trade credit (AP) for non-innovative firms and
the negative effect for innovative firms is in line with the results in Table 6.1. These
results corroborate those reported in Table 6.1 and also suggest that innovative (non-
innovative) firms use (do not use) cash to reduce trade credit financing.
Panel B shows a positive relationship between other short-term liabilities and trade
credit extended (accounts receivable). This positive relationship suggests that firms
use short-term financing to increase the trade credit extended (AR) as is consistent
with the results in Table 6.2. The result is also in line with the proposition that
firms with access to capital markets provide more credit to their customers and also
support other credit constrained firms.35 However, comparisons between innovative
and non-innovative firms show that the differences on the effect of other short-term
liabilities on trade credit extended (AR) are rather insignificant, except for the model
estimated using the DPF approach.36 The results in Panel B further show that cash
has a consistently negative effect on accounts receivable, except for the models esti-
mated using the Fama and MacBeth approach. This result is similar to that reported
in Table 6.2, except for the insignificant differences and positive effect of cash on
trade credit (accounts receivable) of non-innovative firms for the models estimated
34Table 6.5 only presents results on other short-term liabilities and cash. The coefficients of the
control variables (short-term debt, cash, tangible assets, intangible assets, sales growth, size, profit,
asset turnover and volatility) remain qualitatively similar to those presented in previous sections of
the chapter (Table 6.1 and 6.2).
35Petersen and Rajan (1997) report that firms in the US with better access to capital markets
extend more trade credit to their customers.
36The DPF approach that accounts for the censored nature of variables (such as ratios that within
the unit interval [0,1]).
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using the Fama and MacBeth approach. The results are generally in line with those
reported in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
Overall, the main results seem robust to different definitions of trade credit and are
qualitatively similar across several estimation techniques. This shows that recognis-
ing heterogeneity conditional on investments types is important to the understanding
of variations in trade credit policies, the relationship between trade credit and cash,
and the relationship between trade credit and other forms of short-term financing.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the determinants of trade credit, and the differences in
trade credit between innovative and non-innovative firms. Further, the chapter also
examines the time variations in the relationship between trade credit and cash-
holdings, and between trade credit and short-term debt. Several insights on trade
credit policies emerge. First, the results show that relationship between trade credit
and cash-holdings, and between trade credit and short-term debt varies over time
and across innovative and non-innovative firms. There is a high substitution effect
between short-term debt and accounts payable, while there is a complimentary effect
between short-term debt and accounts receivable. Further, the substitution effect be-
tween short-term debt and accounts payable is higher for non-innovative firms than
for innovative firms, which suggests that non-innovative firms use less trade credit
financing for every unit of short-term debt they are able to access.
Second, the effect of cash on trade credit is asymmetric as it has a negative effect
on both accounts payable and accounts receivable for innovative firms, while it has
a positive effect on accounts payable and a negative effect on accounts receivable for
non-innovative firms. This evidence suggests that cash and trade credit (AP) have
a complimentary relationship for non-innovative firms, whereas the two are sub-
stitutes for innovative firms. Innovative firms tend to substitute trade credit with
short-term debt as trade credit is a relatively more expensive form of short-term fi-
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nancing and relying on it reduces flexibility as it is often difficult to get in tight credit
markets or if credit quality deteriorates. Further, innovative investments have long
investment horizons which favour long-term financing sources as firms seek to match
the maturity of assets to the sources of financing.
Third, the sensitivity of trade credit to cash and other short-term liabilities varies
over time and between innovative and non-innovative firms. Whereas cash is a com-
pliment to trade credit (AP) for non-innovative firms, it is a substitute to trade credit
(AP) for innovative firms. There are similar differences on other short-term liabilities
which consistently have a substitution effect on trade credit (AP), with the substitu-
tion effect being significantly higher for non-innovative firms that face less binding fi-
nancial constraints. Comparisons on the the sensitivity of accounts receivable (trade
credit extended) between innovative and non-innovative firms show significant dif-
ferences as other short-term liabilities are a compliment to trade credit extended
(AR), but change to being a substitute during the periods 2001-2005, 2006-2010 and
2011-2013 for non-innovative firms. Similar differences are also observed from com-
parisons of the sensitivity of trade credit extended (AR) to cash. While the relation-
ship between trade credit extended is mostly negative, it is rather less significant
and changes to positive for non-innovative firms over the period 2011-2013. These
results show the importance of studying the dynamic nature of the relationship be-
tween trade credit and other short-term sources of financing (short-term debt and
cash), and the heterogeneity in trade credit arising from differences in corporate in-
vestments.
Finally, the results show that listed firms in the UK adjust towards a target credit
level at a slow-to-moderate speed. This slow-to-moderate speed of adjustment is due
to the existence of adjustment costs that impede firms from fully adjusting towards
the target trade credit level. Comparisons of the speed of adjustment between non-
innovative and innovative firms show that innovative firms consistently adjust faster
than non-innovative firms. This highlights the importance of recognising heterogene-
ity in trade credit conditional on investment types since innovative firms benefit more
231
from re-balancing trade credit towards the target than non-innovative firms.
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Appendices to Chapter 6
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Appendix 6.A Variations in trade credit
The table reports the number of observations (N), mean, median, standard deviation (Stdev), 25th
and 75th percentiles for the variables used. ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for
non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D.
AP-Diff (AR-Diff) represents differences in account payables (account receivables) between innovative
firms and non-innovative firms. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least
five years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined
in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn
from Worldscope through Datastream.
NIN INN AP-Diff AR-Diff
Year N AP AR N AP AR (p-value) (p-value)
1987 50 0.087 0.214 111 0.051 0.253 (0.009) (0.019)
1988 113 0.141 0.250 155 0.097 0.274 (0.001) (0.085)
1989 143 0.169 0.250 172 0.148 0.267 (0.032) (0.178)
1990 177 0.152 0.233 234 0.147 0.258 (0.471) (0.023)
1991 193 0.152 0.234 246 0.137 0.254 (0.047) (0.041)
1992 197 0.149 0.227 252 0.139 0.254 (0.168) (0.006)
1993 201 0.153 0.230 262 0.141 0.257 (0.124) (0.007)
1994 201 0.167 0.249 270 0.146 0.261 (0.011) (0.248)
1995 188 0.173 0.258 259 0.153 0.263 (0.019) (0.601)
1996 180 0.175 0.253 251 0.150 0.270 (0.004) (0.134)
1997 171 0.169 0.253 248 0.142 0.267 (0.002) (0.231)
1998 153 0.166 0.248 229 0.138 0.247 (0.002) (0.914)
1999 122 0.155 0.237 201 0.128 0.239 (0.003) (0.846)
2000 106 0.158 0.216 175 0.124 0.235 (0.004) (0.218)
2001 100 0.150 0.210 177 0.115 0.215 (0.002) (0.691)
2002 93 0.142 0.207 182 0.111 0.208 (0.005) (0.966)
2003 95 0.144 0.205 170 0.118 0.212 (0.023) (0.610)
2004 93 0.138 0.199 171 0.110 0.211 (0.014) (0.472)
2005 91 0.141 0.198 164 0.111 0.200 (0.011) (0.899)
2006 85 0.126 0.173 159 0.110 0.197 (0.157) (0.089)
2007 87 0.102 0.178 155 0.108 0.202 (0.601) (0.157)
2008 89 0.112 0.167 160 0.102 0.186 (0.374) (0.170)
2009 92 0.098 0.145 159 0.097 0.178 (0.887) (0.018)
2010 86 0.099 0.144 151 0.103 0.187 (0.755) (0.008)
2011 79 0.105 0.164 135 0.108 0.178 (0.846) (0.423)
2012 68 0.108 0.161 127 0.107 0.172 (0.960) (0.518)
2013 51 0.103 0.150 117 0.105 0.180 (0.893) (0.143)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 6.C The sensitivity of trade credit: 3 year
sub-periods
The figure plots the time series of the sensitivities of net trade credit from estimating Equations (6.1)
and (6.2) over nine non-overlapping sub-periods (1987-1989, 1990-1992, 1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-
2001, 2002-2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2010 and 2011-2013). ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN
stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that
report R&D. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on
key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in
Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope
through Datastream.
(a) AP-Ostliab (b) AR-Ostliab
(c) AP-Cash (d) AR-Cash
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Appendix 6.D Net trade credit adjustments
The table presents the results of estimating Equations (6.3) and (6.4) that relate changes in net trade
credit (∆NTC) to deviation from target net trade credit (Devit). ALL represents all firms in the
sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative
firms that report R&D. RDD a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that report
R&D and zero otherwise. The sample consists of non-financial firms in the UK with at least five
years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to 2013. All variables used are defined in
Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. The data is drawn from
Worldscope through Datastream. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. All models include firm fixed effects and time dummies (not reported).∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
ALL NIN INN ALL
Devit 0.251*** 0.172*** 0.340*** 0.168***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.042) (0.019)
Devit ×RDD 0.165***
(0.045)
N 7579 2945 4634 7579
Adj.R2 0.115 0.069 0.164 0.124
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Appendix 6.E The sensitivity of net trade credit
The figure 6.2a and 6.2b plot the time series of the sensitivities of net trade credit from estimat-
ing Equations (6.1) and (6.2) over six non-overlapping sub-periods (1987-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-
2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010 and 2011-2013). The figure 6.2c and 6.2d plot the time series of the
sensitivities of net trade credit estimating results of Equation (6.1) over nine non-overlapping sub-
periods (1987-1989, 1990-1992, 1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2010
and 2011-2013). ALL represents all firms in the sample, NIN stands for non-innovative firms that do
not report R&D, and INN stands for innovative firms that report R&D. The sample consists of non-
financial firms in the UK with at least five years of data on key variables over the period from 1987 to
2013. All variables used are defined in Appendix 3.2 in Chapter 3, and are winsorised at the 1th and
99th percentiles. The data is drawn from Worldscope through Datastream.
(a) NTC-Ostliab (b) NTC-Cash
(c) NTC-Ostliab (3 years) (d) NTC-Cash (3 years)
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Chapter 7




Questions on how managers make corporate financing decisions, and the nature of
the interactions between financing and real decisions (e.g., investment, employment,
and production), remain open to debate despite several decades of research. Events
from the global financial crisis (where over-assumption of debt at household, corpo-
rate and sovereign levels was one of the main causes of the crisis) also highlights the
need to re-examine the interdependence of financing and real decisions. Recently,
there has been a marked increase in R&D and changes in corporate balance sheets
(in the form of increases in intangible assets and decreases in tangible assets), due to
the increasing dominance of technological and service sectors. These marked changes
in corporate investment and corporate assets expose firms to binding financial con-
straints, as intangible investments are characterised by high information asymmetry,
long investment horizons, asset substitution problems, high specificity, and low col-
lateral values. This increase in innovative investments should result in corporate
de-leveraging as firms have less pledgeable assets when accessing debt financing.1
However, corporate debt has remained relatively persistent, with an upward drift
characterised by several temporary spikes. This is inconsistent with the expected
de-leveraging to counteract the increase in operating risks (arising from increases in
innovative investments) as predicted by the theory of Krainer (2014). Similarly, Gra-
ham et al. (2015) report a similar threefold increase in corporate leverage in the US
over the past century, which they attribute to an increasing propensity to use debt
financing over time.
Theory suggests several reasons why firms with a high proportion of R&D and in-
tangible assets should prefer equity over debt financing. First, managers choose in-
vestment projects that conform to the risk aversion of the shareholders and use cap-
ital structure to offset any deviations from acceptable risk thresholds (see, Krainer,
2014). As highlighted in the literature, R&D and intangible assets increase operating
1Traditional finance theory posits that collateral reduces the incentive of borrowers to engage in
actions that are detrimental to the creditors (see, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Leland and Pyle, 1977;
Leland, 1998).
242
risk, and this can be offset by adopting conservative financing structures (reducing
debt financing). Second, the special nature of innovative investments favours equity
financing as debt financing is costly and prohibitively restrictive given the need to
adhere to the covenants. These covenants, that seek to protect creditors, may in-
advertently reduce strategic flexibility (see, Hall, 2002; O’Brien, 2003) and require
disclosure of information (proprietary information) which may harm innovative in-
vestments. The need to service debt may also result in managers prioritising liquid-
ity management ahead of further investments in innovation as some projects do not
generate revenues in the short-run. These special characteristics of intangible invest-
ments favour equity financing, which is less restrictive compared to debt financing.
Against this background, this thesis examines the differences in financing structure,
leverage adjustments and trade credit policies of innovative and non-innovative firms
using a sample of 817 (8 396 firm year observations) non-financial firms listed on the
London Stock Exchange over the period 1987 to 2013.2 There is a growing need to
understand how the changing composition of corporate investments affects other cor-
porate decisions (see, Buera and Kaboski, 2012). An examination of the differences
between innovative and non-innovative firms provides insights on how investment
types affect corporate financing decisions. Unlike prior studies that focus on one
form of investment or adopt a ceteris paribus approach, which ignores the interre-
lations between these investments, this thesis examines concurrently the effects of
these forms of investment on corporate financing decisions. This approach recognises
the heterogeneity in corporate investments and the interdependence of corporate de-
cisions (such as investment and capital structure). Further, an understanding of the
time variations in the relationship between investment and financing decisions is im-
portant in light of the changing compositions of corporate investments.3
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2.1 presents a summary of
2The focus on the UK addresses the confinement of studies to the US, which limits generalisability
of results to other economies with different macroeconomic, institutional and legal frameworks.
3Several studies in the US report marked increases in R&D (e.g., Borisova and Brown, 2013;
Brown and Petersen, 2011; Falato et al., 2013; Sporleder et al., 2002) and intangible assets (e.g.,
Falato et al., 2013; Lim et al., 2014; Loumioti, 2012).
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the main results of the empirical analysis of Chapter 4 on the determinants of financ-
ing structure. Section 7.2.2 presents a summary of the main findings of the empirical
analysis in Chapter 5 on leverage adjustments. Section 7.2.3 presents a summary
of the main results of the empirical analysis of Chapter 6 which investigates the de-
terminants of trade credit and the relationship between trade credit and cash, and
trade credit and short-term debt. Section 1.3 presents the policy implications arising
from the research. Finally, Section 7.3 presents the limitations and ideas for future
research.
7.2 Summary of the main findings
7.2.1 Financing structure: The case of innovative versus non-
innovative firms
Chapter 4 investigates the determinants of financing structure and the differences
between innovative firms that report R&D and non-innovative firms that do not re-
port R&D. The results of prior studies that investigate the determinants of financing
structure and interdependence of financing and investment decisions are mixed.4
One strand reports insignificant linkages (see, Mauer and Triantis, 1994), while
another, either reports a positive (e.g., Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005; Rashid and
Caglayan, 2012) or a negative relationship (e.g., Aivazian et al., 2005; Dang, 2011;
DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Lang et al., 1996). Further, Borisova and Brown (2013)
highlight that most prior studies have focused largely on fixed capital investments
(Capex), while overlooking the effects of the marked changes in corporate invest-
ments (the increase in R&D) over the recent decades and their implications on cor-
porate financing decisions. Yet, there is a marked increase in innovation (R&D) and
decrease in both fixed capital investments (Capex) and tangible assets as economies
move from predominantly manufacturing sectors towards service and technology sec-
tors.
4Recent reviews highlight that existing models only explain a low proportion of the variations in
capital structure, with results on some factors being mixed and in some cases, the factors are becoming
less reliable over time (see, Frank and Goyal, 2009; Graham and Leary, 2011; Oztekin, 2015).
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The analysis of Chapter 4 adopts a de-compositional approach in which leverage is
decomposed into four components (total debt, long-term debt, short-term debt and
total liabilities) upon which comparisons of financing decisions of innovative and
non-innovative firms are made. The adoption of a de-compositional approach is mo-
tivated by Rauh and Sufi (2010) who argue that debt is heterogeneous, and in line
with DeAngelo and Roll (2015) and Welch (2004) who highlight that the components
of leverage vary greatly over time even though aggregate leverage exhibits relative
stability (as Lemmon et al. (2008) and Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) report). The
special characteristics of innovative investments, which include long investment hori-
zons, high information asymmetry, asset substitution problems, and poor collateral
values, should result in the adoption of conservative financing structures. A model
by Krainer (2014) shows that managers use capital structure to keep operating risks
within thresholds that are acceptable to shareholders. Similarly, other theories by
Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) predict that innovation should be financed with eq-
uity. The stakeholder co-investment theory of Titman (1984) also posits that firms
with unique products are more likely to face binding constraints. Debt financing is
also less preferred as the covenants associated with debt, which afford close moni-
toring, may inadvertently restrict strategic flexibility (see, O’Brien, 2003) and harm
innovation by requiring disclosure of valuable information (see, Buera and Kaboski,
2012). Following these predictions, the increase in innovative investments should
lead to a marked decrease in debt financing and observable differences in financing
structures between innovative and non-innovative firms.
The results of the analysis presented in Chapter 4 show that leverage has not sub-
sided, contrary to expectations built in response to the increase in innovative invest-
ments, but has remained largely persistent and rising. The persistence in corporate
gearing is inconsistent with the increase in R&D and the decrease in collateral val-
ues, which should result in debt reductions. The results show similarities in financing
structures of innovative and non-innovative firms, which is inconsistent with the pre-
dictions of the information asymmetry theory and most prior studies (e.g., Borisova
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and Brown, 2013; Brown and Petersen, 2009, 2011; Hall, 2009). The similarities in
financing structure are consistent, however, with Chava et al. (2013) who report that
specialist lenders are more willing to finance innovation, and with Stroebel (2015)
who find that integrated lenders lend more than non-integrated lenders. The re-
sults further show that the relationship between leverage and capital expenditure
is positive and significant on three measures of leverage, except for total liabilities.
This suggests that capital expenditure has an insignificant effect on short-term debt,
which is included in total liabilities. The results on tangible assets, growth, size,
profit, and non-debt tax shield are mostly consistent with theory and prior studies,
except for intangible assets that have a positive effect on leverage. This latter re-
sult is inconsistent with the literature that suggests that intangible assets should be
financed mostly with equity. The coefficient of intangible assets is significant even
though most intangible assets are off-balance-sheet items.5 This result suggests that
intangible assets facilitates access to debt financing in a similar way as tangible as-
sets.6 Further, the increase in debt financing over time can be attributed to the
increasing propensity to use debt financing (see, Graham et al., 2015).
Comparisons of the determinants of leverage show variations between innovative
and non-innovative firms. Leverage (except when measured by total liabilities) is
relatively more persistent for non-innovative firms than innovative firms. This re-
sult is consistent with the hypothesis that physical capital investments support debt
financing (see, Almeida and Campello, 2007; Campello and Giambona, 2013; Ortiz-
Molina and Phillips, 2014). However, the insignificant difference in persistence on
total liabilities shows that innovative and non-innovative firms adopt similar financ-
ing structures on aggregate. R&D has a consistently negative and significant effect
on leverage, as is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Aghion et al., 2004; Borisova and
Brown, 2013; Dang et al., 2014a; Elsas and Florysiak, 2013; Hall, 2002). However,
this negative effect is inconsistent with the persistence in leverage and the similar
5ISA 38 restricts the recognition of intangible assets to those that arise from business combina-
tions or are acquired from other firms.
6Similarly, Falato et al. (2013) report that 20% of the secured syndicated loans originated in the
US are collateralised by intangible assets over the period 1996 - 2005.
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debt financing levels of innovative and non-innovative firms. Rather, the persistence
in leverage shows that innovative firms are able to access debt financing despite their
focus on intangible investments. Capital expenditure has a positive effect on leverage
for non-innovative firms, while this effect is consistently insignificant for innovative
firms. The variations of the effect of capital expenditure across the four measures of
leverage used highlight that the mixed results in the literature are due to the differ-
ent definitions of leverage adopted in the literature, or the failure to take into account
the heterogeneity in the effects of firm specific factors across different firm groups.7
Further comparisons show that the coefficients on tangible and intangible assets dif-
fer significantly between innovative and non-innovative firms, except when total li-
abilities is used as the measure of leverage. This exception is due to the inclusion
of non-financial factors in total liabilities and is consistent with Rajan and Zingales
(1995) who argue that measuring leverage using total liabilities is misleading as it
includes non-financing factors that are mostly for transactional purposes. Tangible
assets have a significant positive effect on leverage, and this effect is significantly
higher for innovative firms, which face binding financial constraints. This result is
consistent with theoretical predictions by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Leland and
Pyle (1977) and Leland (1998) that collateral facilitates access to debt financing as it
reduces information asymmetry. Similarly, the positive effect of intangible assets on
leverage is consistently higher for innovative firms which have a larger proportion of
non-physical assets. This result highlights the growing importance of the overlooked
intangible assets on corporate balance sheets. The differences in the coefficients of
the control variables between innovative and non-innovative firms are insignificant,
except for size when examining net-debt. Net-debt increases significantly with size
for non-innovative firms, but is negative and insignificant for innovative firms. This
result suggests that large innovative firms with better access to capital markets pre-
fer equity to debt as is consistent with the proposition that firms which invest in
innovation seek to preserve flexibility (see, Buera and Kaboski, 2012; O’Brien, 2003).
7Barclay et al. (2006) argues that there is no reason to expect the same results from studies that
use different definitions of leverage (market leverage and book leverage).
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The analysis of Chapter 4 then investigates time variations in the effects of R&D,
capital expenditure, tangible assets and intangible assets on leverage (total debt,
net-debt, long-term debt, total liabilities). The analysis uses five non-overlapping
sub-periods to investigate the changes in the sensitivity of leverage to investments
(R&D and capital expenditure) and corporate assets (tangible/intangible assets). The
results show that the relationships between leverage and R&D, and leverage and
capital expenditure change over time in a way that explain the mixed results in
the literature, where some studies (e.g., Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2005; Rashid and
Caglayan, 2012) report a positive relationship, while others (e.g., Aivazian et al.,
2005; Dang, 2011; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Lang et al., 1996) report a negative
relationship. Similarly, there are also significant time variations in the relationships
between leverage and tangible assets, and leverage and intangible assets. The re-
sults show that intangible assets and intangible assets have a significantly positive
effect on leverage (total debt, net-debt and long-term debt) and this effect is higher
for innovative firms than non-innovative firms. This implies that collateral enables
access to debt financing by reducing information asymmetry risks (see, Berger et al.,
2005). The role of collateral in reducing information asymmetry risks over time is
consistently and significantly higher for innovative firms that face binding finan-
cial constraints than non-innovative firms. The results from the analysis in Chapter
6 also show that the positive effect of tangible assets decreases over time for non-
innovative firms, while it increases for innovative firms. This result is consistent
with Falato et al. (2013) and show that an increasing proportion of debt financing
is being secured by (used to finance) intangible assets. Similar changes and differ-
ences are also observable on intangibles assets. These changes show significant time
variation and heterogeneity, across innovative and innovative firms, in the role of in-
vestments and corporate assets on leverage.
Overall, the analyses presented in Chapter 4 show that on aggregate, innovative and
non-innovative firms adopt similar financing structures, but a de-compositional anal-
ysis shows significant differences in the effects of investments and corporate assets on
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leverage. The similar financing structures and persistence in leverage suggest that
innovative firms are able to access debt financing. At policy level, there is a growing
need for improving financing of innovation, especially that innovative investments
are a major driver of economic growth.
The next section presents a summary of the main results of the empirical analysis of
Chapter 5, which examines the differences in leverage adjustments between innova-
tive and non-innovative firms.
7.2.2 Leverage adjustments: The case of innovative versus non-
innovative firms
The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 investigates target financing behaviour and the
differences in leverage adjustments between innovative and non-innovative firms.
The analysis also examines asymmetry and time variation in target financing be-
haviour, which have been overlooked in prior studies.8 The speed of adjustment is
estimated using a two-step procedure in which the target leverage is estimated first
based on firm specific factors and then used in a second stage to estimate the speed
of adjustment.9 This two-step procedure is preferred to the one-step procedure as it
allows one to directly examine asymmetries in target financing behaviour.10
The focus on target financing behaviour and the differences in leverage adjustments
between innovative and non-innovative firms is motivated by the mixed results in the
literature on target financing behaviour and the limited studies on the effects of in-
vestments on corporate decisions. Prior studies on target financing behaviour report
decidedly mixed results, even within the US market where studies are concentrated.
8A few studies investigate asymmetries in target financing behaviour (see, Dang et al., 2014a;
Elsas and Florysiak, 2011; Lockhart, 2014; Warr et al., 2012). However, these studies focus on the US
and do not examine asymmetry arising from differences in corporate investments.
9The target leverage in the first stage is estimated using system GMM and then, the speed of
adjustment in the second stage is consistently estimated using OLS with fixed effects. Elsas et al.
(2013), Faulkender et al. (2012) and Warr et al. (2012) highlight that once the target leverage has been
estimated using system GMM, empirical models in the second stage can be consistently estimated
using OLS.
10The one-step procedure involves estimating the speed of adjustment jointly with the coefficients
of the determinants of capital structure.
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For example, Dang et al. (2014a) (31% - 33%), Flannery and Rangan (2006) (34% -
36%), Huang and Ritter (2009) (17% - 23%), Lemmon et al. (2008) (25%) and Lockhart
(2014) (50% - 77%) report moderate to high speeds of adjustment, while Fama and
French (2002) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) report that US firms adjust leverage
at a relatively slow rate of 7% - 18% and 8.3% - 10%, respectively. Similarly, Chang
and Dasgupta (2009), Chen and Zhao (2007), Iliev and Welch (2010) and Welch (2004)
report limited or no adjustments. This casts doubts on the predictions of the trade-off
theory that firms have a target capital structure and that they actively re-balance
their capital structure towards the target.11
Furthermore, existing studies mostly focus on fixed capital investments despite the
marked increases in innovative investments. Recent studies have also emphasised
the importance of investigating the effects of changes in firm composition on corpo-
rate decisions such as cash holdings and capital structure (see, Buera and Kaboski,
2012; Krainer, 2014).12 There are several reasons why innovative and non-innovative
firms may adjust leverage at different speeds. First, the high uncertainty and infor-
mation asymmetry associated with innovation subjects innovative firms to binding
financing constraints which reduce flexibility in adjusting towards a target leverage.
These constraints arise due to the high information asymmetry, asset substitution
problems, poor collateral values, and long investment horizons associated with in-
novative investments. Such constraints manifest in the form of limited access to
capital markets, high cost of capital, and restrictive debt covenants. The restrictive
covenants that are aimed at protecting creditors tend to reduce the ability to ad-
just leverage and limits strategic flexibility.13 Second, the high operating risks and
bankruptcy costs associated with innovation may prompt managers to actively adjust
leverage to manage risk or reduce bankruptcy costs.14 These opposing predictions on
11Huang and Ritter (2009) also highlight that questions on whether firms engage in target financ-
ing behaviour and the rate at which they adjust towards the target capital structure are amongst the
most important issues in the literature.
12Krainer (2014) highlights the need to re-look at the important linkages between finance and real
decisions in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis where leverage was one of the main
causes of the crisis.
13According to O’Brien (2003), strategic flexibility is crucial for survival in competitive markets for
innovation.
14The model of Krainer (2014) posits that managers use capital structure to keep operating risks
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how innovation affects leverage adjustments and the mixed results in the literature
on target financing behaviour motivate this research.
The empirical analysis of Chapter 5 starts by estimating the target leverage based on
lagged leverage, R&D, capital expenditure, tangible assets, intangible assets, growth,
size, profit, non-debt tax shield, and volatility. The significant coefficients on lagged
leverage suggest that firms have a target leverage as predicted by the trade-off the-
ory. The implied speed of adjustment, (1−λ), for all firms, non-innovative and inno-
vative firms is 24.2%, 17.7% and 32.4%, respectively. This relatively slow to moder-
ate implied speed of adjustment is consistent with the existence of adjustment costs
and with prior studies. Comparisons of the implied speed of adjustment show that
innovative firms are more active in re-balancing leverage towards the target than
non-innovative firms. The results on the effects of investment show that capital ex-
penditure has a positive effect on leverage, while R&D has a negative effect. The
difference of the effect of capital expenditure on leverage between innovative and
non-innovative firms is marginally significant. Further results show that intangible
assets and tangible assets have a positive effect on leverage and their effect on lever-
age significantly differs between innovative and non-innovative firms. This implies
that intangible assets play a similar role as tangible assets in supporting access to
debt financing. The positive effect of intangible assets and tangible assets is signifi-
cantly higher for innovative firms than for non-innovative firms. These preliminary
differences show that investment and corporate assets have an important effect on
the variations in target financing behaviour. The results on the effects of the control
variables (growth, size, profit, NDTS and volatility) on leverage show that they do
not significantly differ between innovative and non-innovative firms, but are mainly
consistent with theoretical predictions and with prior studies.
Following the estimation of the target leverage in the first stage, the next step in-
volves estimating the speed of adjustment. Using the two-step approach allows for
an examination of asymmetry in target financing behaviour. The estimated average
within levels that are consistent with the risk aversion of shareholders.
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speed of adjustment of 34.9%, assuming homogeneous target financing behaviour,
is slow to moderate and is consistent with the existence of adjustment costs. Fur-
ther analyses that allow for asymmetry in leverage adjustment between innovative
and non-innovative firms show significant differences, with innovative firms exhibit-
ing a significantly higher speed of adjustment than non-innovative firms. This re-
sult is consistent with the hypothesis that firms that face high operating risks and
bankruptcy costs more actively re-balance capital structure as the costs of deviat-
ing from the target are substantially higher. Non-innovative firms take almost twice
(28.3% which implies 2.08 years) the time taken by innovative firms (44.8% which
implies 1.17 years) to adjust towards the target.15 This difference in the speed of
adjustment shows that investment type explains some of the observed variations in
target financing behaviour even after controlling for other standard determinants of
capital structure.16
Further analyses of leverage adjustments assuming asymmetry conditional on the
initial deviation from the target show that the speed of adjustment is relatively
higher for firms that are above-target leverage (44.2% or 1.19 years) than for firms
that are below-target leverage (27.8% or 2.13 years). This significant difference be-
tween above-target and below-target leverage firms is consistent with the proposition
that the costs and benefits of adjustment vary with the initial deviation from tar-
get.17 The results in Chapter 5 further show that asymmetry in leverage adjustments
is more apparent when investment type is examined (innovative firms versus non-
innovative firms). The speed of adjustment of innovative firms that are above-target
leverage (51.9%) is one-and-half times faster than that of non-innovative firms that
are above-target leverage (34.9%). Similar differences are also observable for firms
that are below-target leverage, with innovative firms exhibiting a speed of adjust-
ment of 37.5% relative to 24.1% for non-innovative firms. The relatively high speed
15The half-life convention implies that the time take to adjust towards the target is computed as
ln(0.5)/ln(1−λ), where λ is the estimated speed of adjustment.
16This result is qualitatively similar to that obtained using the one-step approach that involves the
joint estimation of the target leverage and the implied speed of adjustment.
17Byoun (2008), Faulkender et al. (2012) and Warr et al. (2012) report similar asymmetries based
on whether the firm is above or below the target leverage.
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of adjustment of innovative firms is consistent with the proposition that firms that
face high financial distress costs benefit more from re-balancing capital structure.18
The main contribution to the literature from these results is to show that firms that
invest in innovation adjust capital structure more actively than non-innovative firms
which face comparatively lower operating risks and financial distress costs. This im-
plies that the costs and benefits of adjusting leverage are asymmetric conditional on
investment type.
The analysis of Chapter 5 also investigates the effects of financing deficits on lever-
age adjustments. Assuming symmetric leverage adjustments, the results show that
a financing deficit reduces the speed of adjustment for non-innovative firms by 10%,
while it increases the speed of adjustment of innovative firms by 13.7% (from 35.9%
to 49.6%). A further examination of asymmetry in target financing behaviour be-
tween firms that are above-target leverage and firms that are below-target leverage
shows that the speed of adjustment increases with a financing deficit for firms that
are above-target leverage, while it decreases for firms that are below-target lever-
age. This result shows that innovative firms are more likely to take the opportunity
presented by the financing imbalances to adjust leverage than non-innovative firms.
The increase in the speed of adjustment for innovative firms with a financing deficit
is consistent with Byoun (2008) and Dang et al. (2014a) (in the US) who report that
financing imbalances offer the opportunity to adjust leverage at comparatively lower
costs. The results from the analysis in this chapter further show that much of the
leverage adjustments in response to the need to cover financing imbalances is done
by innovative firms that face binding financial constraints and higher costs of deviat-
ing from the target capital structure. Financing imbalances allows innovative firms
to reduce the costs of adjusting leverage as these are spread over the need to adjust
leverage and also cover the financing imbalance.
Time variation in leverage adjustments has not been analysed in depth in the lit-
18Krainer (2014) develops a model which shows that capital structure is used to keep operating
risk within the thresholds that are commensurate with the risk appetite of the shareholders.
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erature. Yet, several theoretical studies show that corporate decisions vary over
time (see, Bhamra et al., 2010; Chen, 2010; Levy and Hennessy, 2007). Using 5-
year rolling regressions, the analysis in Chapter 5 also investigates time variation in
leverage adjustment. The time series plots of the deviation from the target leverage
show that large positive shocks coincide with major macroeconomic events, while pe-
riods after major macroeconomic events are characterised by large negative shocks.
The negative shocks suggest that firms reduce leverage as is consistent with the de-
leveraging propositions in the aftermath of macroeconomic shocks. An examination
of the speed of adjustment over time shows that there are significant time-variations
and asymmetries in target financing behaviour. The time series plots of the speed
of adjustment show that, on aggregate, firms adjust leverage at a slow to moderate
speed, which is consistent with the existence of adjustment costs. Further, empir-
ical evidence is provided that innovative firms consistently adjust faster than non-
innovative firms over time. This result implies that innovative firms are more ac-
tive in re-balancing leverage, which is consistent with the predictions of the model of
Krainer (2014) that managers use capital structure to manage risk. Further, the time
series plots show that the average speed of adjustment of all firms fluctuates around
30%, while that for innovative firms exhibits significantly more variation over time
than that of non-innovative firms.19 This is clear evidence that much of the leverage
adjustments are done by innovative firms that face higher costs of deviating from
the target. The time variation in leverage adjustment also suggests that the mixed
results in the literature could be due to the failure to account for the changes in the
speed of adjustment over time or heterogeneity in target financing behaviour condi-
tional on the forms of corporate investment.
The significant differences in the speed of adjustment between innovative and non-
innovative firms make a strong argument that asymmetries, changes in firm compo-
sition, and time-variations are important in understanding the observed heterogene-
19The relative stability of the speed of adjustment for all firms over time is inconsistent with the
prediction that efficiency is improving in financial markets (Philippon, 2015) and the importance of
target financing behaviour (Huang and Ritter, 2009). Rather improvements in information technol-
ogy should result in an increase in the speed of adjustment as result of the decrease in information
asymmetry and costs of issuing or retiring securities.
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ity in target financing behaviour. The results also suggest that firms that invest in
innovation are more active in re-balancing leverage as capital structure is used to
manage risks. This higher speed of adjustment for innovative firms implies that the
costs of deviating from target increase with investments in innovation.
The next section presents a summary of the main results of the empirical analysis
of Chapter 6, which examines the determinants of trade credit and the differences in
trade credit between innovative and non-innovative firms.
7.2.3 Trade credit: The case of innovative versus non-innovat-
ive firms
The empirical analysis of Chapter 6 investigates the determinants of trade credit,
trade credit adjustments, and differences in trade credit policies between innova-
tive and non-innovative firms. The analyses in Chapter 6 are motivated by the few
studies on trade credit despite its importance as a source of short-term financing,
particularly during periods characterised by contractions in bank lending.20 Over
the sample period 1987 to 2013, accounts payable (accounts receivable) accounted
for 13.4% (22.8%) of total assets. Despite this importance of trade credit in capital
structure, little is known about the causes of the observed heterogeneity in trade
credit policies, and how trade credit relates to other sources of firm financing. The
few studies that examine the relationship between trade credit and short-term debt
report mixed results and are more concentrated in the US. The analysis in Chapter 6
builds on these prior studies and examines time series and cross-sectional variations
in the relationship between trade credit, and other forms of financing (which also in-
clude cash holdings) in the UK, where studies are rather limited.
20Several studies highlight the importance of trade credit as a form of short-term financing. For
example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) report that in 1991 trade credit represented 17.8% of firm assets in
the US, 22% in UK, and over 25% in other countries. Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001)
report that trade credit accounts for 25% firms' total assets in countries such as France, Germany, and
Italy, and Aktas et al. (2012) report that trade credit is on average between 10% and 15% of total
assets in the US. Petersen and Rajan (1997) also report that trade credit is 17% of current assets in
the US, while Wu et al. (2012) report ranges from 11% and 15% of total assets for firms in China.
For prior studies on the importance of trade credit as a source of short-term finance, see Aktas et al.
(2012), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), Petersen and Rajan (1997), Rajan and Zingales (1995)
and Wu et al. (2012).
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The focus on differences between innovative and non-innovative firms is motivated
by the increase in innovative investments (the rise in R&D and intangible assets),
with innovative firms increasing over the sample period.21 The role of trade credit
in firm financing is likely to differ across innovative and non-innovative firms as the
former are subject to binding financial constraints that limit access to other forms of
financing (see, Borisova and Brown, 2013; Brown et al., 2012). Innovative firms may
in-turn advance more credit to their customers as a form of guarantee on product
quality.22 This results in two empirically testable propositions on the variations in
the use of trade credit. First, as innovative firms are more likely to be credit con-
strained, they may resort to other forms of financing such as trade credit.23 Second,
the presence of credit constraints and the high costs of using trade credit may also
discourage the use of trade credit as a form of short-term finance (e.g., Lin and Chou,
2015; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995). Further, the short-term nature of trade credit
tends to reduce flexibility, which is critical for survival in competitive markets for in-
novation (O’Brien, 2003). The specialised nature of innovative products may also
necessitates the provision of trade credit to customers since trade credit is a form
of warranty on product quality (see, Wilner, 2000).24 The implication of the second
proposition is that established and reputable suppliers need not provide trade credit
because their reputation dispenses with the need to provide a product warranty (see,
Long et al., 1993). Similarly, firms producing standardise products should give less
trade credit (see, Guariglia and Mateut, 2013; Giannetti et al., 2011). These opposing
predictions and mixed results on trade credit highlight the need for further research,
21Borisova and Brown (2013) and Brown and Petersen (2011) also report that R&D now exceeds
capital expenditure in the US.
22Long et al. (1993) posits that firms use trade credit as a warranty on product quality which
implies that large and more reputable firms provide less trade credit.
23A model of Wilner (2000) posits that financially constrained firms may agree to pay higher implied
rates in trade credit contracts as they anticipate larger renegotiation concessions from long-term or
more dependent suppliers in case of bankruptcy. Consistent with this proposition, Evans (1998) and
Wilner (2000) report that suppliers tend to grant more concessions in case of financial distress than
would be granted by lenders in competitive credit markets. Similarly, Petersen and Rajan (1994)
and Wilner (1997) report that financially constrained firms are more reliant on trade credit than
unconstrained firms.
24According to Antràs and Foley (2011), Lee and Stowe (1993) and Long et al. (1993), trade credit
acts as a form of guarantee on product quality as it allows the customer to try the product before
making a payment.
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with a particular emphasis on the cross-sectional and time series variations between
innovative and non-innovative firms.
Further, Chapter 6 examines the time variations on the relationship between trade
credit and short-term debt and between trade credit and cash holdings. The focus
on time variations in the sensitivity of trade credit to other forms of short-term fi-
nance is motivated by the considerable debate on whether trade credit is a substitute
or a complement to other forms of financing (see, Ferrando and Mulier, 2013; Gian-
netti et al., 2011; Love et al., 2007; Yang, 2011b). For example, Yang (2011b) reports
that the relationship between bank credit and trade credit varies with monetary pol-
icy. Similarly, Meltzer (1960) reports that the relationship between trade credit and
other forms of short-term finance changes with the monetary cycle.25 The analysis
presented in Chapter 6 also examines trade credit adjustments as extant studies have
largely overlooked the dynamic nature of the decision to give or take trade credit.26
Trade credit is thought to be influenced by current or future credit policy, competi-
tors, and market conditions. Also, customers who are used to getting credit usually
expect to continue getting goods or services on credit. This suggests that firms have
a target trade credit level, which should be more important for innovative firms than
non-innovative firms if the former face binding financial constraints and use trade
credit to alleviate information asymmetry in the product market.
The results in Chapter 6 show a secular decrease in trade credit, with accounts
payable (accounts receivable) decreasing from a peak of 17.4% (26.8%) in 1996 to
a low of 9.4% (14.5%) in 2009. Despite this marked decrease, public firms in the
UK have remained net suppliers of trade credit by extending more trade credit than
they receive. Comparisons suggest that the decrease in accounts receivable is rela-
tively more pronounced for non-innovative firms from 2006 to 2011, with these firms
advancing less credit during the global financial crisis. This is consistent with propo-
25Also, Meltzer (1960) and Yang (2011b) report that periods marked by tight or loose monetary
policy change the relationship between trade credit and short-term debt.
26Prior studies adopt a non-dynamic approach to analyse trade credit, see Dass et al. (2014), Garcia-
Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013), Lin and Chou (2015), Love et al. (2007), Klapper et al. (2012),
Mizen (2008), and Wu et al. (2012); Yang (2011a).
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sition that firms with less specialised products extend less trade credit (see, Long
et al., 1993). On average, non-innovative firms use more, or give less, trade credit
than innovative firms. The trends on trade credit, however, are inconsistent with the
proposition that firms with greater access to capital markets (non-innovative firms
in this case) use this advantage to benefit their customers by giving them more trade
credit. Rather, the data shows that supposedly constrained firms (innovative firms)
give relatively more trade credit. This is consistent with the proposition that firms
with specialised products give more trade credit as a form of warranty for product
quality. Firms with better access to capital markets use this advantage to benefit
their customers by providing more trade credit. The provision of trade credit helps
alleviates information asymmetry in the financial markets as it is used by banks as
a credible signal of good credit and in the product market as it gives customers the
opportunity to try the product before making a payment.
The results show that accounts payable is significantly negatively related to other
short-term liabilities, cash, tangible assets, intangible assets, size, profit, and volatil-
ity, while it is significantly positively related to asset turnover. The highly significant
negative effect of other short-term liabilities on accounts payable is consistent with
the proposition that firms that have access to other short-term financing sources rely
less on trade credit (see, Meltzer, 1960). The likely reasons are that trade credit
tends to restrict flexibility and is often difficult to roll-over, especially during periods
characterised by contractions in credit supply.27 Cash has a negative effect on trade
credit, on average, which shows that firms use excess cash to reduce the relatively
expensive trade credit (accounts payable) and have to reduce trade credit extended
(accounts receivable) in-order to build up cash reserves. Comparisons between inno-
vative and non-innovative firms show that cash has an asymmetric effect on trade
credit. Cash has a significant negative effect on accounts payable and accounts re-
ceivable of innovative firms, while it has an insignificant positive effect on accounts
27Similarly, O’Brien (2003) reports that short-term debt tend to restrict flexibility, which is critical
in highly competitive and innovative product markets. Also, Diamond (1991) and Hart and Moore
(1994) present models which show that firms match the maturity of assets and liabilities, which im-
plies that innovative firms with investments that have long horizon will use less short-term financing
sources.
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payable and a marginally significant negative effect on accounts receivable of non-
innovative firms.28 The differences on the effect of other short-term liabilities and
cash on trade credit imply that other-short term liabilities and cash play different
roles in firm financing decisions for innovative and non-innovative firms.
An examination of the sensitivity of trade credit to cash and other short-term li-
abilities reveals significant variations over time and between innovative and non-
innovative firms. Other short-term liabilities have a consistent substitution effect
on trade credit (accounts payable), with this substitution effect being significantly
higher for non-innovative firms that face less binding financial constraints. This
high substitution effect for innovative firms is consistent with studies that show that
the implied interest costs on most trade credit contracts is much higher than other
sources of short-term financing (see, Lin and Chou, 2015; Ng et al., 1999; Wilner,
2000). There are also similar differences on the effect of cash on trade credit, with
cash being largely a compliment to trade credit (accounts payable) for non-innovative
firms, while it is a substitute to trade credit (accounts payable) for innovative firms.
This result suggests that non-innovative firms do not use the excess cash to reduce
the relatively expensive financing from trade credit. Further comparisons on the
the sensitivity of accounts receivable (trade credit extended) to other short-term li-
abilities and cash show similar, and significant differences between innovative and
non-innovative firms. Short term liabilities act mainly as a compliment to trade
credit extended (accounts receivable), but change to being a substitute during the pe-
riods 2001-2005, 2006-2010 and 2011-2013 for non-innovative firms. There are sim-
ilar differences when comparing of the sensitivity of trade credit extended (accounts
receivable) to cash, with the relationship between cash and trade credit extended
being mostly negative, but is rather less significant and changes to positive for non-
innovative firms over the period 2011-2013. These difference show the importance
of studying the dynamic nature of the relationship between trade credit and other
short-term sources of financing (short-term debt and cash), and the heterogeneity in
28The positive relationship between cash and trade credit for non-innovative firms is consistent
with Love et al. (2007) who report that firms in emerging markets do not reduce reliance on the
relatively expensive credit from suppliers even though they have better liquidity positions.
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trade credit arising from differences in corporate investments (innovative firms ver-
sus non-innovative firms).
Finally, the results show that, on average, firms adjust trade credit towards the tar-
get at a slow to moderate speed of 20.1% for accounts payable and 17.4% for accounts
receivable. This slow speed is consistent with the existence of adjustment costs. Ad-
justment costs tend to impede firms from fully adjusting towards the target trade
credit level as they seek to maximise firm value. Comparisons of the speed of ad-
justment between non-innovative and innovative firms show that innovative firms
consistently adjust trade credit faster than non-innovative firms. Innovative firms
adjust accounts payable (accounts receivable) at a speed of 23.7% (22.3%), while non-
innovative firms adjust at a speed of 16.2% (12.9%). The differences in the speed of
adjustment are highly significant for accounts payable (7.5%) and marginally signif-
icant for accounts receivable (9.4%). This implies that the costs of deviating from
target, or the benefits of adjusting towards the target, are relatively higher for in-
novative firms than non-innovative firms as innovative firms face binding financial
constraints or high costs of bankruptcy. The existence of these high financial distress
costs motivates managers to more actively adjust their financing policies, which in-
clude trade credit. These differences show the importance of recognising heterogene-
ity in trade credit conditional on investment types, as innovative firms benefit more
from adjusting trade credit towards the target than non-innovative firms.
Overall, the results in Chapter 6 show that innovative (non-innovative) firms give
more (less) trade credit to their customers and take less (more) goods on trade credit
from their suppliers. The results also show that the effect of cash on trade credit is
asymmetric as cash holdings and accounts payable have a complimentary relation-
ship for non-innovative firms, whereas they are substitutes for innovative firms. This
suggests that innovative firms tend to substitute trade credit with short-term debt
as trade credit is a relatively more expensive form of short-term financing. Further,
innovative firms rely less on trade credit as it also reduces flexibility given that it is
often difficult to roll over. Evidence is also presented of significant time variations in
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the relationship between trade credit and short-term debt, and between trade credit
and cash holdings, and significant variation in trade credit across investment type.
The results reveal that firms in the UK have a target trade credit level and that they
adjust towards the target at a slow to moderate speed due to adjustment costs. The
higher speed of adjustment for innovative firms relative to non-innovative firms also
show that innovative firms more actively re-balance trade credit towards the target
so as to minimise the costs of deviating from target or maximise firm value. The dif-
ferences suggest that innovative and non-innovative firms adopt heterogeneous trade
credit policies.
The next section presents the limitations and suggestions for future research arising
from the analyses in this thesis.
7.3 Limitations and future research
While this thesis investigates the differences in financing decisions of listed inno-
vative and non-innovative firms, it would be interesting to examine whether invest-
ment type causes heterogeneity in corporate decisions of firms in the private sector.
Extending the analyses in this thesis to the private sector can add further insights
as innovations are made mostly by private firms. Little is known about corporate
decisions of private firms, which are more credit constrained by nature (no access
to public markets). Only a few studies examine corporate decisions of private firms
(e.g., Brav, 2009; Frank and Goyal, 2008; Goyal et al., 2011). However, these studies
do not examine how investment type (innovative firms versus non-innovative firms)
causes cross-sectional variations in corporate decisions, and are more concentrated
in the US which limits the generalisation of the results to other economies. It would
also be interesting to compare the differences on the effect of changes in corporate
investments (the increase in R&D and decrease in physical capital expenditure) on
corporate decisions of public and private firms. Moreover, an analysis of cross-country
variations might reveal important insights, especially that innovation is now a ma-
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jor driver of economic growth in many economies.29 Further, differences in access to
capital markets can inform on public policy aimed at promoting innovation.
While the focus on the UK enables an in-depth analysis of corporate decisions in the
UK economy, there is a need to extend the study to other economies.30 Investigating
other countries with different macroeconomic conditions, and legal and institutional
frameworks would be fruitful. This would contribute to extant studies that show
that corporate decisions are influenced by macroeconomic conditions, and legal and
institutional frameworks (e.g., Cook and Tang, 2010; Jõeveer, 2012; Korajczyk and
Levy, 2003; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). Such an analysis, therefore, would be
informative, particularly on how macroeconomic factors jointly influence the interde-
pendence of corporate financing and investment decisions. Antoniou et al. (2008) and
Oztekin and Flannery (2012) report that differences in the legal and institutional en-
vironments between the US and the UK explain some of the cross-country variations
in capital structure. Further, there are limited studies on the effects of sharehold-
ing structure on financing and investment decisions, particularly in economies other
than that of the US. Yet, shareholder structure affects most corporate decisions in
general, and in under-developed markets in particular (e.g., Huang and Song, 2006;
Marchica, 2005; Vincent and Michaely, 2012). A study that investigates the relation-
ship between shareholding structure (which can include government shareholding
and shareholder dispersion) and innovation, can add important insights on the inter-
dependence of corporate decision as the economies transit towards technological and
service-based sectors.
The interdependence of corporate decisions has not been comprehensively investi-
gated, with extant work adopting a ceteris paribus approach in which one decision
29Although the link between innovation and economic growth is well established (see, Akcigit and
Kerr, 2015; Atanassov et al., 2007; Levine, 2005; Michalopoulos et al., 2009; Stulz, 2000), the channels
through which innovation relates to financing decisions is rather unclear (see, Stein, 2003).
30Only US company accounts are available on a consistent quarterly and annual intervals, which
restricts the study of corporate decisions in other countries. Data on other countries is only available
annually with gaps due to missing observations. This limits the sample size and the length of the
studies.
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is fixed while another is examined.31 Although this approach is parsimonious, it
overlooks the simultaneous and inter-temporal nature of corporate decisions. To my
knowledge, Gatchev et al. (2010) is the only empirical study that investigates the
inter-temporal nature of corporate decisions. Several corporate decisions are interde-
pendent as they involve a joint determination of many aspects of corporate strategy,
and often compete for the same limited resources. Although there is consensus that fi-
nancing decisions are interdependent in the presence of market imperfections which
is contrary to the propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1958), Chava and Roberts
(2008) and Stein (2003) highlight that the channels through which they relate are
unclear. It would be interesting to investigate how investment type (R&D, human
capital, working capital, capital expenditure) affect other corporate decisions in a dy-
namic framework that incorporates the simultaneous and inter-temporal nature of
corporate decisions.
The asymmetry in corporate decisions is a promising area for future research as it
addresses several limitations in prior studies that assume homogeneous target fi-
nancing behaviour. The analyses in this thesis highlight significant asymmetries
in corporate decisions arising from differences in corporate investment. A possible
extension would involve looking at the extent to which other factors (e.g., large in-
vestments, human capital, cost of capital, and shareholding structure) are involved
in the causing heterogeneity in target financing behaviour. A review of the literature
by Graham and Leary (2011) highlights the need to expend more effort in identifying
potential, or new, factors that could explain observed variations in capital structure.
Heterogeneity in corporate investments affect other corporate decisions, and may
explain, at least partially, the observed variations in financing and liquidity manage-
ment policies. Similarly, Krainer (2014) develops a model showing important inter-
dependence between real and financing decisions. However, there are limited studies
that examine the channels through which corporate decisions relate (see, Dang, 2011;
Chava and Purnanandam, 2011; Stein, 2003). As the results show significant time
31Recently, Dang (2011) highlights the need to consider the dynamic nature of the interdependence
of corporate decisions.
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variations in the relationship between financing and investment variables, there is a
need to examine the causes, and how these relate to changes in firm composition and
macroeconomic conditions.
There is a growing interest in gaining a clearer understanding of the determinants of
capital structure through de-compositional analyses (see, Bevan and Danbolt, 2002;
Hertzel and Li, 2010; McNichols et al., 2010; Rauh and Sufi, 2010). Similarly, Gra-
ham and Leary (2011) and Titman and Wessels (1988) also highlight that studies
on capital structure are fraught with imperfectly measured variables. They high-
light that the ceteris paribus approach of focusing only on one factor at a time, and
which is adopted by extant studies, tends to overstate the importance of that factor
as it is an imperfect proxy of the true variable, and ignores the interdependent na-
ture of corporate decisions. Several studies report improvements in model fit from
de-composing the determinants of capital structure (see, inter alia, Bevan and Dan-
bolt, 2002; Campello and Giambona, 2013; Chang et al., 2014; Erickson and Whited,
2012; Liu, 2009; McNichols et al., 2010, 2014; Rauh and Sufi, 2010). According to
Graham and Leary (2011), there is also a need examine the off-setting effects of the
dis-aggregated variables on capital structure. This study contributes in this regard
by showing that investment type is one source of the observed heterogeneity in fi-
nancing and trade credit policies.
Although trade credit has remained an important source of short-term financing, it
has been under studied, partly due to lack of information, as Petersen and Rajan
(1997) highlight. There is a need to better understand the determinants of trade
credit and why firms adopt heterogeneous trade credit policies. While this thesis is
focused on trade credit policies of listed firms, an extension of the analyses to examine
other aspects of cross-sectional variations, such as legal, institutional, and macroe-
conomic conditions, might be useful. Further, trade credit policies of private firms,
which constitute the majority of firms in most economies, have not been examined.
The focus on trade credit policies of private firms would add new insights on how
access to capital markets affects these policies. A study that matches the supplier
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of trade credit with the users, encompassing both public and private firms, can show
how firms with better access to financing use their comparative advantage to benefit
customers. There is also a need to understand and quantify the costs of trade credit
and how innovation in financial markets is affecting trade credit policies. Along sim-
ilar lines, Philippon (2015) surprisingly shows that the costs of financial interme-
diation have not decreased in response to improvements in information technology.
The analyses in this thesis can be extended to examine the variations in the costs
of trade credit, which are considerably higher than those of public debt as shown in
prior studies (e.g., Lin and Chou, 2015; Ng et al., 1999; Wilner, 2000). Variations in
the costs of providing loans or credit reveal important information on how technolog-
ical advancements affect financing or capital markets. The results can also inform on
public policy related to improvements in efficiency and changes in access to capital
markets.
Overall, the results in this thesis highlight the need to examine heterogeneity and
time variation in corporate decisions. Focusing on these two important aspects has
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